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Boilerplate and the Impact of
Disclosure in Securities Dealmaking
Jeremy McClane*
Capital markets dealmaking, like many kinds of business
transactions, is built on a foundation of copied and recycled languagewhat many call boilerplate. Regulators and the bar periodicallycall for
less reliance on boilerplate, but despite these pressures, boilerplate
remains a fixture of ever-growing securities disclosures. This Article
explores why boilerplatepersists and how it affects investors, showing
that boilerplate may have a more complex role than commonly
recognized. This Article does so by developing a theory on the effect of
boilerplate in securities disclosure-a context that is little studied
despite a wealth of literature on boilerplate in other settings--and
analyzes disclosure empiricallyusing languageprocessingtechniques on
a dataset of initial public offering disclosure spanning twenty years,
from 1996 to 2015. The data shows that in the aggregate, the use of
boilerplate is associated with some efficiency gains. For example, 10%
more boilerplate in IPO disclosure is associated with a savings of
$65,000 in legal fees, on average, controllingfor other relevant factors.
But the measurable gains are generally outweighed by boilerplate's
information-relatedcosts: greater use of boilerplate is associated with
several indicia of information asymmetry that see issuingfirms give up
as much as $5 to $6 million in the market on averagefor each additional
10% of their disclosure that consists of rote recitations. Greater use of
generic boilerplate language is also related to greater incidence of
securities litigation and is associated with lower readability of already
complex registrationstatements. The evidence points to the conclusion
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that, whether through its content or its signaling effect, boilerplate
disclosure in the aggregate represents greater costs for IPO issuers and
does little to advance the goal of better informing the investing public.
In addition to discussing implications for law and policy, this
Article addresses a puzzle raised by the data: Why do securities issuers
continue to use boilerplate when it has the potential to lose them money,
draw litigation,and buck regulatorypressure?Theory developed in legal
scholarship provides a number of possible answers. The explanation
most consistent with these findings is that boilerplate serves as a
substitutefor informationproduction, meaning that issuers can obscure
sensitive information or shortcut due diligence if they are willing to pay
the price for doing so.
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INTRODUCTION

Lawyers entering corporate securities practice are sometimes
surprised to discover that, of all the things they have learned through
years of education and legal training, the skill they employ most is the
ability to cut and paste. This may have caused some to wonder how
much value this seemingly commodified work adds for clients and
whether the lawyers' specialized skills are being put to their best use.
This Article begins to answer those questions by providing a theoretical
and empirical analysis of boilerplate in securities disclosure.
The theory and evidence point to answers that are more nuanced
than intuition would suggest. As this Article shows, there is evidence
that incorporating boilerplate into securities disclosure does add some
value by reducing transaction costs. But there is also evidence that, in
the aggregate, using boilerplate comes with its own costs that are often
greater than scholars have previously recognized. Nonetheless, the
analysis suggests that some types of boilerplate language may enhance
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communication by its presence or signaling effect, at least with respect
to sophisticated investors.
Although legal scholars have written dozens of articles about
boilerplate in contracts,' as well as in corporate and sovereign bondS 2
(which in many ways function like contracts), to date there has been
little attention given to boilerplate in securities disclosure. 3 This is a
significant omission because
securities disclosure
drives the
multitrillion-dollar securities market in the United States, 4 and
boilerplate in that market plays an important but distinct role than the
role it plays in contracts or bond covenants. Whereas contract terms
and bond covenants generally serve to define the rights and duties of
different parties involved in the course of a transaction, securities
disclosure is a legally mandated mechanism for providing information
about companies raising capital-an objective that reduces information
asymmetries and facilitates the creation of reliable securities markets.
In the former context, boilerplate may provide an efficient stand-in for
terms that have been negotiated countless times in the past. In the
securities
context, boilerplate
represents essentially identical

1.

See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The BoilerplatePuzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 933, 949-50 (2006)

(discussing the application of contract law to boilerplate in commercial transactions); Omri BenShahar, Regulation Through Boilerplate: An Apologia, 112 MICH. L. REV. 883, 895-96 (2014)
(reviewing BOILERPLATE: MARGARET JANE RADIN, THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE

RULE OF LAW (2013)) (arguing that consumers benefit from boilerplate terms through better price
or quality and providing examples of such tradeoffs); Margaret Jane Radin, Response: Boilerplate
in Theory and Practice, 54 CAN. Bus. L.J. 292, 298-99 (2013) (arguing that many boilerplate
contract provisions should be subject to greater judicial scrutiny).
2.
See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An
Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929 (2004) (analyzing boilerplate
language in sovereign bond terms); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and
Innovation in Corporate Contracting, 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997) (discussing boilerplate's role in
corporate bond terms).
3.
One notable article that touches on disclosure boilerplate is Karen K. Nelson & A.C.
Pritchard, Carrot or Stick? The Shift from Voluntary to Mandatory Disclosure of Risk Factors, 13
J. EMPIRicAL LEGAL STUD. 266 (2016). Although their interesting analysis does not itself focus on
boilerplate, one aspect of it looks at how securities issuers copy their own past disclosures in
periodic reports. See id. at 273 (hypothesizing that firms at greater risk of litigation provide less
boilerplate risk-factor disclosure). This Article looks at boilerplate in a different sense. It focuses
broadly on boilerplate as generic language that is copied in different deals among different issuers,
which is a perennial concern among regulators, courts, and practitioners.
4.
See SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS'N, CAPITAL MARKETS REPORT-MODERNIZING AND
RATIONALIZING REGULATION OF THE U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS 4 (2017), https://www.sifma.org/wp2

content/uploads/ 017/08/Capital-Markets-Report-%E2%80%93-Modernizing-and-RationalizingRegulation-of-the-U.S.-Capital-Markets.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3EQ-SA4M] ("As of December 31,
2016, market capitalization-the total value of all publicly traded domestic companies-of the U.S.
stock market was $27.4 trillion . . . ."); see also Report for Selected Countries and Subjects, INT'L
MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=
57&pr.y-7&sy=2016&ey-12020&scam=1&ssd=&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=11&s=NGDPD%
2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPGDP%2CPPPPC&grp-O&a= (last visited Sept. 15, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
N3VR-FX8QJ (reporting that the United States' GDP in 2016 was only $18.5 trillion).
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disclosures about inherently different companies that may or may not
be accurately described in identical terms.
Whether securities boilerplate is problematic has no obvious a
priori theoretical answer, but the issue is not merely academic. The
Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") has tried a number of times
to limit boilerplate recitations in securities disclosures and, in
December 2015, Congress took aim at boilerplate by mandating that the
SEC revise its disclosure regulations to eliminate such language as
much as possible.5 The stated purpose for targeting boilerplate
language has been to reduce costs and increase efficiency both for the
companies that must produce disclosure and for the investors who
consume it.6 The premise is that boilerplate recitations provide little
useful information and are difficult for investors to wade through. That
rationale, however, conflicts with what some scholars have argued
about boilerplate in other contexts, namely that such language has the
power to efficiently convey information because over time it becomes a
7
standardized language that is readily understood by market initiates.
The idea underlying these arguments is that boilerplate is a type of
modular language-a settled formulation of a set of ideas or
information-that can be easily recognized and understood by its
intended audience.
One reason for these divergent views is that the word
"boilerplate" itself, while referring generally to standardized, recyclable
language, can actually encompass different kinds of language with
different uses depending on its purpose. Boilerplate is sometimes used
to refer to standardized legal language, like disclaimers or choice of law
The mandate was buried in a bill primarily aimed at fixing the United State's highway
5.
infrastructure. See Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act of 2015 (FAST Act), Pub. L. No.
114-94, § 72002, 129 Stat. 1312, 1784-85 (2015) ("[T]he Securities and Exchange Commission shall
take all such actions to revise regulation S-K . .. to eliminate provisions of regulation S-K,
required for all issuers, that are duplicative, overlapping, outdated, or unnecessary .... ); see also
Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,915 (Apr. 22, 2016)
(setting out the SEC's analysis of the disclosure issues in the FAST Act and the process for
gathering comments).
See Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, 81 Fed. Reg. at 23,917
6.
("We are specifically seeking comment on ... whether, and if so how, we could revise our
requirements to . . . promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation .... ). To be sure, such
regulation encompasses more than just copied language. However, as discussed below, copied
language is a major component of what is typically defined as boilerplate, and what regulators
target.
See, e.g., Baird, supra note 1, at 936 (arguing that boilerplate in consumer contracts
7.
provides information when sophisticated consumers select products on the basis of boilerplate
terms); Kahan & Klausner, supra note 2, at 718 (discussing how common use of terms in corporate
bond contracts create learning and networking externalities); Henry E. Smith, Modularity in
Contracts:Boilerplateand InformationFlow, 104 MICH. L REV. 1175, 1176-77 (2006) (arguing that
boilerplate gives rise to modular contractual terms that can be readily understood and
transplanted to a wide variety of contract contexts, albeit at the cost of customization).
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provisions, that serve a similar purpose and might be included in a
document to fulfill a legal mandate, out of an abundance of caution, or
because there are only so many ways to say certain things. Such
language might be full of legal jargon or other terms that are poorly
understood even by their drafters but are included out of habit or
caution, and no one has bothered to change them or think them through
in the course of many transactions. Boilerplate can also refer to clauses
that, while not legally mandated or necessary, have been proven
through experience to convey certain ideas or terms in a, way that is
predictable and reliable. Boilerplate might also be a means to be
intentionally generic or vague, either because specifics are unknown,
because specifics are better left for a later time, or because an issuer
desires to be vague and blend in with other disclosing entities.
This Article analyzes these possibilities, providing a systematic,
theoretical, and empirical analyses of boilerplate in securities
disclosure. In doing so, it contributes to the policy and scholarly
debates. To undertake this analysis, I draw insights from the contract
and bond boilerplate literature and show how these literatures help
frame the analysis of securities boilerplate, even though they are
different in important ways. I then explain the results of an empirical
examination of boilerplate in Initial Public Offering ("IPO") documents,
using computerized natural language processing methods common in
social science and studies of literature to measure boilerplate and
assess its effects on issuers and investors. I use these methods to
analyze an original dataset of 2,751 IPOs for operating companies
taking place between 1996 and 2015.8 The IPOs are confined to those

for private companies going public for the first time, as opposed to
spinoffs, securitization vehicles, investment companies, or real estate
investment trusts. This provides a good setting for the analysis because
little company information is typically available to the public for such
companies prior to the filing of the registration statement, and so a
company's legally mandated disclosure document-the locus of the
deal's boilerplate-is often a critical means by which issuers shape
investors' perceptions.
The results of the analysis shed light on boilerplate's potential
value as well as its risks. A securities class action filed against
Wayfair.com provides an illustration. 9 The lawsuit alleged that when
8.
The study period begins in 1996, in part because that is the first year for which disclosures
are available on the SEC's electronic filing system, EDGAR. The study covers the adoption of the
USA JOBS Act in 2012, which introduced confidential filing provisions for certain IPO issuers. See
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 106(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77f(e) (2012).
9.
See Dingee v. Wayfair Inc., No. 15cv6941(DLC), 2016 WL 3017401 (S.D.N.Y. May 24,
2016) (granting the defendants' motion to dismiss).
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Wayfair, an online retailer specializing in home goods and furniture,
went public, its prospectus misled investors by forgoing a specific
disclosure in favor of a boilerplate risk factor about its competitors:
"Our business is rapidly evolving and intensely competitive, and we
have many competitors in different industries. Our competition
includes: furniture stores, big box retailers, department stores,
retailers and
goods
and online home
specialty retailers,
marketplaces . . . ."1o

Absent from this disclosure was any mention of a specific
competitor, Overstock.com, whose similar business model posed a
serious competitive threat to Wayfair. 1 1 When securities analysts
finally noticed the omission several months later, Wayfair stock fell and
the investors lost money. 12 This risk factor was not the only generic
disclosure Wayfair used: fifty percent of the risk factors in its IPO
prospectus included language copied from other companies' recent
deals, according to the measure used in this study. By comparison, the
average amount of risk factor boilerplate across all prospectuses in the
dataset is thirty-two percent.
This example highlights the problems raised by securities
boilerplate. On the one hand, it is easy to see why efficiency might have
prompted Wayfair's counsel-a busy, national law firm-to use readymade language if experience told them that it was sufficient to convey
the risk of competition to investors. On the other hand, one can imagine
how a prospectus that is nearly eighty percent boilerplate might gloss
over important issues faced by a relatively unknown company. The data
shows that both views may have merit given that boilerplate is
associated with lower legal costs on average, but is also associated with
higher average losses to issuers from mispricing and more securities
fraud litigation. The analysis in this Article explores the data to help
understand how the effects of boilerplate balance out and how issuers
and lawyers might use it.
In order to study boilerplate, I first develop a way of defining it
and measuring it. Using that measure, I then examine observational
data for evidence about the relative effects of more and less boilerplate.
First, I find that more boilerplate is associated with lower legal costs,
but find no evidence that it is associated with lower auditing fees or
underwriting fees. Moreover, I find no significant association between

10. Id. at *2 (emphasis omitted).
11. Id. ("The [First Amended Complaint] alleges that the Registration Statement deliberately
omits naming Overstock as Wayfair's 'prime competitor.' ").
12. Id. ("On the day that the [analyst firm's] Report was published, shares of Wayfair
fell . . . over [eleven percent] . . . .").
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boilerplate and faster deal-completion times, the average amount a
prospectus is amended, or the scrutiny it receives from the SEC.
However, I also find evidence that large quantities of boilerplate
are associated with more information asymmetry, which costs issuers
amounts far outweighing any savings in fees, on average. Specifically,
a 10% increase in boilerplate in certain important sections of a
registration statement is associated with as much as a 5.1% to 6.2%
increase in deal underpricing-a phenomenon by which IPO's are sold
at prices below what the market will bear, and which is thought to be
in part a product of information asymmetry.1 3 This translates, on
average, to as much as $6 million that an issuer leaves on the table for
each 10% increase in the use of boilerplate in its disclosure. Higher
levels of boilerplate are also associated with higher risk of prospectusrelated litigation: a 10% increase in the amount of boilerplate in the
some sections of the prospectus is associated with a 1.5% to 4% increase
in the probability of being sued for securities fraud related to the
offering. 14 The analyses also show a relationship between boilerplate
and three other indicia of information asymmetry: greater probability
of pre-IPO price revision, wider first-day bid-ask trading spreads, and
greater divergence of recommendations among analysts following the
issuer. To conduct this analysis, I rely primarily on regression analysis
to assess the basic relationship between boilerplate and the various
outcomes I study and on propensity score matching to attempt to rule
out the possibility that the informational outcomes may be driven by
underlying features of each issuer or by the transactions that initially
prompt the use of boilerplate. Although causality cannot be definitively
inferred from the analysis in this Article, the results taken together
provide strong evidence of the consequences of including too much
boilerplate in securities disclosure.
In sum, the data shows that boilerplate has some value, but in
the aggregate it is associated with deal outcomes, indicating that
neither the issuer nor the investing public are well served. The Wayfair
example above bears this out. If it is true that neither issuers nor
investors benefit from boilerplate, one might wonder why sophisticated
law firms and well-counseled issuers continue to use so much of it in
13. For an explanation of the underpricing phenomenon and the theories about its causes,
see Randolph P. Beatty & Jay R. Ritter, Investment Banking, Reputation, and The Underpricing
of Initial Public Offerings, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 213 (1986); Tim Loughran & Jay Ritter, Why Has IPO
UnderpricingChanged over Time?, 33 FIN. MGMT. 5 (2004); and Jay R. Ritter & Ivo Welch, A
Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and Allocations, 57 J. FIN. 1795 (2002).
14. In addition, boilerplate is associated with indicia of greater investor uncertainty about an
issuer, as well as lower readability scores, measured by the Gunning Fog readability index-in
fact, prospectuses containing large amounts of boilerplate have scores indicating that they are
essentially unreadable by most human beings.
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securities disclosure. One possible explanation is that issuers benefit
from boilerplate disclosure and information asymmetry in some way
that is hard to measure. After all, in the Wayfair example, the
company's prospectus had a much higher level of boilerplate than most
of the other deals done by their law firm: the firm's average risk factor
boilerplate across all deals since 2010 is approximately thirty-five
percent-slightly higher than average, but still much lower than the
amount used for Wayfair. Moreover, the law firm's fees showed no
evidence that Wayfair saved money relative to similar deals, since the
fees were in line with the average amount the firm received for similar
deals in the dataset. Perhaps the deal was sui generis for the firm, or
perhaps the issuer derived a benefit from using a vague disclosure that
is not readily observable in the data. But the most consistent story is
that the market ended up with less information than it should have
had, and Wayfair ended up paying a price for it.
The high-level empirical conclusion, however, cannot answer
whether the overall societal effects of securities boilerplate are
negative, or whether boilerplate simply shifts value from one party to
another. The theory on boilerplate developed in other contexts provides
some possibilities. One possibility consistent with the data is that
boilerplate provides a signal to investors that the burden of due
diligence will be placed largely on them. Thus, the costs of research are
transferred from the banking syndicate and the issuer to the investors.
As in any bargain, those investors will expect something in return, and
that reality will be reflected in the price at which an issuer goes public.
In other words, issuers will leave more money on the table in exchange
for leaving the transaction costs of mitigating information asymmetry
to investors.
Another possibility is that the inclusion of boilerplate is a result
of a network externality. In that case, the loss to the issuer (and possibly
to investors as well) is the result of a human tendency to favor what has
been done before and to exhibit reluctance to expend resources on
creating a new template when the benefit of doing so will largely be
captured by others. The data are least consistent with the theory that
boilerplate is used primarily for its efficiency, at least in the aggregate
sense.
Notwithstanding the analysis with respect to aggregate
boilerplate, it is still possible that certain individual boilerplate phrases
could provide value by conveying information and meeting regulatory
requirements more easily. There is some evidence in the data to support
this. Nonetheless, even if that is the case, it appears that boilerplate
phrases that are individually efficient may still cloud information
transmission if too much other boilerplate is used. Some simple changes
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to regulation could help address both types of boilerplate and help
declutter securities disclosures without losing whatever benefits such
boilerplate might have.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides
definitional background, as well as a general description of IPO deals
and how boilerplate is produced for them. It also describes the SEC's
disclosure regime and its efforts to regulate boilerplate, as well as the
academic discussion of boilerplate to date. Part II explains the methods
used in the empirical portion of the paper and discusses the various
means of analyzing boilerplate. Part III discusses the results of the
analysis, and Part IV discusses the implications of the analysis for the
law, legal scholarship, and the SEC's reform efforts.
I. BACKGROUND
Some background on the process by which securities disclosure
is produced is important both for formulating an accurate definition of
boilerplate and for appreciating how the use of boilerplate might affect
a transaction through pricing and other measurable outcomes. In brief,
when a company decides to conduct an IPO, the issuing company, often
unfamiliar with the norms and practices of securities markets, gathers
a group of advisors, including its law firm, its auditor, the investment
banks that will underwrite the deal, and the investment banks'
lawyers. 15 The issuer's counsel usually takes the lead drafting the
disclosure document with help from the bankers and their lawyers. As
the lawyers and bankers conduct due diligence on the issuer, the parties
meet in drafting sessions to refine the disclosure. 16 The issuer's lawyers
rarely start from scratch to draft the disclosure; as in many business
transactions, they pull text from the disclosures issued in precedent
deals, usually those that were completed recently for other companies
in the issuer's industry group, those with which they are familiar, or
those suggested by the underwriting banks.1 7 The process, as detailed
below, is intended to comply with the law as well as market practice.

15. See Carl W. Schneider, Joseph M. Manko & Robert S. Kant, Going Public: Practice,
Procedure, and Consequences, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1981) (describing the tasks performed by
bankers, lawyers, and issuing-company management when conducting an IPO).
16. See id. at 17-19 (discussing the role of company counsel in collecting due diligence and
drafting the registration statement).
17. See id.
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A. Drafting IPO Disclosures
The types of disclosure a company must make when seeking to
issue securities are set out in the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities
Act") and the regulations promulgated by the SEC. 18 The primary goal
of the disclosure rules is to reduce information asymmetry that exists
between a company entering the public securities market and potential
investors. 19 The information asymmetry exists because the people who
manage issuing companies have better information about the
company's past and future performance than investors are presumed to
be able to obtain on their own. 20 Company insiders-such as its officer
and directors-may have incentives to reinforce this asymmetry by
selectively disclosing certain information about their company to entice
investors, highlighting positive information and obscuring negative
information; they may also be reluctant to reveal sensitive information
that might benefit their competitors. 21 The law thus requires companies
to disclose certain kinds of information, and creates incentives for the
investment banks and law firms advising the issuer to conduct due
diligence, gather information, ensure its accuracy, and adequately
communicate it in the prospectus accompanying the registration
statement, the primary disclosure document required by the Securities
Act.22
18. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2012). Regulation S-K is the set of rules
that primarily implements the disclosure requirements of the Securities Act of 1933. 17 C.F.R.
§§ 229.1-229.1200 (2018). The Securities Act of 1933 adopts a regime of full disclosure to protect
investors, as opposed to a regime regulating the merits of any particular investment (as the Food
and Drug Administration ("FDA") does with new medicines, for example), on the theory that
"[p]ublicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to
be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman." LOUIs D. BRANDEIS, OTHER
PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914); see also Hersh Shefrin & Meir Statman,
49 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 21, 25 (1993) ("[Mandatory disclosure regulations seek to protect investors
from insufficient and misleading information, rather than to protect or prevent them from choosing
securities lacking merit.").
19. See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 358 F. Supp. 2d 189, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
("The Securities Act of 1933 ... was designed to provide investors with full disclosure of material
information concerning public offerings of securities . . . ." (first alteration in original) (quoting
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976))).
20. See Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775, 804
(2006) ("Even sophisticated investors are not skilled at obtaining private information possessed by
firms."). However, for an argument that the law should regulate on the basis of such bargaining
between issuers and investors, see Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A MarketBased Proposal, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 279, 283 (2000).
21. See Merritt B. Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and Underwriter Due
Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REV. 1005, 1019 (1984) ("Management[s] best
interests ... are sometimes different from those of the shareholders.").
22. Cf. id. (proposing additional due diligence requirements for Exchange Act filings to
increase efficiency). The terms "registration statement" and "prospectus" have different legal
meanings under the Securities Act. The prospectus forms part of the registration statement,
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The prospectus has two main purposes that are sometimes in
tension. On the one hand, the prospectus serves to comply with the
disclosure requirements mandated by the law and the SEC2 3 and limit
the company's liability for material misrepresentations. 2 4 Achieving
this purpose often involves a balancing act between providing specific
and detailed information about a company, while cautiously
incorporating caveats, and using language that has been tested by the
market, the SEC, and the courts. 25 On the other hand, the prospectus
forms the basis of the marketing effort that the company and the
investment bankers undertake to sell the stock. 26 For that purpose, the
company and the underwriting banks want to highlight the company's
potential and avoid negative language that would undermine
management's confident narrative regarding the company's future
performance. 27 Lawyers on both sides of the deal-those representing
the issuer and those representing the group of investment banks
underwriting the transaction-perform most of the work of drafting the
prospectus. 28 And although the content of the disclosure is mandated by
the SEC, the issuer has the final say on what goes into the document,
although industry participants often simply refer to the prospectus. For ease of reference, I adopt
this convention and refer to the disclosure as the prospectus here.
23. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-229.915 (2018) (providing disclosure requirements). Required
disclosure includes (1) information about the company's business, see §§ 229.101-229.103; (2) the
management's discussion and analysis of financial condition of the company, including future
projections if desired, see § 229.303; (3) financial statements and an auditor's opinion covering
them, see § 210; (4) a description of material contracts, see §§ 229.10-229.915; (5) information about
legal and regulatory problems facing the company, see § 229.103; (6) information about the officers
and directors of the company and their compensation, see §§ 229.403-229.405; and (7) certain
industry-specific
information,
see Industry Guides, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/industryguides.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
YN29-Y9R8].
24. The company's advisors can shield themselves from liability under Section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933, as long as they have conducted adequate due diligence. See Securities Act
of 1933, § 11(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (2012); see also Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F.
Supp. 643, 688-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (establishing the terms of the due diligence defense for
nonissuer defendants in prospectus-related litigation if the defendant can show reasonable
grounds for that belief after a reasonable investigation into the truth of the alleged
misstatements).
25.

See SEC. INDUS. ASS'N, CAPITAL MARKETS HANDBOOK 272 (John C. Burch, Jr. & Bruce S.

Foerster eds., 2006) (reviewing the IPO process); Schneider et al., supra note 15, at 10 ("[Tlhe
prospectus . . . is prepared as a brochure describing the company and the securities to be offered.").
26. See SEC. INDUS. ASS'N, supra note 25, at 272.
27. See Schneider et al., supra note 15, at 14 (describing the tensions that sometimes arise
between the desires of underwriters and counsel and the desires of issuers); see also STEVEN E.
BOCHNER, JON C. AVINA & CALISE Y. CHENG, WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, GUIDE TO THE

INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING 29 (8th ed. 2016), https://www.wsgr.com/publications/PDFSearch/
IPOGuide2016.pdf [https://perma.cclK9KN-TVPD] (stating that the issuer's counsel and
underwriters must seek to serve the marketing and disclosure functions of the prospectus).
28. See Schneider et al., supra note 15, at 14-17 (discussing the role of company and
underwriters' counsel in the drafting of disclosure).
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and thus exercises discretion over what gets disclosed and in what level
of detail. 29 The issuer's management typically relies on its law firms and
bankers to advise it on the right level of disclosure, although it can
decide how much deference to give these advisors.
In addition to working for the issuer, the lawyers and
investment bankers are presumed to perform a gatekeeping function on
behalf of investors. 30 In theory, since no one is at the table to represent
investors when the disclosure is being drafted, the bankers and lawyers
consider what information the investors need and how best to
communicate it, which might be at odds with what the issuers
themselves want. 31 Thus, the lawyers and bankers must negotiate with
the issuer's management over what to disclose, how it will be worded
(vaguely or in detail), and how to manage ambiguities in the
regulations. 32 Boilerplate language serves as an opening salvo in this
negotiation-a basis for filling out the draft and possibly helping the
lawyers and bankers anchor the prospectus around their preferred
wording. The prospectus, which begins as language copied from the text
of prior transactions, is thus revised iteratively in meetings involving
both sets of counsel, the underwriters, and representatives from the
company. Moreover, as more due diligence is done, more information
comes to light and, assuming the issuer agrees, the text becomes more
specific. 33
Once the prospectus is drafted, the issuer files the preliminary
version of it (referred to as the "Red Herring") with the SEC as part of
29. See id. at 18 ("In the last analysis, the company and its management must assume the
final responsibility to determine that the information in the registration statement is accurate and
complete."); see also Tom Arnold, Raymond P.H. Fishe & David North, The Effects of Ambiguous
Informationon Initial and Subsequent IPO Returns, 39 FIN. MGMT. 1497, 1500 (2010) (describing
the issuing management's control over the message conveyed in the disclosure).
30. See Schneider et al., supra note 15, at 14 (noting the potential conflict that may arise
between the desires of underwriters' and issuer's counsel and the desires of issuers).
31. Id.
32. See Arnold et al., supra note 29, at 1500 (discussing how the Risk Factors section of
Regulation S-K forces companies to make judgments about what to disclose and the wording used
when disclosing); see also Kathleen Weiss Hanley & Gerard Hoberg, The Information Content of
IPO Prospectuses, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 2821, 2825 (2010) (discussing the issuer's role in producing
information for the prospectus).
33. Schneider et al., supranote 15, at 23 ("This drafting is an iterative process, as knowledge
gained in due diligence informs what needs to be said about the issuer."); see also Royce R.
Barondes & Gary C. Sanger, Lawyer Experience and IPO Pricing 8 (May 4, 2000) (unpublished
[https://perma.cc/
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=227729
manuscript),
2YSK-JBX3]:
Lawyers can cause disclosure to be more negative in a number of ways. They can
uncover negative information in the due diligence process that everyone agrees needs
to be disclosed. Additionally, they can take a more hard line in the drafting of the
prospectus, compelling disclosure of information the business thought could remain
undisclosed, or requiring language that casts information in a more negative light.
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the registration statement on Form S-1. 3 4 The preliminary prospectus
includes a price range at which the issuer and its underwriters expect
to market the stock based on information learned in the due diligence
review. 35 The SEC reviews the preliminary prospectus, and gives
comments and requests clarifications or additions that the issuer must
address. 36
B. The Prospectusand IPO Pricing
As previously mentioned, one of the functions of a prospectus is
to provide a basis of information for marketing the company, and the
success of the marketing effort helps set the price at which the
company's stock will debut. 3 7 While the SEC is reviewing the
preliminary prospectus, the underwriter and issuer's management
begin marketing the stock primarily, and in some cases exclusively, to
large institutional investors-such as pension funds, mutual funds, and
hedge funds-that will be the initial investors in the securities.3 8 The
lead underwriter and the issuer's management pitch the securities to
institutional investors in various cities by presenting the company's
story and prospects consistent with the information in the preliminary
prospectus. 39 During this process, known as a road show, the initial
investors are able to gather additional information not necessarily
reflected in the prospectus by speaking to the company's management
and the bankers more or less privately. 40 After these presentations, the
initial investors express their level of interest in investing by making
indicative orders, which are nonbinding but which the investors and
bankers are usually expected to honor. 4 1 In this way, these initial
investors play an indirect role in determining the final price for the
transaction, because the underwriters use the indicative orders to

34. The most common form of registration statement used for IPOs is Form S-1, although
Form SB-1 was available for smaller issuers until the repeal of the small business disclosure rules
in 2005. For simplicity, I will refer to all of these documents as S-1 or Form S-1.
35. See Schneider et al., supranote 15, at 22-23 (describing the distribution of "red herring"
prospectuses).
36. See id. at 19-22 (discussing the SEC comment and review process); see also William W.
Barker, SEC Registrationof Public Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933, 52 Bus. LAW. 65,
70-72 (1996) (describing the SEC staffs role in the registration and disclosure process).
37. See Manuel A. Utset, ProducingInformation: Initial Public Offerings, Production Costs,
and the ProducingLawyer, 74 OR. L. REV. 275, 284 (1995) (describing the lawyers' job in an lIPO
to be the production of an "information bundle').
38. See Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 22-24 (discussing "red herring[s]" and "dog and
pony show [s]").
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
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assess investor demand. 42 The lead underwriter and the issuing
company's management negotiate the final offering price based largely
43
on the investor demand ascertained during the road show. Once the
final price is negotiated, a final version of the prospectus and final
pricing information are filed with the SEC and, once deemed effective,44
the shares can be sold to the wider market and the company officially
goes public. 45
C. Disclosure Regulation and the BoilerplateProblem
As the discussion above highlights, language borrowed from
prior transactions is a ubiquitous feature of IPO prospectuses (and
securities disclosure more broadly), and the SEC has taken note. For
many years, the regulator has taken steps to discourage too much
copying and reliance on generic language in its attempt to promote
clearer securities disclosure more broadly.
For instance, the SEC created a Task Force on Disclosure
Simplification in 1995 and charged it with improving and streamlining
disclosure. 46 The stated rationale for creating the task force was the
perception that IPO prospectuses had become overly dense due to the

42.

See id.; see also JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION 115,

122-25 (11th ed. 2009) (discussing the book-building process); Barondes & Sanger, supra note 34,
at 7 (describing how the offering process is decided and the use of the initial filing price range as
a proxy for the estimate developed during the "beauty pageant").
43. See Barondes & Sanger, supra note 33, at 8:
In a customary IPO, there is not a definitive agreement on the price at which the
underwriters will purchase and resell the stock in the IPO until after the preliminary
marketing process is complete, some time after a preliminary prospectus has been
circulated. SEC rules, however, require that a preliminary prospectus for an IPO
circulated prior to the pricing include a bona fide estimate of the price, frequently stated
as a range, at which the stock will be sold .... This price estimate may change in
subsequent preliminary prospectuses, as the lead managerd acquires information
during the marketing process.

44. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.424(b), 230.430A (2018) (regulating the filing of prospectuses and
the prospectus in a registration statement at the time of effectiveness); see also COFFEE & SALE,
supra note 42, at 128-29 (discussing Rule 430A). Prior to the adoption of Rule 430A, underwriters
had to file pricing information in the form of an amendment to the registration statement before
the SEC would declare the registration statement effective. See COFFEE & SALE, supra note 42, at
128-29. Rule 430A allows the registration statement to be declared effective before pricing-related
information is filed as long as a complete final prospectus is filed shortly thereafter. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.430A (regulating the prospectus in a registration statement at the time of effectiveness).
45. See COFFEE & SALE, supra note 42, at 128-9 (discussing the procedure surrounding
effectiveness).
46. See Report of the Task Force on Disclosure Simplification, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N
(Mar. 5, 1996), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/smpl.htm [https://perma.ccD539-3M66) ("The
Task Force was asked to review rules and forms affecting capital formation, with a view toward
streamlining, simplifying, and modernizing the overall regulatory scheme . . . .").
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incorporation of large amounts of nonspecific boilerplate language.4 7
The SEC believed that some securities lawyers had come to view
prospectuses less as sources of information for issuers and more as
forms of insurance against liability for both issuers and underwriters. 48
This trend was propelled by the fact that it is more difficult to find
issuers liable for events or circumstances that are adequately disclosed;
therefore, including greater quantities of disclosure that had already
been vetted by the SEC and tested in the market became a rational
approach to drafting. 49 The SEC attempted to curb generic boilerplate
and make prospectuses clearer through rules designed to reduce
duplicative and generic information.5 0
In 1998, the SEC also advanced its so-called Plain English
Initiative, which went into force in October of that year. As part of the
initiative, the SEC created guidelines for making prospectuses more
readable,5 1 including a "plain English rule" mandating that certain
parts of the prospectus-in particular the Summary and Risk Factors
sections-be written more clearly. 52 The rule specifically provided that
the entire prospectus should avoid boilerplate. 53 Other guidance issued

47. See id. ("Dense writing, with legal boilerplate and repetitive descriptions of the company,
has become the standard convention."); see also BOCHNER ET AL., supra note 27, at 34 ("The Risk
Factors section is commonly perceived simply as lawyers' boilerplate. . . .").
48. See Regulation of Securities Offerings, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,174, 67,176 (proposed Dec. 4, 1998)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 202, 210, 228, 229, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249) ("[We seek to
discourage drafters from just routinely providing the boilerplate transactional disclosure that
some have suggested the standardized disclosure items have evoked. This alternative would refocus drafters on analyzing and including the information particular to that deal that is material
to investors. More focused disclosure could result."); see also BOCHNER ET AL., supra note 27, at 34
(describing historical trends in risk-factor drafting).
49. See BOCHNER ET AL., supra note 27, at 34.
50. See Regulation of Securities Offerings, 63 Fed. Reg. at 67,176. In particular, the SEC
streamlined disclosure requirements relating to the description of the registrant's business by
eliminating duplication of quantitative information provided in the financial statements; revised
the description of property to elicit more meaningful and material disclosure; limited the scope of
Item 507, relating to securities offered for the account of a company's individual security holders,
so that a company only would have to disclose information regarding certain of its selling affiliates
and significant beneficial owners rather than all of its selling security holders; and modernized
the existing guides for industry-specific disclosure. See id.
51. See id. at 67,222 ("In recognition of the importance of the prospectus to investors, we
recently adopted rules that require the use of plain English in the prospectus.").
52. Plain English Disclosure, 63 Fed. Reg. 6,370, 6,370 (Dec. 4, 1998) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 228, 229, 230, 239, 274) ("The rule requires issuers to write the cover page, summary, and risk
factors section of prospectuses in plain English."). The Rule went into effect and required
compliance as of October 1, 1998. Id. Securities Act Rule 421(d), within Regulation C, is the plain
English rule. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.421 (2018).
53. See Plain English Disclosure, 63 Fed. Reg. at 6,371 ("[Ajvoid ... [v]ague boilerplate
explanations that are readily subject to differing interpretations. . . ."); see also A Plain English
Handbook: How to Create Clear SEC Disclosure Documents, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N 65 (Aug.
1998), https://www.sec.gov/pdf/handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MSB-S43J] (summarizing the
plain English rule).
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around the same time addressed boilerplate in the Risk Factors section,
which the SEC was concerned had become overly filled with generic
risks to help issuers escape liability.54 The SEC issued guidance
admonishing issuers to remove boilerplate risk factors completely from
prospectuses.5 5 Such risk factors, the SEC feared, overwhelmed
investors with risks that were generic and highly improbable and
caused investors to discount or miss risks that might actually be
important.5 6 Similarly, the SEC targeted boilerplate in the
Management's Discussion and Analysis section of SEC filings between
2000 and 2003. Finding that too much of the section had become rote
copying and pasting, the Commission issued guidance warning issuers
57
not to rely on standardized, untailored language in that section.
In addition to the SEC's explicit targeting of boilerplate
language, Congress's passage of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act ("PSLRA") in 1995 indirectly affected the use of boilerplate.
The law afforded protection from lawsuits for issuers that made
future
their
about
statements-statements
forward-looking
prospects-as long as the statements were accompanied by meaningful
cautionary language.5 8 The legislative history of the PSLRA indicates
54. See Plain English Disclosure, 62 Fed. Reg. 3,152, 3,163 (proposed Jan. 21, 1997) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 230, 239) ("Often the risk factor disclosure in a prospectus is
boilerplate, listing risks that could apply to any offering or that are not likely to occur.").
55.

Id.

56. See id. (emphasizing "the problem of listing many risk factors that are so general that
they are not meaningful and add to the length of the document making the document difficult to
read").
57. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, SUMMARY BY THE DIVISION OF CORPORATION FINANCE OF
SIGNIFICANT ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THE REVIEW OF THE PERIODIC REPORTS OF THE FORTUNE 500

https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/fortune500rep.htm
2003),
27,
(Feb.
COMPANIES
[https://perma.cc/X3TQ-QTLW] ("Our comments addressed situations where companies simply
recited financial statement information without analysis or presented boilerplate analyses that
did not provide any insight into the companies' past performance or business prospects as
understood by management."); Interpretation: Commission Guidance Regarding Management's
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, Securities Act Release
No. 33-8350, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48,960, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,056, 75,063 (Dec. 29, 2003)
("Any such discussion should be specific to the circumstances and informative, and companies
should avoid generic or boilerplate disclosure."). In addition, an earlier release admonished against
the use of boilerplate language in the MD&A section when discussing the impact of the
technological issues associated with the approach of the year 2000. See Interpretation: Statement
of the Commission Regarding Disclosure of Year 2000 Issues and Consequences by Public
Companies, Investment Advisers, Investment Companies, and Municipal Securities Issuers,
Securities Act Release No. 33-7558, Exchange Act Release No. 34-40,277, Investment Company
Act Release No. 23,366, 63 Fed. Reg. 41,394, 41,398 (Aug. 4, 1998) ('This reflects our view that a
flexible approach best elicits meaningful disclosure and avoids boilerplate discussions."); see also
Notice: Disclosure in Management's Discussion and Analysis About the Application of Critical
Account Policies, Securities Act Release No. 33-8098, Exchange Act Release No. 34-45,907, 67 Fed.
Reg. 35,620, 35,622 (proposed May 20, 2002).
58. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A) (2012) (noting that a person "shall not be liable with respect
to any forward-looking statement" so long as the forward-looking statement "is accompanied by
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that such cautionary language could not be mere boilerplate, but that
specific disclosures would instead be needed for issuers to have
protection from suit. 5 9 While this provision is not available to IPO
issuers, the law nonetheless reflects congressional concern with rote,
meaningless cautionary statements and presumably had an impact on
how practitioners thought about the cautionary language they used.
Most recently, in December 2015, Congress passed the Fixing
America's Surface Transportation ("FAST") Act, a bill aimed at
providing infrastructure repair to the nation's highway system, but that
also included several provisions related to offerings under the
Securities Act.6 0 In particular, the FAST Act required the SEC to review
its disclosure regulations and look for ways to eliminate redundancies
and the use of needless boilerplate language. 61 As a result, the SEC
proposed a set of relatively modest rules that have not been adopted as
of the time of this writing, but has not otherwise taken steps to reduce
or eliminate boilerplate. 62
D. Defining Boilerplate
Before analyzing the theory and evidence on securities
boilerplate, I attempt to define the term in a way that can be analyzed
theoretically and empirically. In light of the forgoing background
discussion, I use two related definitions of boilerplate in this Article and
employ text-analysis techniques to measure boilerplate and assess its
impact. The first definition of boilerplate is simply the amount of
overlap between documents--or to put it another way, the amount of
common language that is reproduced in multiple prospectuses. A second
and related definition of boilerplate is copied language that conveys
only generic information about a company, as opposed to mere framing
or structural language (e.g., "Our results from operations last year
were . . . .").

I use these definitions because they best align with traditional
legal views of boilerplate as well as the motivations behind the SEC's
meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors that could cause actual results to
differ materially from those in the forward-looking statement").
59. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 43 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
60. Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-94, §§ 72001-03,
129 Stat. 1312, 1784-85.
61. Id. § 72002.
62. See FAST Act Modernization and Simplification of Regulation S-K, 82 Fed. Reg. 50,988,
51,024 (proposed Nov. 2, 2017) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249, 270,
274, 275) (proposing amendments "to modernize and simplify certain disclosure requirements in
Regulation S-K . .. in a manner that reduces the costs and burdens on registrants while continuing
to provide all material information to investors").
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policies. The SEC's pronouncements on boilerplate are surprisingly thin
as to what the agency actually means by the term. 63 A basic definition
drawn from Black's Law Dictionaryis "content that is made to fit many
uses." 6 4 The SEC's regulatory discussions of boilerplate refer to it as
"imprecise" language "subject to differing interpretations." 65 In
addition, the SEC in its release and disclosure rules makes reference to
language that can be used for any issuer 66 and that is copied from the
disclosures of other issuers. This definition makes sense given that IPO
prospectuses are written using language borrowed from the disclosure
of other, similar companies. This definition of boilerplate shares
similarities with that adopted by other scholars who have examined the
issue empirically. Professors Karen Nelson and Adam Pritchard
examine standardized cautionary language in the Risk Factors section
of company annual reports on 10-K forms using a similar definition, and
measuring identical text by comparing the overlap in the number of
bigrams and trigrams in those sections.67 Professor Kathleen Hanley
and Gerard Hoburg study standardized language in IPO prospectuses,
adopting a similar definition encompassing overlapping text. 68 In their

63. See e.g., Plain English Disclosure, 62 Fed. Reg. 3,152, 3,163 (proposed Jan. 21, 1997) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 230, 239) (admonishing issuers against the use of repetitive
boilerplate language, but not defining boilerplate language). To be sure, the SEC's regulations
speak to more than boilerplate alone. They reference legalese and overly dense repetitive text,
among other drafting issues. Given the traditional definition of boilerplate, and the central role of
standardized disclosure copied from other deals, I use the definition adopted here.
64. Boilerplate, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
65. Plain English Disclosure, 62 Fed. Reg. at 3,155.
66. For example, Item 503(c) of Regulation S-K states that issuers should not "present risks
that could apply to any issuer or to any offering." See 17 C.F.R. § 229.503. In describing "generic"
disclosure, the SEC explains:
[A]1though Item 503(c) instructs registrants not to present risks that could apply to any
registrant, risk factor disclosure typically includes generic risk factors. Registrants
often use risk factors that are similar to those used by others in their industry or
circumstances as the starting point for risk disclosure, and the disclosure is not always
tailored to each registrant's particular risk profile.
Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916, 23,955 (Apr.
11, 2016). In addition, it quotes the FAST Act's admonition to get company-by-company
"information ... disseminated to investors without boilerplate language or static requirements";
such boilerplate and static requirements imply language that remains unchanged from company
to company. Id. at 23,921.
67. Karen K Nelson & A.C. Pritchard, Litigation Risk and Voluntary Disclosure:The Use of
Meaningful Cautionary Language (2nd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper)
(Aug. 2007), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=998590## [https://perma.cc/
6ENG-7KGX] (comparing the number of identical trigrams in one annual disclosure to the next
year's annual disclosure to measure the level of boilerplate language). As further explained below,
I used this method in untabulated alternative specifications as a robustness check. The results
were consistent with the method employed here.
68. Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 32, at 2831 (explaining how to use root words to identify
standard language in prospectuses). As explained below, I employed this method in untabulated
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study, Hanley and Hoburg created wordcount vectors from the text of
all IPO prospectuses filed in the ninety days before a given offering and
all industry prospectuses filed between ninety-one days and one year
before a given offering; they then regressed the word content of each
prospectus on the word content of the precedent deals to develop a
measure of standardized text.69
Although recycling text from other issuers is likely to generate
generic disclosure, it is not necessarily the kind of boilerplate that
investors or the SEC might worry about. The generality or specificity of
the borrowed language, as well as the importance of what it is
describing, are also relevant. For example, an issuer might use a copied
risk factor stating that "the company faces risks if its supply chain is
disrupted." This vague statement might apply to any company, but a
more specifically tailored version of the disclosure indicating the kind
of events that are likely to affect the supply chain would be more
valuable. On the other hand, issuers might use generic framing
language that introduces other disclosures-such as "Our net operating
losses last year were . . . ."-without reducing informativeness.

70

Thus, the definition I employ for the empirical analysis takes
into account both overlap and topic. In order to assess which boilerplate
is truly generic and which is either informative or at least innocuous, I
construct a topic model that groups the repeated sentences
thematically. This facilitates separating generic from potentially
informative boilerplate and allows me to assess the impact of these
topics on the outcomes used in the cosine similarity analysis. Together,
these techniques shed light on the boilerplate issue further discussed
below. In addition, I employ robustness checks of this methodology. As
explained below, I use a second algorithmic similarity measure, known
as Word2vec, that takes into account the context, order, and meaning
alternative specifications as a robustness check. The results were consistent with the method
employed here, albeit more complicated to execute.
69. See id. at 2841.
70. Courts have also addressed the issue in a related context. Some have defined boilerplate
in securities disclosure as overly generic language when construing the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act ("TSLRA") forward-looking statements safe harbor, which requires
meaningful cautionary language. See, e.g., Slayton v. Am. Express Co., 604 F.3d 758, 772 (2d Cir.
2010) ("A vague or blanket (boilerplate) disclaimer which merely warns the reader that the
investment has risks will ordinarily be inadequate to prevent misinformation. To suffice, the
cautionary statements must be substantive and tailored to the specific future projections,
estimates or opinions in the prospectus which the plaintiffs challenge." (quoting Inst. Inv'rs Grp. v.
Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 256 (3d Cir. 2009))). In addition, Congress has expressed a view on the
issue in the PSLRA context. The Conference Report for the PSLRA states: "Under this first prong
of the safe harbor, boilerplate warnings will not suffice . . . . The cautionary statements must
convey substantive information about factors that realistically could cause results to differ
materially from those projected in the forward-looking statement, such as, for example,
information about the issuer's business." H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 43 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
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of words when calculating similarity of texts. While this method is
computationally expensive to perform, it provides assurance that the
basic cosine similarity measure captures boilerplate well.
E. Legal Theory and Boilerplate
To develop hypotheses about the role of boilerplate in securities
transactions and to provide context for the empirical analysis, I survey
the legal literature on boilerplate more generally. Legal scholars have
written numerous articles about boilerplate in a variety of legal
transactions, including consumer contracts, sophisticated merger deals,
corporate debt instruments, and sovereign bonds.7 1 Despite all of this,
securities disclosure boilerplate has received relatively little attention
until recently. Theory that has been developed in contracts and
consumer disclosure literatures, however, is valuable for understanding
what role boilerplate might play in securities disclosure.
To draw from these other literatures, it is important to be clear
about the similarities and differences between securities disclosure and
other settings in which boilerplate is used. Like many other types of
drafting that lawyers do, securities disclosure lends itself to
commodification because the kinds of information requiring disclosure
for many deals are similar, at least in a very general sense. As in other
contexts, securities boilerplate may be language that has proven its
usefulness before, either with investors or with the SEC. However,
disclosure exists to correct information asymmetries between issuers
and investors in securities markets, which are uniquely prone to fraud
and manipulation. Investors purchasing company shares invest in the
company's current assets as well as the expectation of its future
prospects. 72 The law seeks to ensure that the company discloses enough
information to allow investors to make an informed decision about the
value of those assets and future prospects, which are inherently difficult
to value without detailed information generally only possessed by
company insiders. 73 Without such regulation, company insiders might
make overly positive claims or withhold negative information, thereby
74
skewing investors' ability to assess the company's true value. Thus the
71. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Merritt, supranote 21, at 1015-22 (noting that security value is based on asset
value and expectation of future dividends).
73. See Prentice, supra note 20, at 778 (highlighting the empirical link between mandatory
disclosure requirements and efficient capital markets). For an argument that the law regulates on
the basis of such bargaining, see Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based
Proposal,88 CALIF. L. REV. 279, 283 (2000).
74. See Prentice, supra note 20, at 812. ("A central premise of disclosure theory is that any
entity contemplating making a disclosure will disclose information that is favorable to the entity,
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question that arises with regard to boilerplate in securities disclosures
is whether it is an effective way to inform investors and fulfill the SEC's
regulatory mandate.
By contrast, much of the prior scholarly work on boilerplate
concerns documents that serve a similar function to contracts or notice
provisions: their purpose is to set out the legal relationships between
various parties or put parties (such as consumers) on notice of their
rights (or lack thereof). Corporate and sovereign bond documents set
out, for example, the mechanisms by which bondholders get paid and
specify what will happen upon the occurrence of a default. An example
of such language is the pari passu clause in sovereign bond covenants,
about which a number of important articles have been written.7 5 Unlike
many such boilerplate provisions which are easily understood by
contracting parties, Professors Mark Weidemaier, Robert Scott, and
Mitu Gulati's research has shown that among lawyers who regularly
employed such boilerplate, "there was no widely held understanding of
what the clause actually meant." 76 The confusion became notorious
after it resulted in problems for sovereign issuers, such as the Republic
of Argentina, which was unable to restructure its sovereign debt due in
part to the clause.7 7
While these bonds are also securities, scholars studying
boilerplate in bond markets have focused less on disclosure about
issuers and more on the language that governs cashflows and
bondholder rights. Likewise, in consumer transactions, scholars have
written primarily about how boilerplate is deployed to define parties'
rights or limit consumer remedies.7 8 In many corporate and commercial
situations the boilerplate that lawyers produce is intended to facilitate
contracting rather than fulfill a complex regulatory regime or provide
information about an intangible and speculative financial product.
Moreover, in many contracting situations the onus is on the parties to

&

and will not disclose information unfavorable to the entity.'" (quoting Ronald A. Dye, An
Evaluation of "Essays on Disclosure"and the Disclosure Literature in Accounting, 32 J. AccT.
ECON. 181, 184 (2001))).
75. See Mark Weidemaier, Robert Scott & Mitu Gulati, Origin Myths, Contracts, and the
Hunt for PariPassu, 38 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 72, 96 (2013) (discussing how the pari passu clause
became an embedded ritual within sovereign bond boilerplate). A typical paripassu clause states:
"These Notes rank, and will rank, equally (or Pari Passu) in right of payment with all other present
and future unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness of the Issuer." Choi & Gulati,
supra note 2, at 990.
76. Weidemaier et al., supra note 75, at 74.
77. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 259 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding
that the paripassu clause prohibits Argentina from formally subordinating the bonds by issuing
superior debt and from paying on other bonds without paying on the FAA Bonds).
78. See, e.g., Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Master Engraving Co., 527 A.2d 429, 436 (N.J. 1987)
(reviewing boilerplate language that limited a buyer's remedy).
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negotiate for the terms, rights, or information that they need. In these
contexts, the important questions are whether boilerplate provides an
effective substitute or starting point for negotiated provisions, whether
boilerplate terms are salient and legitimate to contracting parties, and
whether parties to the deal understand their implications.
Despite the differences between securities disclosure and other
kinds of corporate and commercial documents, scholarship across a
range of areas is informative for thinking about securities boilerplate
and assessing the validity of the SEC's rationale for targeting it.
Synthesis of this scholarship helps bring to light some possible roles
that securities boilerplate might play and explain why so much
boilerplate persists. For ease of exposition, I group these reasons into
three categories: efficiency (meaning savings in time and monetary
costs), market forces (using, and indeed fearing to deviate from,
language that has proven its value with the regulators and the market),
and strategic vagueness (employing language that fulfills a regulatory
requirement without expressing anything material). These categories
overlap in some ways, but the thread of each is analytically distinct. I
will explain each of these, and the literatures that describe them, in
more detail in the following sections.
1. Efficiency and Bargaining
Much of the robust literature on boilerplate espouses the idea
enhances efficiency, reducing transaction costs to the
boilerplate
that
contracting parties. It does so by providing a starting point for the
drafting process and an analogue to default terms that parties can
choose to rely on without negotiation or tailoring. Where parties
explicitly bargain over terms, such as in a merger transaction,
boilerplate is efficient because it provides tested and readily understood
clauses or modules that can be employed more quickly than if terms
were developed from scratch. Where a transaction is more one-sided,
such as in the sale of consumer products for which bargaining with
individual purchasers over terms is not feasible, boilerplate terms have
been described as features of products that can be accepted or rejected
wholesale by the consumer and which, in theory, might be subject to
market forces. This theory justifies the use of boilerplate on the grounds
that it reflects an implicit bargain between contracting parties or, at
the very least, it is what the parties would have wanted had explicit
bargaining been feasible.
Whether the efficiency gains from boilerplate outweigh its
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potential drawbacks is highly disputed. 79 For example, there is a
forceful debate about boilerplate terms in consumer contracts that force
consumers to arbitrate claims and limit their ability to aggregate
claims.8 0 On one side of this debate, scholars theorize that boilerplate
reduces costs for consumers and producers of goods alike, and therefore
reflects an optimal outcome.8 1 According to this argument, contracts
containing boilerplate are the result of an implicit bargain between
consumers and producers in which consumers receive a discount on the
goods in exchange for agreeing to the boilerplate terms forcing them to
take any disputes to arbitration. 82 Although boilerplate terms are
usually presented in a take-it-or-leave-it manner, consumers are free to
reject undesirable terms by taking their business elsewhere. 83 Those
who critique this line of reasoning argue that the boilerplate limitations
on rights are not salient to consumerS 84 and, in any event, it is
questionable whether consumer markets are sophisticated enough to

79. See Radin, supra note 1, at 298 (asserting that judges should more carefully scrutinize
many boilerplate contract provisions).
80. See id.; see also Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitrationto Eliminate
Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practiceor UnconscionableAbuse?, 67 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 75 (2004) (arguing that boilerplate arbitration clauses unfairly deprive consumers of class
action litigation rights); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration:Is It Just?, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 1631 (2005) (making a similar case with regard to the growing use of boilerplate mandatory
arbitration clauses).
81. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 1, 895-96 (arguing that consumers actually benefit from
boilerplate terms through a reduction in prices).
82. See Radin, supra note 1, at 294-95:
The business will save money by deleting its customers' legal rights; the business will
pass on these savings to the consumer; the consumer will value her legal rights less
than the amount of the price reduction; so therefore, the consumer is choosing . . . to
sell off her individual rights for the price reduction.
83. As one scholar put it, "If ... a particular contract is a mass-produced inalterable thing,
then the words that make it up are just elements of the thing, like wheels and carburetors." Arthur
Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 138 (1970); see also RICHARD POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 144 (8th ed. 2011) ("[W]hat is important is not whether there is
haggling in every transaction but whether competition forces sellers to incorporate in their
standard contracts terms that protect purchasers."); Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi,
Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 442 (2002) ("[T]he
aggregate decisions of many consumer can pressure businesses into providing an efficient set of
contract terms in their standard forms."); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, StandardForm
Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1209 (2003) (arguing that there is a
"market discipline established by the ability of buyers to shop among sellers for the most desirable
package of product attributes, including contract terms").
84. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
STAN. L. REV. 211, 241 (1995) (exploring the relationship between cognitive limitations and the
ability of consumers to rationally evaluate preprinted terms); Robert A. Hillman, Online
Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-Standard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 837, 850 (2006) (discussing the problem of information overload in boilerplate terms).
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price the legal terms into the price of goods.85
Research on boilerplate in the realm of negotiated agreements
among relatively sophisticated market actors embraces similar
efficiency arguments. This strand of research examines the use of
boilerplate terms in areas such as secured transactions, 86 bonds,8 7 and
corporate contracts. 8 Much of the research focuses on the cost
effectiveness of the use of boilerplate terms for agreements that often
have complex but highly standardized features.8 9 Efficiency and
consistency are assumed to be the purposes of boilerplate language in
many such situations. 90 However, although parties are frequently
sophisticated enough to demand favorable terms, this research suggests
that needless or even harmful terms are sometimes reproduced through
the unthinking use of boilerplate. 91 Thus the drawbacks of boilerplate
may sometimes outweigh its efficiency benefits.
The general argument that boilerplate promotes efficiency is
plausible in securities disclosure as well: It should be quicker to take
language from existing disclosure than it would be to draft everything
from scratch. Therefore, one hypothesis is that boilerplate enhances
efficiency by lowering transaction costs. Testing that hypothesis
requires defining precisely what efficiency would mean in a securities
deal. Cost and time are obvious candidates, as they are issues that could
hinder completion of a successful deal. However, the boilerplate
literature suggests that whether boilerplate is efficient depends in part
on its other costs or benefits, including whether it accomplishes the
intended purposes of disclosure (to convey useful information) or

85. Eisenberg, supra note 84, at 241 (asserting that the baseline rights of the consumers often
diverge from the contract terms contained in a form contract, thus leading to the consumer's
confusion over her basic legal position when accepting the contract).
86. See Baird, supra note 1, at 949-50 (discussing the inappropriate application of contract
law to boilerplate in secured transactions where property is exempt from execution by operation
of law).
87. See Mitu Gulati & Robert E Scott, The Three and a Half Minute Transaction:Boilerplate
and the Limits of Contract Design, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 2-5 (2012) (discussing the reasons for
the persistence of pari passu clauses in sovereign debt covenants and the problems with contract
terms that are included for the sake of efficiency only).
88. See Smith, supra note 7, at 1176 (describing modular contracting as a way to divide
complex negotiations involving multiple issues into smaller parts that are easier to understand).
89. See Baird, supra note 1, at 935.
90. See Gulati & Scott, supra note 87, at 4 (describing the conventional wisdom that
boilerplate language allows lawyers to be quick and efficient in serving their clients' needs).
91. See, e.g., id. at 5 (providing an illustration of how the ubiquitous repetition of the pari
passu clause in sovereign debt contracts led to a harmful result for a client); cf. Bernhard
Ganglmair & Malcolm Wardlaw, Measuring Contract Completeness: A Text Based Analysis of
Loan Agreements (Mar. 31, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.econ.jku.at/papers/2015/
ressem/FoSeContractCompletenessganglmair.pdf [https://perma.cclBHJ2-D8V4] (finding that
complexity in contracts increases growth opportunities for clients).
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whether it represents the result of an actual or implicit bargain between
its producer (the issuer) and its consumers (the investors). Evidence of
tradeoffs between boilerplate and other costs or benefits also needs to
be explored to determine whether efficiency primarily explains
boilerplate's use. Measuring these costs and benefits is one goal of the
empirical analysis below.
2. Market Forces and Network Externalities
A related area of legal theory posits that standard language
emerges when text comes to be accepted over time by market
participants through many iterations of a type of transaction. Once a
standard becomes accepted in the market, there is little incentive to
change it because change is costly and the benefit of doing so will not
accrue to the individual who implements the change, but instead to all
future users of the new language. Boilerplate has thus been described
as the product of a network externality: it becomes more valuable as
more parties use it, but that value accrues to parties outside of the deal
in which the standard was created (i.e., parties to future deals). 9 2
Experienced deal participants might seek to use terms that are
"market," meaning that they are widely used and therefore widely
recognized and understood by market participants, such as investors. 93
Boilerplate terms might also be the product of learning externalities if
they have been formed through the experience of those who used them
in the past. The new corporate law associate given the task of drafting
a prospectus can produce a quality product by relying on years of others'
experience. Such disclosures have three attractive features. First, they
might reduce risk and uncertainty because they have already been
tested by the markets and regulators. Second, they might be more easily
understood by market participants who read such language frequently
and immediately recognize the basic message. Third, they might signal
quality by indicating that the company and its advisors understand the
market and are familiar with the latest deals and trends. 94 In a sense,

92. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 2, at 730 (noting that learning externalities allow
early adopters of a term to "confer positive externalities on later adopters"). Reuse of boilerplate
disclosures may also represent the less rational phenomenon of status quo bias. Given that the
actors in IEPO deals (apart from the issuer) are repeat players, one would expect the costs and
benefits of boilerplate to play a greater role than a cognitive bias in determining boilerplate use
over time.
93. See Roberta S. Karmel, DisclosureReform-The SEC is Riding Off in Two Directions at
Once, 71 Bus. LAW. 781, 818-22 (2016) (describing a situation in which market standards have
developed for disclosure of emerging growth companies).
94. Any of these might be described as a learning externality. See Kahan & Klausner, supra
note 2, at 730.
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market forces might then act to sort disclosure language that is effective
from language that is not, and thus perpetuate the effective language. 95
There are potential downsides, however, as parties may be reluctant to
abandon a widely used standard for one that would be more value
creating due to the collective action problem inherent in creating the
new standard. Thus, boilerplate might represent a network or learning
externality, which in turn might have positive implications if it is the
equivalent of easily recognizable language that makes disclosure more
efficient for those who are familiar with it, but may have negative
implications if reliance on it undermines innovating more effective
language.9 6
A hypothesis that emerges from this literature is that lawyers,
underwriters, and issuers might find it valuable to employ language
that has already passed SEC scrutiny and been tested on the market.
The SEC reviews every IPO prospectus and issues comment letters
seeking more information for parts of the document that are unclear or
misleading. 97 Comment letters and the revisions they require take time
to process and can delay a deal, and therefore the lawyers on a deal
98
might use boilerplate to minimize the number of comments they draw.
Several sources of evidence might be examined to empirically test this
hypothesis. If boilerplate is the result of a positive learning externality,
one would expect to see benefits in terms of the outcomes that would
drive the terms' use; transaction speed, the number of SEC comments
disclosures draw, and indicia of investor uptake of information are all
candidates, given that costs or benefits with regard to these outcomes
would create incentives for the use or abandonment of standardized
disclosures. If boilerplate represents language that is market standard
and readily understood by investors and analysts, one would expect to
95. For a parallel point made in the context of fine print in consumer contracts of adhesion,
see Baird, supra note 1, at 949:
By enforcing fine print that most never read, we may be enabling sellers to customize
terms and offer a package that is far better than one that imposed only a general
obligation to conform to generally recognized norms. If there are enough sophisticated
buyers in the marketplace and it is easy enough for them to understand what is in the
fine print, the forces of competition will drive sellers toward efficient terms.
96. For a similar point with respect to contracts, see Smith, supra note 7, at 1176 (describing
contract boilerplate as a modular language through which large, complex deals are broken into
more easily understandable pieces). See also Erik F. Gerding, Contract as Pattern Language, 88
WASH. L. REV. 1323, 1326 (2013) (describing contract boilerplate as a pattern language through
which large transactions are pieced together using various smaller, standardized transactions).
97. Schneider et al., supranote 15, at 23.
98. Id. (discussing the SEC comment process); see also CHARLES J. JOHNSON, JR., JOSEPH
McLAUGHLIN & ERIC S. HAUETER, CORPORATE FINANCE AND THE SECURITIES LAWS

§

3.06 [F] (5th

ed. 2016). From 2013 to 2015, the average number of comments the SEC made in connection with
IPOs ranged from thirty to forty-two per deal. See id. at 3-94 (referencing a 2016 study by
Proskauer Rose LLP examining market practices and trends for U.S.-listed IPOs).
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see indications that it corresponds to greater certainty about an issuer.
As a corollary, the empirical results would show that boilerplate is
associated with less uncertainty with regard to an issuer. However, a
contrary result might indicate a negative network externality.
3. Strategic Use of Boilerplate
Another related group of theories suggests that generic
boilerplate helps issuers to be strategically vague. Strategic vagueness
has been posited in contract design as a way for parties to defer issues
that would be easier to negotiate at a later time or to save resources
when contract issues are unlikely to be relevant. 99 In the context of
disclosure, overuse of boilerplate could serve the additional purpose of
making disclosure intentionally vague, which might be desirable for
some companies.1 0 0 A company may prefer vagueness because it does
not want to disclose specific, sensitive information for fear that
investors will punish it because of that information or that competitors
will use that information against it.101 There may also be more benign,
strategic reasons to disclose in only vague terms. If there is only a very
small chance that a certain kind of information will be relevant to
investors or for the company's prospects, but it is mandated by the
SEC's regulation nonetheless, it may be worthwhile to use an easier,
more standard set of disclosures and worry less about whether language
is rote or generic.1 02
In either of these cases, boilerplate makes sense as a means of
complying with SEC disclosure regulations while disclosing only vague
information. To the extent companies are strategically vague (either on
their own or at their advisors' urging), one would expect the benefits of
making such disclosures to be at least equal to the costs of negative
investor reactions or a possible sanction for noncompliance with the
99. See Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of
Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 852 (2010) (discussing the strategic use of vague
language in M&A contracts as a means of saving resources against the remote possibility that the
language will be important in the future).
100. Cf. Baird, supra note 1, at 949 ("Sellers that want to send signals have to devise ways of
assuring buyers that the promise is not being undercut by what is in fine print.").
101. See Merritt B. Fox, RetainingMandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not
Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1340-62 (1999) (making a similar argument for
investor decisions to disclose generally).
102. See, e.g., Choi & Triantis, supra note 99, at 852 ('If a provision matters only in remote
contingencies, for instance, then the back-end costs should be discounted by that remote
probability, and it may be correspondingly efficient to save front-end costs by using a standard (or
a vague term) rather than a rule."); Eric Talley, DisclosureNorms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 1956
(2001) (observing that, with respect to disclosure in situations of asymmetric information,
"informed parties have an incentive to capitalize on their advantage by devising strategies to
exploit their less knowledgeable counterparts").
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disclosure requirements. These possible costs and benefits are further
assessed below.
4. Tying Theory to Reality: How Disclosure Impacts Investors
One point that should be addressed before proceeding with the
rest of the analysis is the widespread doubt that investors actually read
much, if any, of the disclosure documents produced in connection with
securities offerings. 103 Although the SEC's regulations are heavily
concerned with the ability of individual investors to obtain and
comprehend disclosure, 104 many (including the author) doubt that
investors actually read the IPO disclosure carefully. If that is true, how
can boilerplate make any difference?
There are several plausible mechanisms through which
disclosure can influence investors and markets even if the language is
not completely read, and these possible mechanisms motivate the
empirical approach. First, most of the initial investors in IPOs are large,
institutional money managers such as mutual funds and pension
systems. 105 These entities employ teams of people who can process and
analyze the disclosure and who possess automated means of parsing it
as well. These institutions are key actors in the IPO process for setting
prices by setting demand and by prompting market reaction through
the signaling power of their participation. 106 In fact, these entities' role
is so prominent that some scholars have argued that securities
regulation ought not to consider individual investors at all, and should
instead focus on institutional investors, since they are in the best
107 Regardless of
position to understand and transmit disclosure.

103. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar, supra note 1, at 891 ("The regulatory agenda that requires the
sophisticated party to provide comprehensive information to its clients so as to help the clients
reach autonomous, educated choices has never worked. . . ."); see also Tom C.W. Lin, A Behavioral
Framework for Securities Risk, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 325 (2011) (discussing the divergence
between rational actor models of investor behavior and more realistic behavioral models).
104. For a recent illustration of this, see, for example, Mary Jo White, A Conversation with
Chair Mary Jo White, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/securities-regulation-institute-keynote-white.html [https://perma.cc/GC6C-CAKS] (noting
that individual investors, when it comes to IPOs, "may get very excited from an article or a blog
and invest their money, and so you worry about them not getting sufficient or accurate
information").
105. Sean J. Griffith, Spinning and Underpricing, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 583, 585-90 (2003); cf.
Kasim Alli, Jot Yau & Kenneth Yung, The Underpricingof IPOs of FinancialInstitutions, 21 J.
Bus. FIN. & ACCT. 1013, 1014-16 (1994) (assuming financial institutions act as initial investors in
IPOs).
106. See Alli et al., supra note 105, at 1014 (noting that financial institutions are not as
underpriced as other firms for larger insurance against legal liability for misrepresenting value).
107. See, e.g., Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities
Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711 (2006) (arguing that securities regulation would maximize efficiency
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whether one agrees with that argument, it is rooted in the reality that
disclosure is likely (and perhaps most effectively) consumed primarily
by sophisticated entities.
Investment analysts also influence this process. Although many
firms do not have any analyst following at the IPO stage, for those that
do, analysts read, parse, and synthesize disclosure about an issuer to
be used by other investors. Accordingly, analysts' recommendations
may influence those who do not read the documents themselves.1 0 8
Second, the issuer's road show involves presentations that track
the disclosure in the prospectus. 109 Boilerplate does not bear directly on
such presentations, but it may have indirect effects, because the
investors reading through a prospectus may need to process it quickly
to determine what kind of further information is needed. Perhaps more
importantly, boilerplate may signal to investors that the company has
not conducted thorough due diligence or is intentionally avoiding
disclosing something negative.
Third, and relatedly, the mere act of drafting specific disclosure
prompts the lawyers and bankers to ask questions, conduct research,
and uncover information. In this way, boilerplate may reflect that the
company and its advisors have not asked hard questions or done
thorough research, which may itself result in poor information
dissemination. These possible mechanisms are each relevant to the
analysis below.
II. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF BOILERPLATE IN SECURITIES DOCUMENTS

Natural language processing ("NLP") tools provide methods for
assessing the impact of boilerplate in ways that would have been
difficult a decade ago. In recent years, language processing has entered
wider use in social science and legal scholarship. Legal scholars have

if it were designed for sophisticated institutional investors); see also Luigi Zingales, The Future of
Securities Regulation, 47 J. ACCT. RES. 391, 417 (2009) (suggesting that securities laws should be
designed for efficiency rather than investor protection, and proposing that individual investors
impose unjustified regulation costs on the market).
108. See Jill E. Fisch, Does Analyst Independence Sell Investors Short?, 55 UCLA L. REV. 39,
47-48 (2007) (noting that research sold by analysts is rapidly dissipated and "others cannot readily
be excluded from using the information."); see also Shefrin & Statman, supra note 18, at 28 (noting
that "[i]nsiders create new information when they trade").
109. Liability may attach for false statements made during the road show, see 15 U.S.C. § 771
(2012), and any statements made during the road show that are material but not included in the
prospectus can form the basis for liability for material omissions under the Securities Act of 1933,
see 15 U.S.C. § 771, or Rule 10b-5, see 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018). Although some new information
may be offered during the road show, if provided in written form, it must be accompanied by a
preliminary or final prospectus. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.433 (2018).
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used NLP methods to analyze various types of legal documents 1 o and
finance scholars have used these methods to examine prospectuses1 1 1
and periodic filings with the SEC. 112 In this Part, I describe the methods
used for measuring and analyzing boilerplate in the empirical portion
of the study.
A. Data
The data for the empirical analysis is taken from a variety of
sources. First, a set of IPOs was constructed for the years 1996 through
2015. IPOs for all issuers other than operating companies going public
for the first time are removed, meaning that IPOs of companies spun
off from larger companies, real estate investment trusts, securitization
vehicles, and investment companies were kept out of the dataset. The
reason for doing so is that the goal of this Article is to assess the
information effects of boilerplate and there may be other sources of
information for such companies apart from the IPO prospectus. The
result is a dataset of 2,751 IPOs.
I downloaded the prospectus for each issuer from the SEC's
online database, EDGAR, in either a text or HTML format. For
purposes of the analysis, I used the initial S-1 filing containing a
preliminary prospectus since this version of the prospectus is the one
most likely to be seen by initial investors. I also gathered each final

110. A growing number of legal academics have used language processing and machine
learning to study the law. See, e.g., Jonathan Macey & Joshua Mitts, FindingOrder in the Morass:
The Three Real Justificationsfor Piercingthe CorporateVeil, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 99 (2014) (using
a machine-learning algorithm and text processing to analyze the most common conditions for the
successful employment of corporate veil piercing doctrine); Nelson & Pritchard, supra note 67, at
1-2 (using computational linguistics to examine cautionary language in annual reports filed with
the SEC); Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, ContractingOut of the FiduciaryDuty of Loyalty: An
Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075, 1078 (2017)
(using machine learning to quantify the occurrence of fiduciary duty corporate opportunity waivers
in public companies); Eric Talley & Drew O'Kane, The Measure of a MAC: A Machine-Learning
Protocol for Analyzing Force Majeure Clauses in M&A Agreements, 168 J. INST. & THEORETICAL
EcoN. 181, 183 (2012) (using machine-learning classifiers to identify and analyze material adverse
event clauses).
111. See, e.g., Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 32, at 2821-25 (describing a project in which
natural language processing is used in prospectuses).
112. See Andriy Bodnaruk, Tim Loughran & Bill McDonald, Using 10-K Text to Gauge
FinancialConstraints, 50 J. FIN. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 623, 623-30 (2015) (using an automated
parsing algorithm to measure financial constraints); Tim Loughran & Bill McDonald, Measuring
Readability in FinancialDisclosures,69 J. FIN. 1643, 1643-46 (2014) (noting a recent trend of textbased analysis in accounting and finance literature); Tim Loughran & Bill McDonald, Plain
English, Readability, and 10-K Filings 2-4 (Aug. 4, 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10. 1. 1.531.6671&rep-repl&type=pdf
[https://perma.cc/HXN2-J5QD] [hereinafter Loughran & McDonald, 10-K Filings] (evaluating
readability of 10-K filings and linking readability with investor response).
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prospectus filed pursuant to Rule 424(b), 113 as well as each amended
version in between. 114 I then cleaned the documents in a manner that
is standard for text processing. 115 This involves the elimination of
graphic content, punctuation, and stop words-words such as articles,
personal pronouns, and conjunctions that appear often but provide little
information relevant to meaning. 116 Removal of stop words is standard
in language processing, as these words have been found not to
contribute to the analysis of texts. 117 For all HTML documents, I
removed tags and other HTML code. For all documents, tables
containing numeric information were also removed because such tables
cannot be easily compared and, in any event, are not the source of
boilerplate that the SEC has expressed concern about. Finally, each
word was stemmed-that is, any endings were removed and the word
was reverted to its root, as is standard practice in text processing.1 18
In addition to the text data, I gathered other relevant data for
each deal. I gathered financial information on issuers from Compustat.
I obtained information on the market performance of issuers' securities
from the Center for Research on Securities Prices ("CRSP") and the New
York Stock Exchange Trade and Quote database ("TAQ"). From the
Thomson One database, I obtained the dealsheet for each IPO and
extracted information such as the identity and roles of the
underwriters, the identity of counsel for issuers and underwriters, the
auditors, auditor fees, and the size and timing of the deals.
B. Text Similarity
Once the text was processed and cleaned, I used a number of
methods to assess the amount of boilerplate in each document. The
main method was cosine similarity-a simple but powerful method for
measuring the amount of resemblance in the language of different
documents, which in turn provided the starting point for measuring
boilerplate in the IPO documents. Cosine similarity has been used in

113. 17 C.F.R. § 240.424(b) (2018).
114. Amendments appear on Form S-1/A. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, SEC 870 (09-18),
FORM S-1 (Sept. 2018), https://www.sec.gov/files/forms-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/QYW7-NTSL].
115. See Matthew Gentzkow, Bryan T. Kelly & Matt Taddy, Text As Data 6-7 (Nat'1 Bureau
of Econ. Res., Working Paper, Mar. 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=2941254 [https://perma.cclFE5C-AYF9] ("[C]leaning steps reduce the number of
unique language elements we must consider and thus the dimensionality of the data.").
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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information retrieval systems. 119 While this methodology is widely used
in finance and other fields, it is still relatively new in legal research and
therefore I provide a detailed description of it below. As an additional
validation step, I used another measure of similarity to check the
performance of the cosine similarity method. The method, called
Word2vec, accounts for the location of groups of words together to
assess word context. This method yielded results consistent with cosine
similarity, but required far more computing resources. Therefore, I used
cosine similarity for the Article's primary analysis.
1. General Methodology Description for Measuring Similarity
Cosine similarity is one means of measuring the amount by
which two selections of text overlap. Measuring cosine similarity entails
converting a selection of text to a numerical vector that represents the
number of times each word in the text appears. The appearances of
these words are weighted based on how frequently they appear across
all documents using the common term frequency-inverse document
frequency ("tf-idf') method. The method reduces the importance of
words that appear very frequently across all documents so that the
ultimate comparisons more strongly characterize the similarities and
differences in less common language. The similarity score is calculated
as the dot product, or what can be conceptualized as the cosine of the
angle between the vectors, which can then be interpreted as measures
of similarity. Since the cosine yields a number between zero and one,
the measure can be interpreted as a percentage of similarity or overlap
120
between the compared texts.

119. Cosine similarity is widely used in studies of information processing. See Rada Mihalcea,
Courtney Corley & Carlo Strapparava, Corpus-based and Knowledge-based Measures of Text
(2006),
776-77
INTELLIGENCE
ARTIFICIAL
FOR
ASS'N
Semantic Similarity, AM.
23
(using
.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VBL-NUG6]
http://www.aaai.org/Papers/AAAI/2006/AAAIO6-1
cosine similarity to measure the semantic similarity between text segments); see also Dekang Lin,
An Information-Theoretic Definition of Similarity 1 (1998) (unpublished manuscript),
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edulviewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.55.1832&rep=repl&type-pdf
[https://perma.cc/BG5E-CHT6] (noting that cosine coefficients are utilized for measuring
similarity when "objects are represented as numerical feature vectors").
120. See Mihalcea et al., supra note 119, at 776 ("This similarity score has a value between 0
and 1, with a score of 1 indicating identical text segments, and a score of 0 indicating no semantic
overlap between the two segments.").

224

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 72:1:191

As an illustration, consider an example involving two sentences
from the dataset, which I label Text 1 and Text 2:
Example 1:
Text 1: "Our growth depends on our ability to retain
existing sellers and attract new sellers"
Text 2: "New and existing sellers are key essential factors
for our growth"
These two sentences are first converted into numeric vectors based on
the words they contain. If one imagines these vectors as though plotted
on a plane, the angle between the two vectors shows the degree at which
they are inclined with one another. If they are exactly the same, then
the vectors will be parallel to each other, resulting in zero degrees of
inclination (cosine of one), and if they are completely opposite, then they
will be at ninety degrees of inclination (cosine of zero). 12 1
The inclination of the vectors thus provides a useful means of
measuring the similarity (or difference) between the two. In the
example above, the cosine value equals 0.70, which allows for an
interpretation that the sentences are 70% similar to one another.
For purposes of illustration, some other examples from the
dataset are:
Example 2:
Text 1: "Investors should also understand that holding a
portfolio of stocks even for an extended period of time can
result in negative returns"
Text 2: "Investors holding individual stocks for an
extended period of time also face the risk that the
company they are invested in could enter a state of
permanent decline or go bankrupt"
The cosine similarity value for the above example is 0.55204, or
approximately 55%.

121. The angle of inclination between these two vectors is calculated as their dot product. See
Lin, supra note 119.
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Example 3:
Text 1: "The company produces automobiles"
Text 2: "The company produces aircraft and it produces
satellites"
This gives cosine similarity of 0.575, or approximately 57%.
2. Measuring the Copied Language Between Transactions
I performed comparisons to determine the cosine similarity, or
the effective overlap of the language, that each prospectus shares with
every other prospectus. In order to examine the patterns with respect
to various types of disclosure, I also excerpted several sections of each
prospectus that are considered important for investors: the Risk
Factors, the Use of Proceeds, the Management's Discussion and
Analysis ("MD&A"), and the Business Description sections. 122
I compared the text of every document, and each of the four
individual sections, to the corresponding text from every other
document in the dataset to obtain the cosine similarity for each pair.
The result was a matrix containing 3,784,000 observations.
Using this matrix, I created a measure of the average amount of
overlap in every selection of text to every other corresponding selection
in the same industry, within the preceding year. 123 This approach best
matched what the literature and anecdotal reports describe regarding
the way in which lawyers and bankers draft IPO disclosure-by
starting with recent deals from within the same industry. 124 This
measure served as a basis for the analysis below. 125

&

122. See Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 32, at 2823 (describing the prospectus's most important
sections as "the Prospectus Summary, the Risk Factors section, the Use of Proceeds and
Management's Discussion and Analysis").
123. This corresponds to the definition that the SEC suggests in some of its releases as well.
See, e.g., Plain English Disclosure, 62 Fed. Reg. 3,152, 3,152 (proposed Jan. 21, 1997) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 230, 239) (proposing rule to require plain English "in writing the front
and back cover pages, summary and risk factor sections of prospectuses; revise current
requirements for highly technical information in the front of prospectuses").
124. Cf. Schneider et al., supra note 15, at 12 (noting that choosing the correct form is merely
the beginning of prospectus preparation as they are applicable to nearly all industries).
125. This method is different from the one employed by Professors Hanley and Hoberg, who
construct a "standard content" measure using a statistical regression to determine the relationship
between words in a prospectus and words from other company prospectuses occurring within an
industry within the preceding ninety days, and prospectuses between ninety-one days and one
year before each IPO, and outside of the industry in the preceding ninety days. See Hanley
Hoberg, supranote 32, at 1643. As a robustness check, I employed the method used by Hanley and
Hoberg and obtained similar results.
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C. PhraseAnalysis
A second component of the definition of boilerplate supplements
the simple "copied language" definition. The phrase analysis described
here attempts to separate copied language that vaguely and generically
describes substantive issues (which might be problematic for investors)
from copied language that serves a more innocuous framing or other
function. The goal is to address the problem that cosine similarity may
gloss over important differences in seemingly similar language. To
illustrate, if one considers Examples 2 and 3 from the preceding Section,
each sentence pair has a similar value for cosine similarity, but a
human reader would likely detect more important thematic differences
between the two sentences in Example 3 than in the two sentences in
Example 2. These thematic differences are not completely captured by
similarity measurements alone. In addition, although cosine similarity
is a useful means for determining the extent to which two documents or
sections are similar, it does not help to identify precisely which text
within those sections or documents is similar and which is not.
1. Sentence-Level Analysis
In order to address these issues, I analyzed each sentence in
each document and created groupings based on the topics they covered
or the functions they performed. This in turn allowed me to distinguish
generic disclosure on important issues, repetitive but possibly
informative language, and framing language that should have no
import to investors.
In order to do this, I first extracted every individual sentence
from every prospectus and from each of the individual sections
studied-Risk Factors, Use of Proceeds, MD&A, and Business
Description. I then compared each phrase in each of these sections to
every other phrase in the corresponding sections for all other deals to
determine the degree of similarity between all phrases. I then identified
identical or nearly identical sentences. For this purpose I considered
sentences to be substantially identical if they had a cosign similarity
score of at least 0.7 or greater (and thus could be considered 70% or
more similar). 126 A visual examination of the sentences revealed that

126. The seventy percent cutoff was determined after experimenting with cutoffs of fifty
percent, seventy percent, and ninety percent. There are relatively few sentences that are
completely identical. Lawyers drafting deal documents typically alter the language of even very
similar documents, if even in relatively minor ways, such that the new document is not an exact
replica of its precedent. It is not surprising, therefore, that when I attempt to identify only
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the 70% cutoff was appropriate-it was wide enough so that two
sentences with the same meaning but a few words changed were
counted as being the same (as in Example 1 above), but narrow enough
that it excluded sentences having different meanings but sharing
similar words. The cutoff also effectively separated sentences that
shared most of the same words but differ by one or two words in a way
that would change the meaning. I preserved sentences that appeared in
at least twenty deals.
2. Creating a Topic Model
The process just described yielded the most frequently occurring
sentences across all the documents and their corresponding appearance
throughout all the years and different industry sectors in the dataset.
It was difficult to discern any clear patterns from reading the sentences.
I therefore created topic clusters using principal component analysis, a
statistical technique that is useful for finding latent patterns and
12 7
rooting out redundancies in large datasets.
For each section studied above, and for the document as a whole,
groupings (or principal components) were determined for the
boilerplate sentences throughout all of the prospectuses. Each principal
component consisted of a weighted average for each sentence, with
weightings assigned such that the components describe the maximum
amount of variation in the data. The weightings of each component
indicated the importance of each sentence to its respective topic or
component. This allowed me to group the boilerplate sentences together
by both their meaning and the importance of their recurrence. The
components could also be used as variables that describe the prevalence
of topics in each document. 128 The clusters revealed which repeated
sentences are merely framing language or rote disclaimers that appear
in every prospectus and which pertain to information that investors
might reasonably want specific information about. The framing
sentences and rote disclaimers were then removed from the corpus, and
the cosine similarity measures were recomputed. In removing these
sentences, I used a conservative approach because even seemingly
sentences that are ninety percent similar or more, I obtain only a relatively small number of
results.
127. The principal component analysis reduces the dimensionality of a large data construct by
calculating a number of vectors equal to the number of components in the construct, each of which
is orthogonal (or nearly so) to every other, thus each conveying the maximum possible information.
Hervd Abdi & Lynne J. Williams, Principal Component Analysis, 2 WILEY INTERDISC. REVS.:
COMPUTATIONAL STAT. 433, 433-40 (2010).
128. The twelve most prominent boilerplate topics in each section are set out in Appendix
Table D.
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boilerplate phrases might give information by their presence. For
example, a relatively common phrase states that "summary pro forma
financial data have been derived from the Company's consolidated
financial statements." This seemingly banal statement could provide
information because pro forma financial data is required of companies
that have acquired or plan to acquire other companies, and thus the
reference could itself be an informative signal in such a situation. A
conservative approach is justified. A list of the most common boilerplate
phrases removed is included in Appendix Table H.
D. Robustness Checks
I employed additional tests to check the robustness of the
methods just described. First, I compared all of the documents (as well
as the individual documents' sections) using the Word2vec algorithm.
The Word2vec algorithm is implemented in such a way that it compares
not only the order of all of the words in the prospectuses but also takes
into account the context with which words are used, drawing on a
corpus of word embeddings-i.e., instances in which words occur near
or adjacent to each other in sentences. 129 This method yielded results
highly consistent with the more efficient cosine similarity method. 130 In
addition, I did the analysis using groups of three words (trigrams)
instead of individual words as the basic unit for measurement. The
results from this were similar to those obtained using unigrams, and
for the sake of efficiency I use the original measure for the analysis. I
note that, although different approaches were tested to ensure that the
measure I use is appropriate, no quantitative model of language that
currently exists is perfect, and there will inevitably be some
shortcoming. The model and others like it are useful nonetheless, and
insights can be drawn from it despite the fact that there may be specific
circumstances that the model does not capture.
III. RESULTS OF ANALYSIS
This Part explains the results of the analysis. In doing so, it
describes how the data relates to the theoretical arguments about
boilerplate that can be gleaned from the literature.

129. See Gentzkow et al., supra note 115, at 23 ("[Word2vec] trains the vector representations
for each word to be highly probable given the vector representations of the surrounding context.").
For space economy, these results are not reported here.
130. See infra Appendix Figure 2.
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A. Summary Trends in the Use of Boilerplate
As described above, I calculated a single boilerplate measure for
each deal in a manner that was consistent with practitioner accounts of
how boilerplate is incorporated into prospectuses. 131 The measure used
was the average similarity between a given deal document and all other
deal documents in the same industry group within the preceding
year. 132 This was done by comparing each relevant section of text to its
corresponding section in every other document (or comparing whole
documents for the portion of the graph relating to the whole document)
in the dataset that came from the same industry and was filed in the
preceding year. The averages for each of these are shown in Figure 1,
which graphs the use of boilerplate in the entire prospectus document
and the Business Description, MD&A, Risk Factors, and Use of
Proceeds sections.
Figure 1 provides average similarity percentages for all
documents (whether in the same industry or not, denoted by the dark
gray bar), as well as averages for comparisons between documents
within the same industry (denoted by the light gray bar) in the past
year.
Some interesting patterns are evident from Figure 1. The overall
level of boilerplate in the typical registration statement is considerable.
On average, the prospectuses across the entire time period share
approximately 47% identical content to other recent industry deals. The
averages for the individual sections studied are as follows: 32% for Risk
Factors, 34% for MD&A, 23% for Use of Proceeds, and 15% for the
Business Description. Of course, these averages vary over time, likely
driven by trends in the market as well as regulation, as discussed below.
B. Boilerplate Trends Over Time
Of course, Figure 1 represents only averages, and the actual
levels of similarity for individual deals vary widely by deal and by time.
It is worth examining what might account for these differences and
what impact the SEC's policies have had.

131. See BOCHNER ET AL., supra note 27, at 34 (providing an overview of a prospectus
summary's typical requirements).
132. For industry groups, I used the SEC's Standard Industry Classification ("SIC") categories.
As a robustness check, I also performed the analysis using Fama French 48 industries. The results
were consistent. As a further robustness check, I calculated average similarity for deals outside
the same industry.
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FIGURE 1: AVERAGE AMOUNT OF IDENTICAL TEXT
(ALL DEALS AND DEALS IN THE SAME INDUSTRY IN THE PAST YEAR)
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First, a pattern that is clear from the data, regardless of when a
deal is completed, is that the size of the transaction (measured by the
gross proceeds) bears a strong negative relationship to the amount of
boilerplate that is used in the disclosure, as illustrated in Appendix
Figure 1. The size of a transaction is related to its importance and the
amount of attention it is likely to attract from investors, market
observers, and regulators. It follows that size would be related to the
amount of attention and tailoring that go into the disclosure, and
therefore the size of the offering must be taken into account for any
analysis of boilerplate to be meaningful beyond merely capturing the
effect of deal size.
Second, the similarity measures described above allow for
analysis of how patterns of boilerplate use have changed with time and
evolving regulation. Indeed, an analysis of the trends over time shows
that the level of boilerplate has grown steadily, despite some pullback
based on SEC guidance. Figure 2 depicts the use of boilerplate over the
time period covered in the data.
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FIGURE 2: AVERAGE SIMILARITY BETWEEN DEALS IN THE SAME
INDUSTRY AND IN THE PRECEDING YEAR
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Controls are included for gross proceeds and industry group
(using two-digit Standard Industry Classification ("SIC") codes) to show
that the trend is independent of size, industry, or importance of the
deal. The first discontinuity line corresponds to October 1998, when the
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SEC's plain English rule governing boilerplate in disclosure went into
effect. 133 Subsequent lines are placed to illustrate points at which the
trends in boilerplate use changed over time. For several sections, the
average boilerplate use shows an upward trend prior to October 1998,
and the trend turns immediately downward thereafter before rising
again in subsequent years.
It is plausible that the SEC's plain English rules spurred the
downward trend in boilerplate after 1998. It is not clear, however, what
caused boilerplate use to rise again a few years later in most cases. The
reversal of the downward trend in boilerplate occurred in 2003. There
are a number of possible explanations for this. One possibility is that it
is due to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("SarbanesOxley") and the entry into force of many of the regulations mandated
by it in 2003. Although the law did not target boilerplate specifically, it
is plausible that it might have led to more boilerplate because SarbanesOxley introduced numerous new disclosure requirements that had not
previously been tested by the markets or reviewed by the SEC. 134 In
particular, it introduced new requirements for the management of
public companies to either assess their internal controls and financial
reporting processes or face liability for failure to do so. 1 3 5 As explained
in Part I, if boilerplate represents a network externality, then
boilerplate might be a means for parties to comply with disclosure
requirements through the use of precedent documents, because such
language has passed the scrutiny of the markets and regulators.1 3 6 It

133. The Plain English Rule was proposed in early 1998 and formally went into effect in
October 1998. See Plain English Disclosure, 63 Fed. Reg. 6,370, 6,370 (Dec. 4, 1998) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 230, 239, 274) (adopting a rule that "requires issuers to write the cover
page, summary, and risk factors section of prospectuses in plain English"); see also 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.421(d) (2018).
134. See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
135. Id. §§ 301-03, 401-09, 116 Stat. at 775-78, 785-91.
136. Sarbanes-Oxley spawned many new disclosure requirements. See, e.g., Disclosure
Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; Correction, 68 Fed. Reg.
15,353 (Mar. 31, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229); Disclosure in Management's
Discussion and Analysis About Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements and Aggregate Contractual
Obligations, 68 Fed. Reg. 5,982 (Jan. 28, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 249). Other
new requirements were enacted gradually over time, either incidentally to Sarbanes-Oxley or as
new initiatives. See, e.g., Securities Offering Reform, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722 (Dec. 1, 2005) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 228, 229, 230, 239, 240, 243, 249, 274) (allowing more flexible
incorporation of information by reference for certain companies); Additional Form 8-K Disclosure
Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date, 69 Fed. Reg. 15,594 (Aug. 23, 2004) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 230, 239, 240, 249) (expanding the number of reportable events for
public firms and shortening the filing deadline for many events to four business days); U.S. SEC.
& EXCH. COMM'N, ADVISORY COmm. ON IMPROVEMENTS TO FIN. REPORTING, FINAL REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON IMPROVEMENTS TO FINANCIAL REPORTING TO THE UNITED STATES
SECURITIES
AND
EXCHANGE
COMISSION
(Aug.
1,
2008),
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stands to reason that company officers and their counsel might be
cautious in complying with the new disclosure requirements and might
thus seek to copy language that has already been tested by the market
and regulators. However, whether this explanation accurately captures
the reasons for the upward trend in boilerplate after 2003 is not clear
from the data. Nonetheless, the rise suggests that if dealmakers are
rational, they derive some value from boilerplate that outweighs any
negative consequences from using it.
C. Efficiency Explanationsfor Boilerplate
As discussed above, theory suggests that using cut-and-paste
prospectuses might be more efficient, and if the language is tried 'and
tested, it might lead to less regulatory scrutiny. Indicia of efficiency that
can be observed in the data are the cost of a transaction to the issuer in
terms of both fees and time, as well as the extent to which the deal is
subject to regulatory delay. In this Section, I test the hypothesis that
boilerplate is beneficial to issuers in terms of costs, time, and regulatory
scrutiny. I do so by examining advisory costs to the issuer (legal fees,
the underwriters' discount, and auditing fees), timing of deal
completion, and the number of SEC comments that are associated with
increased or decreased levels of boilerplate.
1. Advisors' Fees
The data provides some support for the hypothesis that
boilerplate enhances efficiency, at least as measured by issuer costs, in
that higher levels of boilerplate are associated with lower legal fees.
However, there is no statistically significant association between
boilerplate and auditor fees, or the underwriters' discount, even though
auditors and underwriters might also contribute to boilerplate use
either directly-through participation in drafting-or indirectly-by
engaging in less due diligence and necessitating less alteration of a
boilerplate precedent. Legal fees in the dataset range from
approximately $20,000 to over $5 million, with average fees equal to
approximately $850,000 and median fees of about $600,000. Linear
regression analysis shows a negative and statistically significant
relationship between boilerplate and legal fees (as the natural log of the
fees). In other words, the analysis bears out the intuition that more
boilerplate is related to lower legal fees, even when controlling for

[https://perma.cclU2ST-4W941
http://www.sec.gov/aboutloffices/ocaacifr/acifr-finalreport.pdf
(recommending measures to streamline financial reporting and eliminate redundancies).
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factors that might otherwise affect each. The factors that I control for
in the analysis include the IPO year, the issuer industry (using twodigit SIC codes), the gross proceeds from the offering, the age of the
company, the size of the company (by assets), and the presence of
venture capital backing. I also use fixed effects for each underwriting
bank and each issuers' law firm. According to the analysis, each
additional 10% of boilerplate in a document is associated with legal fees
that are approximately $46,000 to $84,000 lower (or $65,000 lower on
average). 137 While this is a significant amount, it is relatively modest
given the average fee total.
One might suspect that the relationship between boilerplate and
fees is driven by the quality of the law firms doing the deal or, relatedly,
by how busy the law firm is. The quality of law firm in a practice area
can be measured by both the market share (in dollars) of the deals the
firm does in a given year in a given practice area and the raw number
of deals. 138 Although there are obviously other features that define the
quality of a law firm, market share and deal numbers are a reasonable
approximation of how the market regards the firm's work. These
statistics are also related to the firm's level of busyness. Very busy law
firms may try to be more efficient by using more boilerplate; on the
other hand, they may try to limit boilerplate if it is thought to produce
poor quality disclosures. Neither supposition is supported by the data,
however.
While certain law firms tend to use less boilerplate than others,
the quality or busyness of the firms is not associated with the amount
of boilerplate used. Appendix Figure 2 illustrates that the amount of
boilerplate does not vary significantly from the average regardless of
the quality of the firm. When the relationship between the quality of a
law firm (as proxied by both its experience in raw number of deals and
its deal market share) and the amount of boilerplate is examined using
linear regression analysis, no statistically significant relationship is
apparent for most specifications, and where the result is significant, the
magnitude of the effect is nearly zero, as indicated in Appendix Table
B. Similarly, law firm experience and deal flow turn out not to bear a
statistically significant relationship to the amount of boilerplate used,
once relevant factors are controlled for. One might assume that firms
with greater deal flow would use more boilerplate because they have

137. See infra Appendix Table A.
138. See, e.g., BLOOMBERG, GLOBAL EQUITY CAPITAL MARKET LEAGUE TABLES FY 2017, at 5

(2017),
https://data.bloomberglp.com/professional/sites/1OUPDATE-2-Bloombergs-FY-2017Global-Equity-League-tables.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N8NE-LQHX]
(ranking underwriters by
market share in the U.S. equity market).
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more precedents to draw upon. However, the data does not reveal any
such relationship, as indicated in Appendix Table B.
In contrast to legal fees, accounting fees (and the underwriting
discount) in the dataset bear no statistically significant relationship to
the boilerplate measure. Auditing fees in the dataset range from
$35,000 to $8 million, with an average of approximately $590,000 and
a median of $400,000. The raw data show a general relationship in
which deals with higher amounts of boilerplate tend to have lower
accounting fees; however, this pattern does not withstand the addition
of standard controls in regression analysis, as reported in Appendix
Table A. This suggests that, all else equal, accounting fees do not appear
to be a major factor that should drive reliance on boilerplate and there
is no good evidence that boilerplate leads to greater efficiency with
respect to the accountants' fees.
2. Transaction Speed
There is no statistically significant association between the use
of boilerplate and the speed at which a deal in the dataset is
completed. 139 I measure deal speed as the length of time that elapses
between the time that the issuer files the registration statement and
the date of the offering. This time-period average is 101 days for deals
in the dataset, and the median is seventy-seven days.
In theory, using boilerplate might lead to faster deal completion
because cutting and pasting is faster than drafting and editing
nonstandard disclosure language. On the other hand, boilerplate might
slow deals down if it draws SEC comments which must then be dealt
with through revisions.
The data does not reveal a pattern in the raw data or in a
regression analysis either way. Although this does not definitively
indicate the absence of a relationship, any such relationship is not
strong enough to be apparent in the raw data or when using relevant
controls. Nonetheless, given that the timing of an IPO depends on a
number of factors in addition to disclosure issues, it is possible that any
effect is too attenuated to be perceptible. In any event, the evidence does
not suggest that transaction speed is a compelling reason for the use of
boilerplate.

139. See infra Appendix Table A.
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3. Number and Extent of S-1 Amendments
In order to further assess whether boilerplate impacts the time
efficiency of a deal, I analyze the amount of work that goes into
amending the preliminary prospectus after it is filed. I do so by looking
at the number of times an amendment to each prospectus is filed before
the prospectus is finalized. In addition, I examine the proportion of the
initial prospectus that is amended between the preliminary and the
final versions. If boilerplate is more efficient because it is tested by the
market, there should be less need to amend the prospectus as the deal
is marketed and due diligence proceeds. Therefore, there should be
fewer amendments, and there should be fewer changes between the
preliminary prospectus and the final prospectus.
The data reveals no statistically significant relationship
between boilerplate and either the number or extent of amendments to
the prospectus, as reported in Appendix Table C. The average
prospectus in the data is amended five times in the course of an IPO
transaction. While some deals in the dataset are not amended at all
before the final version is filed, some are amended as many as twentythree times. However, no relationship is apparent between the number
of amendments (or the log of the number of amendments) and the
amount of boilerplate used.
Similarly, there is no statistically significant relationship
between the use of boilerplate in Form S-1 and the amount of the
prospectus that is amended before the final prospectus is filed, as
reported in Appendix Table C. To calculate the amount by which a
prospectus is amended, I calculate the "edit distance" between the
preliminary prospectus filed with the registration statement on Form
S-1 and the final prospectus. Edit distance is a similarity measure that
calculates the number of insertions, deletions, and changes from one
document to another. The data shows that on average, around 16% of
the text of a preliminary prospectus is changed before the final version
is filed. The amount of change for the deals in the data ranges from 2%
of the text to 32% of the text. The lack of any discernable relationship
between the number of amendments and the amount by which the
disclosure is amended weighs against the efficiency theory of
boilerplate.
4. SEC Comments
In theory, boilerplate might represent a positive learning
externality if it is language that has passed muster with the SEC, and
thus can be used efficiently to help navigate the review process. If that
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is the case, then, on average, one might expect that the amount of
boilerplate used in a preliminary prospectus would be associated with
fewer SEC comments asking for clarification. Alternatively, if
boilerplate creates noise, it might lead to a greater number of SEC
comments. In order to assess whether either of these possibilities is
true, I gathered the comment letters for the deals in the dataset that
are available on EDGAR. One complication to this step is that comment
letters were only made publicly available on EDGAR beginning in 2005
and are not available for prior years. Nonetheless, I collect the letters
for the deals that occur during or after 2005. I then parse the letters to
determine the number of comments in each letter.
IPOs in the dataset occurring after 2005 go through an average
of four rounds of comment letters. These deals receive an average of
thirty-four comments between the letters, with a minimum of two and
a maximum of one hundred comments. The data reveals no relationship
between the amount of language copied from other deals and the
number of letters or comments, as set out in Appendix Table C. While
this does not prove the absence of a relationship, it does cast doubt on
the theory that boilerplate borrowed deal to deal enhances efficiency or
represents a learning externality with respect to regulatory review of
the registration statement. It could be the case that learning
externalities exist with respect to specific boilerplate passages, but that
in the aggregate there is no evidence that boilerplate facilitates the SEC
review process. However, it is noteworthy that, despite the SEC's
interest in boilerplate and despite the fact that the SEC flags
boilerplate language for comments, the overall amount of boilerplate in
a document bears no statistically significant relationship to the number
of comments the prospectuses in the dataset drew.
D. InformationAsymmetry
Regardless of boilerplate's effect on the cost or speed of
transactions, an important question for lawyers as well as the SEC is
whether boilerplate has any real impact on a prospectus's ability to
convey information. The question is difficult to answer because investor
reactions are hard to measure directly. Nonetheless, a number of
indirect proxies for investor reactions can, when taken together, provide
evidence as to whether any effect is present. But investors are not
homogenous, and they range in sophistication and ability to acquire
their own information. To tease out the possible impact on different
types of investors, I employ several proxies that are discussed in the
financial economic literature: document readability, offering price
accuracy and the level of underpricing, and the propensity for the
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offering price to be revised or corrected as new information is developed
during road shows. 140
I assess three possible hypotheses regarding the impact
boilerplate might have on investors in the market that tie back into the
literature on boilerplate in other contexts. 14 1 The first possibility is that
boilerplate use has no discernable impact whatsoever. The second
possibility is that boilerplate tends to obscure information in the
aggregate, either out of intentional strategic vagueness or a negative
network externality that leads to overinclusion of needless verbiage. If
that is the case, then, on average, greater amounts of boilerplate would
make it harder for investors or the market to determine the "true" value
of the company's shares. A third possibility is that boilerplate increases
information flow, either as a modular language or due to a network
externality, or both. If that is the case, it could happen in one of two
ways-either through its content, as a form of modular language that
seasoned investors understand, or because its mere presence has a
signaling effect.
1. Readability
One way to assess boilerplate's effect on comprehensibility is to
examine readability. Whether an investor is scrutinizing a prospectus
or flipping through it quickly, readability plays a role in her ability to
absorb information. This is true for investors of all types, but especially
for retail investors. A number of automated readability scoring systems
exist to assess the readability of a text. All of these measures have their
limitations, especially with regard to highly technical documents such
as securities disclosures. However, they have been shown to provide a
reasonable, if only approximate, measure of text readability and,
therefore, in conjunction with the other analysis in this Article, add to
the understanding of boilerplate's role in disclosure.
The empirical analysis shows that boilerplate bears a strong
relationship to the readability of disclosure. I assess readability by
means of the Gunning Fog readability index, a widely used, simple, and
consistent method of determining the readability of texts. 142 The index
140. See B. Espen Eckbo et al., Security Offerings, in HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE FINANCE:
EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 233, 236-38 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2007) (reviewing the method
used for empirical finance literature on IPOs).
141. See supra Section I.E.
142. For one of the first explanations and reviews of the Gunning Fog index, see George R.
Klare, Assessing Readability, 10 READING RES. Q. 62, 73 (1974). The Gunning Fog index has been
used widely in financial research. See, e.g., Aymen Ajina, Mhamed Laouiti & Badreddine Msolli,
GuidingThrough the Fog: Does Annual Report Readability Reveal EarningsManagement?, 38 RES.
INT'L Bus. & FIN. 509, 510 (2016).
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level of a particular document is calculated using a formula that
accounts for the average number of words per sentence and the ratio of
complex words (defined as words with three or more syllables) to total
words. 143 Although the measure is simple, it is considered a reasonable
indicator of the reading difficulty of a text.'"
As demonstrated by Figure 3, the changes in boilerplate by
regulation closely track similar changes in the readability of the various
sections of prospectuses.

143. Klare, supra note 142, at 73.
144. As a robustness check, I performed the analysis using several other readability measures:
the Flesch Reading Ease Index, the Flesch-Kincaid Index, the Smog Index, the Coleman-Liau
Index, and the Automated Readability Index. All produced consistent results. Although the change
in readability varied depending on the test used, the overall pattern was the same.
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FIGURE 3: READING DIFFICULTY OF PROSPECTUSES OVER TIME,
MEASURED BY THE GUNNING FOG INDEX
Risk Factors Readability Over Time
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The scatterplots are binned into fifty quantiles that average the
observations in the data. The graphs demonstrate the trend with
respect to readability of the prospectuses over time. The lower numbers
indicate documents that are easier to read, while the higher numbers
indicate a trend toward more difficult documents.
In general, a Gunning Fog score of eight is considered
appropriate for most audiences, whereas a score above eighteen is
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considered unreadable by most audiences. 14 5 The average Gunning Fog
score for entire prospectuses in the dataset is 17.9. The easiest
prospectus to read has a total score of 10.8, and the most difficult has a
score of 27.3. To put the scores in context, consider that Green Eggs and
Ham by Dr. Seuss has a score of 2.5 and three recent issues of the Yale
Law Journal have a collective score of 14.3.146
As in Figure 2 above, the graphs in Figure 3 are demarcated to
note the points at which the plain English rule was enacted in late 1998
and any points at which the trend changed in subsequent year. Further
analysis confirms a statistically significant change in the relationship
147
between boilerplate and readability, as set out in Appendix Table G.
Although a link between readability in general and overuse of
boilerplate might seem intuitive, it is not clear from the data precisely
why there would be a link between boilerplate and numerical
readability scores such as Gunning Fog that are calculated based on the
number of words per sentence and syllables per word, which are not
necessarily related to boilerplate. One plausible explanation is that
boilerplate develops by accretion-words and phrases are added over
time and not eliminated. Moreover, when language is not tailored, it
means that no one is making any attempt to streamline it and make it
more readable by removing complex words and phrases. Moreover,
although other components of the rule may have also affected
readability when the rule was adopted, the relationship between
boilerplate and readability remains even when a control is used for the
other components of the rule. This suggests that boilerplate itself, or at
the very least, the effort to reduce the use of boilerplate, has a large role
to play in readability.
It has been pointed out that common measures of readability
may not be appropriate for highly technical documents that are
consumed primarily by experts, since these measures were created for
general-use texts. This argument has traction when considering that
experts consume prospectus language and standard readability scores
may not capture the impact of language on these individuals. However,
the readability scores are still relevant to retail investors who are not
necessarily experts in reading such disclosures. To the extent that these
scores reveal relative changes in reading ease, they convey something
145. See Loughran & McDonald, 10-K Filings, supra note 112, at 12 (suggesting that 10-K
filings are unreadable by most audiences because the filings average a Gunning Fog score above
eighteen).
146. Credit goes to Tim Loughran and Bill McDonald for the idea for these examples. For
further analysis of the Gunning Fog Index in relation to various texts, see Loughran & McDonald,
10-K Filings, supra note 112, at 10, 12-13.
147. See supra Appendix Table G; see also supra Figure 3.
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about how boilerplate might affect the accessibility of the disclosure to
the average retail investor.
2. Analyst Assessments
The recommendations of securities analysts also serve as an
indirect proxy for information asymmetry, and thus a gauge for whether
boilerplate contributes to or reduces information asymmetry. Securities
analysts, especially those on the sell side-i.e., those that work for
investment banks and brokerage houses-issue reports and
recommendations about whether to buy, sell, or hold a particular
security. These analysts are sophisticated consumers of securities
disclosures and important intermediaries who digest company
information for other investors who may lack time or expertise to assess
issuances themselves. 148 One way of measuring information asymmetry
for a particular issuance is to look at the divergence of securities
analysts' recommendations regarding the IPO.149 If analysts'
recommendations are uniform or nearly so (for example, if they all
recommend buy, or give a similar earnings forecast), then it indicates
that, whether the analyst community is right or wrong, they are getting
strong signals about a stock's potential performance. 15 0 If the analysts'
recommendations are all different (for example, some say strong buy,
some say hold, others say sell) it indicates that the information
available about an issuer is less certain. 15 1 With respect to IPOs, since
the company usually has not issued any public information prior to the
offering, the analysts must rely more on the disclosure than they might
for companies that have been public for some time.
To investigate the analysts' perceptions, I obtained data on
analyst recommendations from the Institutional Brokers Estimate
System ("IBES"). Although not all companies that go public are followed
by analysts initially, the dataset includes a sufficient number of IPO
firms with at least two analysts covering them (1,859) within the first
sixty days of going public to provide a useful sample. Since these
companies are newly public, many analyst opinions do not give earnings
forecasts, but they do give recommendations ranging from strong buy,
buy, hold, sell, and strong sell. To measure the dispersion, I assign a

148. See COFFEE & SALE, supra note 42, at 122 (describing the role of securities analysts in
equity markets).
149. See, e.g., Jon A. Garfinkel, Measuring Investors' Opinion Divergence, 47 J. ACCT. RES.
1317, 1344 (2009) (linking the level of analyst coverage to analyst opinion divergence).
150. Cf. id. at 1317-18 (suggesting that the degree of heterogeneity among analyst opinions
greatly affects the price of a company's stock).
151. Id.
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numeric variable of one to five to each type of recommendation and then
use a probit model to assess the likelihood that the analysts' opinions
will diverge by more than one category of recommendation. Of course,
many factors besides disclosure affect analysts' forecasts, such as
general market conditions and trends in a certain industry at a given
time. Therefore, I use fixed effects to control for the year, the industry
category, and the underwriter of each transaction. Controls were also
included for the log of the company's age, the log of its total assets, the
log of the number of analysts covering the company, the presence or
absence of venture capital, and the log of the gross proceeds of the deal.
The results in Table 1 demonstrate that boilerplate bears a positive
relationship to divergence of analyst opinions when controlling for those
factors.
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TABLE 1: DIVERGENCE OF ANALYST OPINIONS AS A FUNCTION OF
BOILERPLATE
Dependent Variable:
Probability of Divergence
in Analyst Opinions
(2)

Overall Similarity

(1)
-0.10
(0.15)

Pseudo R2
Number of Observations

0.20
1,389

Risk Factors Similarity
Pseudo R2

0.51**
(0.23)
0.20

Number of Observations

1,299

Use of Proceeds Similarity
Pseudo R'

0.70**
(0.29)
0.20

Number of Observations

1,299

1,285

MD&A Similarity

0.34*
(0.17)

0.48**
(0.22)

-0.09
(0.27)

Probability Change per
10% Change in
Similarity
(3)
-1.00 to -0.90%

0.25
1,111
0.16
(0.14)
0.25

1.60 to 5.10%

1,285
0.21
(0.32)
0.25

Pseudo R2

0.23

Number of Observations

1,227

1,229

Business Similarity

-0.03
(0.08)

-0.08
(0.08)

Pseudo R 2

0.19

0.24

Number of Observations
Prior to 2002 FE
Industry FE
Year FE
[PO * Year FE
Bank FE

1,194
X
X
X
X

1,282
X
X
X
X
X

2.10 to 7.00%

3.40 to 4.80%

0.25
-0.03 to -0.08%

Probit model with marginal effects reported. Controls include fixed effects for
each lead underwriting bank, the IPO year, the industry, and the interaction
of these two sets. An indicator is also included for deals done prior to 2002.
Additional controls for deal gross proceeds (log), the number of analysts
making recommendations (log), issuer age (log), issuer total assets (log), and
prospectus wordcount (log) are

included for all specifications

but not

tabulated. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked
with *, ** and *** are statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level
respectively.

Table 1 shows that boilerplate in the MD&A, Risk Factors, and
Use of Proceeds sections is associated with an increased probability of
disagreement among the analysts' predictions, even after underwriter
fixed effects are included. It is plausible that boilerplate in these
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sections in particular would affect analyst recommendations, given that
they would be scrutinized by anyone looking to assess an issuer.
Two caveats are in order with respect to analyst coverage. First,
prior to 2002, many securities analysts were found to have significant
conflicts of interest because those that worked for investment banks
(which are many of them) were compensated directly by the bankers
and sales and trading operations. 152 Therefore, many analysts had an
incentive to give favorable recommendations to stocks that their banks
were underwriting. 15 3 This behavior included accompanying bankers
and issuer's management on their road shows and helping to convince
investors of the worth of the stock. 15 4 The conflict of interest led to the
"global settlement" among the buy-side analysts and to regulations
mandating that analysts be separated from commercial operations by a
"Chinese wall." 15 5 To account for the significant change in analyst
regulation, a control is used for all deals during or prior to 2002.
Second, as in other parts of this article, a caveat is in order,
because other explanations are possible. For example, it could be the
case that boilerplate is used by companies that are high risk or whose
future performance is more uncertain, and that analysts' opinions on
such companies diverge due to that risk or uncertainty. The regression
analysis includes controls for indicia of risk and uncertainty, but it is
possible these controls do not completely capture the risk and
uncertainty. As a further test to ascertain whether boilerplate has a
direct effect on analysts, I conduct an analysis using matched samples
of issuers, as explained in the explanatory note for Appendix Tables F1
and F2. The results are consistent with those above and provide further
evidence that boilerplate has an effect on analyst recommendations.
This, in turn, bolsters the conclusion that boilerplate matters for
information asymmetry.

152. See James C. Spindler, Conflict or Credibility:Research Analyst Conflicts of Interest and
the Market for Underwriting Business, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 303-05 (2006) (noting that
investment banks would offer positive analyst research in quid pro quos for underwriting
businesses).
153. See id.
154. See id. ("Analysts were, essentially, part of the investment banking team-pitching deals
to issuers, marketing offerings in roadshow presentations to investors . . . ."); see also Daniel J.
Bradley, Bradford D. Jordan & Jay R. Ritter, Analyst Behavior Following IPOs: The "Bubble
Period" Evidence, 21 REV. FIN. STUD. 101 (2008); Michael T. Cliff & David J. Denis, Do Initial
Public Offering Firms PurchaseAnalyst Coverage with Underpricing?, 59 J. FIN. 2871 (2004);
Raghuram Rajan & Henri Servaes, Analyst Following of Initial Public Offerings, 52 J. FIN. 507
(1997); Steven X. Zheng & David A. Stangeland, IPO Underpricing, Firm Quality, and Analyst
Forecasts, 36 FIN. MGMT. 45 (2007).
155. See Spindler, supra note 152, at 304-05 ("With Sarbanes-Oxley's mandate implemented
by the exchanges and NASD, the market for analyst research is effectively outlawed.").
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3. Pricing and Market Reaction
Underpricing, price revision, and the changes in the bid-ask spread
with respect to a newly public company's trading price are additional
proxies of information asymmetry with regard to a company's
securities. As discussed below, underpricing, price revision, and bid-ask
spread have variously been used as proxies of information asymmetry
in a large swath of the financial economics literature. I use these proxies
to assess how boilerplate might affect securities disclosures' ability to
reduce information asymmetry.
These signals are particularly relevant with respect to institutional
investors, because they are the earliest consumers of the disclosure and
the level of institutional investor interest in a deal helps determine the
level at which the initial and final prices of the stock are set. These
investors' level of interest is affected by information asymmetry about
the issuer, which should, in theory, be mitigated by the disclosure. If
the disclosure does a poor job of mitigating information asymmetry,
then the initial investors are more likely to be uncertain about investing
in an issuer. This means that they would require more inducement
before giving the issuer serious consideration, given the uncertainty
involved and the fact that they would have to expend their own
resources, to the extent they could, to obtain the necessary information.
The most salient inducement that issuers and their bankers have
available is the price of an offering. If there is more information
asymmetry with respect to a given issuer, the initial price is set lower
to attract more interest, which in turn will affect the level of
underpricing-the phenomenon of pricing the IPO below the level that
the market will ultimately bear. The lower price also induces investors
to do their own research, including by speaking to the issuer's
management at the roadshow. The result of this process is that these
investors may signal demand that deviates from what the banks
anticipated based on how they thought the deal (and issuer
information) would be received. In that event, the issuers and bankers
might ultimately price the deal above the initial price range. The
interaction between information and pricing makes underpricing and
price correction reasonable proxies for information asymmetry vis-A-vis
the institutional investors.
The bid-ask spread-that is, the difference between the price a
market maker will buy a stock for and the price it will sell for-has also
been widely used to measure information asymmetry. Market makers
keep the spread as compensation for providing liquidity in a security. A
wider spread is thought to represent, in part, higher compensation for
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the additional risk of trading in securities for which information
asymmetry is high and where market makers may be at a disadvantage
to informed traders. Although information asymmetry is not the only
determinant of the spread, it nonetheless serves as a useful proxy for
means of assessing a firm's information environment and its
relationship to disclosure.
a. Underpricingand Bid-Ask Spread as Proxies for Information
Asymmetry

.

Vast literatures exist on the relationship between information
asymmetry and both underpricing and the bid-ask spread. In this
Section, I provide a brief explanation of the salient points from those
literatures needed to provide context for the analysis.
Underpricing is a common feature of U.S. IPOs, and the extent
to which it occurs provides a proxy for the asymmetric information with
respect to a transaction. Underpricing refers to the propensity for an
IPO stock's price to rise on the first day of trading in the market and
come to an equilibrium above the offering price. One might assume that
a large price increase is a positive outcome for an IPO, and indeed some
level of price increase (the first day bounce or "pop") has historically
been a mark of a successful offering. For this reason, underpricing is
often intentional to a certain extent; investment banks routinely and
transparently pitch their IPO clients on an offering price set at a fifteen
percent discount below what they think the market will bear in order
to ensure a pop and attract interest from investors. 156 However, as the
name implies, underpricing indicates that the initial offering price was
set lower than what the market would bear and the issuer thus gave up
proceeds it could have otherwise collected. 15 7 Thus, whether
underpricing is problematic is a matter of degree. The more a stock is
priced below the level needed to ensure a successful deal, the more
15 8
underpricing represents an unnecessary loss for the issuer. Scholars
have puzzled over why issuers would tolerate excessive underpricing,
which has often far exceeded fifteen percent, even surpassing one
156. See id. at 599-612 (describing the potential benefits of underpricing to issuers, including
positive signaling effects and rewarding investor disclosure of demand); Goldman Sachs Grp.,
1999),
18,
(Jan.
4
Public Offering
Initial
to eToys Regarding
Presentation
2
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.comlinteractive/ 013/03/10/opinion/sunday/noceragoldman-sachs-etoys.html?ref=Sunday [https://perma.cc/3G4V-XlVIEP] (describing a "discount,"
usually ten to fifteen percent, necessary to ensure adequate post-offering appetite for stock).
157. See Griffith, supra note 105, at 583-90 (noting that underpricing allows individuals to
quickly resell the shares they were allocated in an IPO for a profit).
158. See id. at 599-602 ("Issuers lose $0.93 per dollar of underpricing. Underpricing is thus
much more expensive to issuers than it is to underwriters.").
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hundred percent in many deals over the past few decades. A number of
theoretical explanations have been advanced, 159 the bulk of which focus
on the role underpricing might play in mitigating the effects of
uncertainty and risk related to the issuer or reducing litigation risk to
the issuer and the underwriter. These explanations in turn also relate
to problems of information asymmetry. According to theory, stock
issuances for companies about which investors have less information
exhibit more underpricing due to greater variance in predictions about
the company's performance and the institutional investors' need for
greater compensation for the risk of investing in an opaque company.16 0
Since the share prices rise quickly to the equilibrium level,
underpricing compensates those investors with immediate returns.
The uncertainty can stem from inherent risk related to the
business, from lack of information about the business, or both. Investors
commonly deal with the inherent risk of particular businesses through
diversification. When lack of information is a problem, underpricing can
provide investors with an inducement to expend resources to gather
their own information about a company. Thus, it is plausible that more
underpricing would be present where a company and its underwriters
underinvest in producing information, which would mean more

159. Most of the theoretical explanations come from finance literature. See, e.g., James R.
Booth & Richard L. Smith II, CapitalRaising, Underwritingand the CertificationHypothesis, 15
J. FIN. ECON. 261, 261 (1986) (hypothesizing that an "underwriter can be employed to 'certify' that
the issue price is consistent with inside information about future earnings prospects of the firm");
Kevin Rock, Why New Issues Are Underpriced, 15 J. FIN. EcON. 187, 188 (1986) (arguing that
underpricing follows from the fact that underwriters discount the price to reach the "uninformed
investor" and counteract adverse selection in the IPO market); Seha M. Tinig, Anatomy of Initial
Public Offerings of Common Stock, 43 J. FIN. 789, 790 (1988) (demonstrating that "gross
underpricing serves as an efficient form of protection against legal liabilities and the associated
damages to the reputations of both the investment bankers and the issuers"). However, the legal
literature has addressed the issue as well. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, The Lawsuit
Avoidance Theory of Why Initial Public Offerings Are Underpriced, 41 UCLA L. REV. 17, 17-22
(1993) ('The 'lawsuit avoidance' theory posits that underpricing IPOs can avoid some suits
altogether and reduce the potential damages in others, thereby serving as a form of insurance
against legal liability."); Barondes & Sanger , supra note 34, at 169 (reviewing theories for
underpricing); Yoram Barzel et al., Prevention Is Better Than Cure: The Role of IPO Syndicates in
PrecludingInformationAcquisition, 79 J. Bus. 2911, 2911-13 (2006) (arguing "that information
preclusion explains why managing underwriters require members of the underwriting syndicate
to behave passively with respect to valuing and pricing an issue, engage in 'reciprocal
participations' with syndicate members across successive IPOs, and maintain stable syndicate
membership over time"); Richard A. Booth, Going Public, Selling Stock, and Buying Liquidity, 2
ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 649, 654 (2007) (offering a solution to underpricing by "conduct[ing]
IPOs by means of a modified Dutch Auction"); James C. Spindler, IPO Underpricing, Disclosure,
and LitigationRisk 15-16 (Univ. S. Cal. L. Sch., L. & Econ. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 94,
2009),
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1105&context-usclwps-lewps
[https://perma.cc/4BMU-Z6JS] (providing evidence consistent with theories that underpricing is
caused by information asymmetry).
160. Barondes & Sanger, supra note 34, at 18.
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boilerplate if boilerplate tends to be uninformative and less boilerplate
if it tends to be more informative. 16 1 Although this is one of several
explanations that has been posited for underpricing, it is especially
plausible where there is high variance in first day returns because it
indicates uncertainty that is at least partly determined by information
asymmetry.162 Consequently, if boilerplate has an impact on
information asymmetry, a relationship should be present between
boilerplate and underpricing. 163
The bid-ask spread of a company's stock is another indicator of
information asymmetry used in the finance literature. 164 Information
asymmetry with regard to an issuer affects the bid-ask spread because
the spread represents, in part, compensation to market makers for the
risk involved in providing liquidity-i.e., standing ready to buy and sell
a given security. If there is more information asymmetry with regard to
a security, market makers require a larger spread in anticipation of
165
increased risk posed by other, more informed traders in the market.
If boilerplate is associated with information asymmetry, one should
expect to see a relationship between it and larger spreads, controlling
for relevant factors (including other determinants of the spread that are
not related to information, discussed below). As time goes on, informed
traders trading in the company's stock provide information and thus
reduce the information asymmetry. Thus if disclosure quality impacts
information asymmetry, one should expect to see more boilerplate

161. See id. (positing that underpricing may occur to compensate uninformed buyers for the
buyers' lack of knowledge about the company, which often leads to the uninformed buyers
purchasing a great portion of the "bad (overpriced) IPOs").
162. This is a variation of Akerlof's lemons problem. For a more in-depth discussion of this
problem as it relates to underpricing in IPOs, see Rock, supra note 159, at 187. It should be noted
that other theories have been advanced to explain underpricing. See Ritter & Welch, supra note
13, at 1795. In any event, information, or lack thereof, is likely to play into underpricing,
particularly when viewed in light of the propensity for price correction (which would counteract
underpricing).
163. See Arnold et al., supra note 29, at 1516 ("Companies with more ambiguity in their
offering prospectuses experience higher underpricing at the IPO."); Hanley & Hoberg, supra note
32, at 2860 ("Greater informative (standard) content decreases (increases) both the price change
from the filing midpoint to the IPO price and underpricing."); Tim Loughran & Bill McDonald, IPO
First-dayReturns, Offer Price Revisions, Volatility, and Form S-1 Language, 109 J. FIN. ECON.
307, 324 (2013) ("In sum, one of the more appealing conceptual frameworks for IPO underpricing
emphasizes the role of ex ante uncertainty.").
164. See Dan Amiram, Edward Owens & Oded Rozenbaum, Do InformationReleases Increase
or Decrease Information Asymmetry? New Evidence From Analyst ForecastAnnouncements, 62 J.
Acc. & ECON. 121, 125 (2016) (employing bid-ask spreads as a measure of information asymmetry
and noting that it is well established that spreads reflect information asymmetry, among other
factors).
165. See id. at 124-125 ("One way to conceptualize this ... is that as a specialist observes
order flow, she increases [the] bid-ask spread to protect herself when it is more likely that order
flow is coming from sophisticated investors that have superior [information] processing abilities.").
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associated with wider spreads that narrow as information enters the
market in other ways, such as informed trading.
b. Analysis of the Data
The data support the hypothesis that boilerplate is related to
asymmetric information and that more boilerplate (in the aggregate at
least) in fact increases investor uncertainty. This is apparent first in
the underpricing data. Figures 4A and 4B illustrate the relationship
evident in the raw data with respect to some of the key sections of the
prospectus. The figures show percentage boilerplate in the Risk Factors,
Use of Proceeds, and MD&A sections by quartile in relation to
underpricing (Figure 4A) and variance of first-day returns (Figure 4B).
The dominant (although not universal) pattern in the raw data is that
underpricing and the variance of first-day returns both increase as
boilerplate increases.
FIGURE 4A: AVERAGE UNDERPRICING IN RELATION TO BOILERPLATE
Risk Factor Boilerplate and Underpncing

Use of Proceeds Boilerpate and Underpncing
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FIGURE 4B: VARIANCE OF FIRST-DAY RETURNS IN RELATION TO
BOILERPLATE

Variance of First Day Returns as Function of Risk Factor Boiterplate
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As Table 2 below shows, the relationship between prospectus
language similarity and first-day price returns remains in ordinary
least squares ("OLS") regressions that include controls for numerous
factors that would have an effect on underpricing. 166 The dependent
variable is the level of underpricing, defined as the percentage price
increase on the first day of trading. The main independent variable is

166. OLS is a statistical method that attempts to determine the relationship between a set of
explanatory variables and an outcome variable of interest by finding a function that approximately
fits a set of data, holding a number of other factors (controls) constant. See JEFFREY M.
WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROss SECTION AND PANEL DATA 49 (2001).

I note that for the Use of Proceeds section, both underpricing and variance appear to drop off
above 29% copied language. It is not clear why that is the case, although it should be noted the
section is typically very short and certain standardized language about the proceeds may have
relatively little impact on underpricing, relative to other parts of the disclosure.
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level of boilerplate, defined as the average similarity between IPO
prospectuses as a whole, and broken down by section.
TABLE 2: UNDERPRICING AS A FUNCTION OF BOILERPLATE
Change in Returns
per 10% Increase in
Similarity

First-Day Returns

Overall Similarity
Gross Proceeds (log)
Adj. R2
Number of Observations
Risk Factor Similarity
Gross Proceeds (log)
Adj. R 2
Number of Observations
Use of Proceeds Similarity
Gross Proceeds (log)
Adj. R 2
Number of Observations
MD&A Similarity
Gross Proceeds (log)
Adj. R2
Number of Observations
Business Similarity
Gross Proceeds (log)
Adj. R2
Number of Observations
Industry FE
IPO Year FE
Industry * Year FE
Law Firm FE
Bank FE

(1)
0.30**
(0.12)
0.09
(0.05)
0.37
2,050
0.22***
(0.13)
0.09
(0.05)
0.36
2,023
0.60***
(0.17)
0.10
(0.05)
0.36
2,023
0.62***
(0.18)
0.10
(0.05)
0.32
2,050
0.00
(0.14)
0.08
(0.05)
0.31
2,020
X
X
X

(2)
0.34**
(0.15)
0.13*
(0.07)
0.34
2,164
0.23**
(0.12)
0.12
(0.00)
0.39
2,162
0.55**
(0.14)
0.13
(0.19)
0.39
2,160
0.51**
(0.19)
0.12
(0.06)
0.34
2,162
0.07
(0.16)
0.11
(0.06)
0.33
2,162
X
X
X
X

(3)
3.00-3.40%

1.70-2.80%

5.55-6.00%

5.10-6.20%

0.00-1.00%

X

Controls include deal proceeds (log) and fixed effects for each lead
underwriting bank, the issuer's law firm, the IPO year, the industry, and the

interaction of these two sets. Additional controls for issuer age (log), issuer
total assets (log), venture capital involvement, volatility, syndicate size,
whether the firm is a technology firm, debt to asset ratio, and prospectus

wordcount (log) are included for all specifications but not tabulated. Robust
standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the industry and year levels.

Alternative untabulated specifications clustering standard errors at the bank
and year levels for the first specification and the law firm and year levels in
the second specification were significant at or below the 10% level for all
specifications.

Estimates

marked with *,

**, and ***

significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.

are statistically
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The regression analysis controls for the log of the gross proceeds
for each deal, serving as a control for the size and quality of the deal, as
well as the log of the issuer's assets to control for issuer size.1 67 The
analysis also uses fixed effects for each lead underwriter, each issuer
law firm, each industry category,1 68 the presence of venture capital
backing in the deal, each year, and the interaction of year and industry
group.1 69 Additional controls are used for the company's age, the
market's volatility (measured by the CBOE Volatility Index), and an
indicator for whether the company is a technology firm, according to
SDC categories.
The table shows that for several of the sections, as well as for the
prospectus as a whole, the average underpricing increases as the level
of boilerplate language increases. That in turn suggests greater
information asymmetry in the offering process as boilerplate
increases.170

A similar effect is evident with respect to bid-ask spreads. The
spread is determined by information asymmetry as well as market
makers'

order-processing

costs

and

inventory

carrying

costs.

71

Accounting for those other factors, wider spreads indicate more
information asymmetry and narrower spreads indicate less. Although

167. In line with the financial economic literature on IPOs, the regressions described in this
Article use the natural log of the gross proceeds of each IPO in order to mitigate skewness in the
distribution of dollar amounts. Eckbo et al., supra note 140, at 275-79. The gross proceeds are
highly correlated with the size of the issuer and are frequently used as a measure of the issuer's,
quality. Id.
168. SIC codes are used to categorize the industry of issuing companies and are assigned for
each securities issuer. See Eckbo et al., supra note 140, at 425. The analyses in this Article use the
first two digits of the SIC code, which represents broad enough category to create groupings of
similar deals, but specific enough to ensure that deals in the same category are in related
industries. As a robustness check, I also tested each specification with Fama French industry
classifications.
169. Fixed effects provide a method of controlling for variation within certain categories of
variables by removing the mean of the observations for the dependent variable of interest. See
WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 166, at 265-66 (illustrating a fixed-effect method). For example, if 2007
was a year that saw a particularly large amount of underpricing, the fixed effect would remove the
year-specific average of the underpricing and leave only the variation attributable to other factors.
The same is done for each IPO quarter, each lead underwriter, each industry, and the interaction
of each industry and year.
170. The argument that unclear disclosure generally affects underpricing has been advanced
elsewhere and supported by other empirical studies. See Spindler, supra note 159, at 30 (providing
an empirical study to illustrate that disclosure affects uncertainty and underpricing); see also John
L. Campbell et al., The Information Content of Mandatory Risk FactorDisclosures in Corporate
Filings, 19 REV. AcCT. STUD. 396, 405-06 (on file with author) (discussing market uptake of risk
information); Todd D. Kravet & Volkan Muslu, Textual Risk Disclosures and Investors' Risk
Perceptions, 18 REV. ACCT. STUD. 1088 (2013) (on file with author) (analyzing market absorption
of risk information from periodic filings on Form 10-K).
171. See Amiram, et al., supra note 172, at 125 (using controls for various non-information
asymmetry components of the bid-ask spread).
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the pattern with respect to spread and disclosure is more difficult to
visualize in the raw data, it can be analyzed in a regression model.
Appendix Table E provides results of a regression model of bid-ask
spreads on the first day of trading and at thirty days and sixty days
after the IPO date in relation to the level of boilerplate. In addition to
the controls included in the underpricing analysis, the model accounts
for noninformation-related determinants of the spread by including
controls for daily turnover, return volatility, and firm size, following the
finance literature. The Table shows that greater levels of boilerplate are
associated with wider bid-ask spreads on the first day of trading,
indicating greater information asymmetry. The Table also shows that
greater levels of boilerplate are more associated with spreads that
become narrower over time compared to issues with less boilerplate
disclosure. This is consistent with the hypothesis that boilerplate in a
registration statement either contributes to, or indicates, information
asymmetry at the time of an IPO and that this asymmetry is reduced
over time as information enters the market by other means.
I note that the analysis with respect to both underpricing and
spreads does not demonstrate that these relationships are causal. It
could be the case that the boilerplate obscures information, or it could
be the case that low-quality issuers use more boilerplate, but would
have experienced more underpricing and wider spreads in any event. I
address this problem in three ways. First, I employ controls for
company age, venture capital involvement, amount of proceeds,
managing underwriters, and law firms since these variables are
correlated with the quality of the issuer.1 72 Older companies have a
longer track record from which to draw information. Those companies
also tend to have long-standing relationships with their bankers and
lawyers, and might therefore expect more effort from those parties in
drafting disclosure.
Deal size is also important for disclosure and the outcome I
analyze here. Larger deal proceeds are correlated with stronger and
larger companies, since it easier for those companies to raise capital
and to attract high quality law firms and underwriters to do so. Fixed
effects for managing underwriters control for some aspects of issuer
quality because underwriters provide a sorting function, in which highprofile underwriters generally take on the highest quality clients.
Venture capital involvement can also indicate quality, given the
resources that such firms can offer and given the fact that such firms
have invested based on information not known the rest of the market.
172. See Eckbo et al., supra note 140, at 276-79 (providing a table of multiple different studies
where a variety of variables are used to determine underpricing).
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The second approach to addressing the causation problem is to
perform a test using propensity score matching. The test involves
performing similar regression analysis on samples of issuers matched
on their predicted propensity to use boilerplate based on criteria that
would otherwise indicate their quality, industry, deal timing, and other
factors, as further explained in the text accompanying Appendix Tables
F1 and F2. The method simulates an experiment in which companies in
a control (low boilerplate) group are compared with similar companies
in a treatment (high boilerplate) group. The results are consistent with
the OLS analysis above. 173
c. Price Revision
As previously noted, an additional proxy for the information
asymmetry between investors and the issuer at the time they review
the disclosure is the amount of offering price revision that takes place
during the road show. 174 In particular, upward price revision, when
viewed in conjunction with the other indicia analyzed here, provides a
means to assess the relationship between boilerplate and information
asymmetry.
When the price is revised upward during the road show, it
indicates that the initial offering price range, set based on the
information available to the underwriter after the preliminary
prospectus is drafted but before due diligence is complete, was set far
lower than the already underpriced level that the underwriter
anticipated would be necessary to attract sufficient investor attention.
A systematic pattern of such revisions linked to boilerplate would be
most consistent with situations in which there is information
asymmetry at the start of the marketing process that is alleviated by
information that became available to the investors through channels
other than the disclosure. The most likely such channels would be the
road show or the investors' own research.
In either case, a positive relationship between boilerplate
disclosure in the preliminary prospectus and upward price revision
would imply that the boilerplate represents less information regarding
an issuer, making the initial pricing less accurate and leaving investors
to obtain information in other ways. Moreover, scholars have pointed
out that pricing can be done in two ways: through preoffering
173. See infra Appendix Tables Fl and F2 and accompanying text.
174. Issuers and their bankers set an indicative price range in the initial Form S-1 based on
estimates of what the ultimate price might be. The final price will end up either within that range,
or it might be revised up or down from the initial range based on investor interest after the road
show. See BOCHNER, supra note 27, at 47 (describing the road show process).
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information discovery (via due diligence) or through book building,
during which investors express their level of interest (i.e., demand) for
the stock after being allowed to meet the company's management, read
the disclosure, and ask questions.1 7 5 These scholars posit that there is
a tradeoff between due diligence and book building. An issuer (and
perhaps more importantly, its underwriters) can invest in conducting
due diligence and set the price accordingly, or it can simply set a low
price and effectively pay off the initial investors to do their own research
on the company. Less due diligence would result in less specific
disclosure and more boilerplate borrowed from other deals, while
reliance on book building would be marked by more price revision as
the issuer and its investment banks set the initial price low to induce
initial investors to do their own research. 176 Accordingly, a relationship
between boilerplate and price revision would also indicate a
relationship between boilerplate and information asymmetry.
d. Analysis of Price Revision
The pattern in the price revision data is consistent with the
conclusion that boilerplate is related to information asymmetry.
Looking at the raw data first, Figure 5 illustrates a generally positive
relationship between the amount of copied language and a greater
likelihood of upward price revision. The Figure shows the percentage of
the relationship between boilerplate and price revision in the Risk
Factors, Use of Proceeds, and MD&A sections (demarcated at the 25th
and 50th percentiles). The mean occurrence of price revision trends
upward for all three sections, although I note that the confidence
intervals overlap significantly.

175. See Loughran & McDonald, supra note 163, at 315 ("The higher the uncertainty
surrounding the IPO's valuation, the more likely new information (positive or negative) revealed
during the bookbuilding process will have a significant impact in offer price revisions.").
176. See id. at 318 ("We could expect the IPOs with substantial uncertain/ negative language
to have, on average, low preliminary offer prices, large upward price revisions, and high first-day
returns due to the need of bankers to compensate investors for their information production.").
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FIGURE 5: RISK FACTOR BOILERPLATE AND PRICE REVISION
MD&A Boilerplate and Price Revision
Risk Factor Boilerplate and Upward Price Revision
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The relationship remains in a probit regression analysis of the
probability that a deal's price will be revised outside the initial range,
17 7 as shown in Table
given the amount of boilerplate in the disclosure,
3.

177. A probit model is a statistical model in which the outcome variable can take on only one
of two values; it is useful for estimating the probability of an event occurring, versus the probability
of the event not occurring. See WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 166, at 457-58 (illustrating the probit
model).
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TABLE 3: PRICE REVISION AS A FUNCTION OF BOILERPLATE
Probability Change
per 10% Change in

Price Revision
Overall Similarity
Pseudo R2
Number of Observations
Risk Factors Similarity
Pseudo R2
Number of Observations
Use of Proceeds Similarity
2

Pseudo R
Number of Observations
MD&A Similarity
2

Pseudo R
Number of Observations
Business Similarity
Pseudo R2
Number of Observations
Industry FE
IPO Year FE
Industry * Year FE
Bank FE
Law Firm FE

(1)
0.26**
(0.11)
0.20
1,805
0.29***
(0.09)
0.22
1,873
0.12
(0.15)
0.23
1,873
0.19*
(0.11)
0.23
1,867
0.04
(0.21)
0.22
2,372
X
X
X
X

(2)
0.24*
(0.13)
0.23
1,589
0.33**
(0.16)
0.24
1,658
0.04
(0.20)
0.24
1,658
0.29**
(0.14)
0.24
1,652
0.26
(0.27)
0.23
2,157
X
X

Similarity
(3)
2.40 to 2.60%

3.00 to 3.30%

0.04 to 1.20%

1.19 to 2.90%

0.40 to 2.60%

X
X
X

Marginal effects reported. Controls include fixed effects for each lead
underwriting bank, the issuer's law firm, the IPO year, the issuer's industry
category, and the interaction of these two sets. Additional controls for issuer
age (log), issuer total assets (log), deal proceeds (log), venture capital
involvement, volatility (as VIX level), syndicate size, whether the firm is a
technology firm, debt to asset ratio, and prospectus wordcount (log) are
included for all specifications but not tabulated. Robust standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the bank and year levels for the first
specification and the law firm and year levels in the second specification. An
alternative specification clustering standard errors at the year and industry
levels was also performed but not tabulated. Estimates marked with *, **,
and *** are statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.

Table 3 indicates that for several of the sections, an increase in
boilerplate is associated with an increased likelihood of upward price
revision. In particular, boilerplate in the Risk Factors and MD&A
sections leads to a higher probability of upward price revision,
indicating a relationship between boilerplate in those sections and
information asymmetry.
Once again, this analysis does not demonstrate that these
relationships are causal. The analysis includes controls for company
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age, venture capital involvement and amount of proceeds, since these
78
variables are highly correlated with the quality of the issuer.1 Fixed
effects are used for each lead underwriter and the issuer's law firm,
which are related to the quality of the issuer and characteristics of the
deal, including disclosure. Fixed effects are also used for the issuer's
industry, the IPO year, and the interaction of the two, to account for
trends in each. In addition, as with underpricing and spread, I perform
an analysis using matched samples of issuers, as further explained in
Appendix Table G and the accompanying text.17 9
4. Litigation
The probability of drawing prospectus-related securities
litigation provides a final metric of the effectiveness of boilerplate in
creating information asymmetry. Issuers, and in some cases their
underwriter and auditors, can be held liable for material misstatements
or omissions in their disclosures. 18 0 Litigation might be related to
boilerplate in those disclosures in a number of ways. First, boilerplate
language can act as a type of catch-all disclosure that could potentially
act as cheap insurance to protect issuers from litigation arising out of
1
alleged omissions or misrepresentations in the offering document.18 If,
for example, certain risk factors have been found to sufficiently warn
investors of certain risks and resulted in dismissal of securities lawsuits
in the past, other firms would adopt the same disclosures to be afforded
the same protection. If these disclosures offer such protection more
often than not, then one would expect boilerplate to be associated with
lower litigation risk on average.
On the other hand, generic boilerplate disclosures may fail to
protect issuers from liability if they are too generic to be considered
meaningful, as described anecdotally in the Wayfair case discussed in

&

178. See Eckbo at al., supranote 140, at 276-79 (providing a table of multiple different studies
where a variety of variables are used to determine underpricing).
179. For a fuller account of this analysis, see infra explanatory note for Appendix Tables Fl
and F2.
180. Securities Act of 1933, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012).
181. See BOCHNER, supra note 27, at 34 ("The Risk Factors section is commonly perceived
simply as lawyers' boilerplate, but a properly prepared risk factors discussion is carefully tailored
to the company and can provide substantial protection from liability."); US IPO Guide, LATHAM
2018), https://m.1w.com/thoughtLeadership/lw-us-ipo-guide
WATKINS LLP 58 (May 31,
[https://perma.cc/4TLD-CSFU]; Patrick J. Schiltheis et al., The Initial Public Offering: A
Guidebook ForExecutives And Directors, WILSON SONsiNI GOODRICH & ROSATI 140 (3rd ed. 2008),
[https://perma.cc/TAN8https://www.wsgr.com/publications/PDFSearch/IPO-guidebook-3.pdf
G6AV] ("[Glood risk factor disclosure may be the company's 'cheapest form of insurance.' There
are certainly plenty of examples in securities litigation where risk factor disclosure led to the
dismissal of multi-million dollar securities class action lawsuits.").
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the Introduction. 182 Such disclosure might fail to convey specific
information about a company that turns out to be critical for assessing
a company's risks and prospects. If a company's share price does poorly
and the performance is related to matters covered by generic boilerplate
disclosure, then litigation is more likely to ensue based on the theory
that more specific information should have been given. Indeed, some
scholars have theorized that generic risk disclosures might even attract
litigation by obscuring problems with the company, which could deceive
investors or provide a roadmap for plaintiffs' attorneys seeking
language to ground a claim upon. 183 Moreover, if expansive use of
boilerplate results from a lack of careful due diligence of the company
by its lawyers and underwriters, or reticence to disclose harmful
information, then it is more likely that important information was not
disclosed to investors, and possibly not even discovered by its advisors.
It might thus call into question the reliability of the disclosure as a
whole and result in more situations ripe for litigation.
The raw data indicates that more boilerplate in certain sections
of the prospectus is generally related to more litigation. Figure 6
illustrates this relationship, indicating a higher average share of
litigation in those deals with boilerplate higher than the 25th percentile
for Risk Factors, Use of Proceeds, and MD&A sections.

182. See Dingee v. Wayfair Inc., No. 15cv6941(DLC), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68322, at *10-11
(S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2016) (reviewing vaguely worded risk factor disclosure in an IPO). As noted
above in Part I, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 created a safe harbor,
protecting issuers from litigation based on forward-looking statements, as long as they provide
"meaningful cautionary language" in the prospectus. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A) (2012) (stating
that a person should not be liable for a forward-looking statement that is accompanied by
meaningful cautionary statements). However, the safe harbor explicitly does not apply to IPOs.
See id. ("[Tihis section shall not apply to a forward-looking statement ... that is ... made in
connection with an initial public offering .... .").
183. See Spindler, supra note 159, at 33 ("[Cjontrolling for risk of litigation, more disclosure
makes a firm more likely to be sued for in relation to its IPO."); see also Saumya Mohan, Disclosure
Quality and Its Effect on Litigation Risk 38 (Sept. 1, 2006) (unpublished dissertation, McCombs
School of Business, University of Texas at Austin), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=956499 [https://perma.ecd53P9-MY9E] ("My findings are that filings which are long
but contain a smaller proportion of informative words such as numbers, past and future related
words are more likely to precede shareholder lawsuits."); Nelson & Pritchard, supra note 67, at 28
("High risk firms also revise their cautionary language more from year-to-year, suggesting they
avoid boilerplate warnings that are unlikely to garner legal protection under the statute.").
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FIGURE 6: RISK FACTOR BOILERPLATE AND
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As in other parts of this Article, Table 4 shows the results of a
linear regression of boilerplate on IPO-related class actions filed in
federal courts within three years after a company's IPO.1M The analysis

shows a statistically significant relationship with respect to prospectus
boilerplate and litigation: a 10% greater level of boilerplate is associated
with between a 1.5% and 4% increase in the likelihood that an issuer
will be subject to securities litigation.

184. Three years is the statute of limitations period for lawsuits brought under Sections 11
and 12 of the Securities Act. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77m (2012). It is the shortest
statute of limitations period for the legal provisions that form the bases of most IPO litigation.
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TABLE 4: LITIGATION AS A FUNCTION OF BOILERPLATE

Occurrence of Federal Securities Litigation Within

Three Years of IPO
Overall Similarity
Adj. R 2
Number of Observations
Rf Similarity
2

Adj. R
Number of Observations
UP Similarity
2

Adj. R
Number of Observations
MD&A Similarity
Adj. R 2
Number of Observations
Business Similarity
Adj. R 2
Number of Observations
Industry FE
IPO Year FE
Industry * Year FE
Litigation Target FE
Law Firm FE

(1)
0.37***
(0.11)
0.46
1,751
0.25**
(0.11)
0.50
1,749
0.02
(0.20)
0.51
2,331
0.24**
(0.12)
0.70
2,223
0.22
(0.30)
0.50
2,327
X
X
X
X
X

Law Firm Market

(2)
0.10
(0.07)
0.28
2,317
0.16**
(0.05)
0.36
2,317
0.18**
(0.09)
0.60
2,317
0.30***
(0.08)
0.59
2,305
0.11
(0.32)
0.48
2,314
X
X
X
X

(3)
0.28*
(0.16)
0.33
1,971
0.23**
(0.09)
0.38
2,329
0.19**
(0.08)
0.59
2,332
0.30***
(0.08)
0.60
2,257
0.11
(0.32)
0.61
2,327
X
X
X
X

(4)
0.10
(0.07)
0.59
2,317
0.24**
(0.10)
0.60
2,317
0.26***
(0.05)
0.59
2,317
0.34***
(0.09)
0.61
2,305
0.11
(0.35)
0.40
2,314
X
X
X
X

Probability
Change per 10%
Change in
Similarity
(5)
1.00 to 3.70%

1.60 to 2.50%

2.60 to 4.30%

2.40 to 3.40%

1.90 to 3.90%

X

Share
Bank FE
Bank Market Share

X
X

Marginal effects reported. Controls include fixed effects for the issuer's law
firm (in the first specification), fixed effects for each lead underwriter (in the
third specification), an indicator for whether the firm is a likely litigation
target, the IPO year, the issuer's industry category and the interaction of
industry and year. Issuer's law firm market share (in the second
specification) and lead underwriter market share (in the fourth specification)

are also included. Additional controls for issuer age (log), issuer total assets
(log), deal proceeds (log), issuer's level of debt at the time of the IPO (log),
venture

capital involvement,

debt to asset ratio,

turnover

(log), and

prospectus wordcount (log) are included for all specifications but not
tabulated. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Estimates
marked with *, ** and *** are statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1%

level respectively.

As in other parts of this Article, caveats are in order. The
analysis does not demonstrate that these relationships are causal. For
example, it could be the case that issuers who are already more likely
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to face litigation rely on boilerplate to mitigate their risk. If that is the
case, it is also possible that such issuers would have experienced more
litigation had they not used the boilerplate that they did. I use a number
of approaches to address these possibilities. I include a variable to
indicate firms that are especially likely to be targets of securities
litigation to control for firms' ex ante litigation risk, borrowing from
other literature.1 8 5 I also include controls for other indicia of firm
quality and transaction quality, both of which affect the probability of
litigation. This includes controls for company age, venture capital
involvement, amount of proceeds, the size of the issuer (by assets), the
issuer's amount of sales, and the amount of debt the issuer holds. I also
control for the quality of the issuer's law firm and issuer's underwriter,
as represented by their dollar market shares in IPO transactions in the
preceding year, in addition to including underwriter and issuer law firm
fixed effects in some specifications. These controls are related to the
quality of the issuer as well as the quality of the disclosure. Fixed effects
are also used for the issuer's industry, the IPO year, and the interaction
of the two to account for trends in each, especially given that certain
industries draw more litigation than others at different times. In
addition, I perform an analysis using propensity score matching on
samples of issuers, as discussed in the explanatory text preceding
Appendix Tables Fl and F2. The analysis yielded statistically
significant results (at or below the 10% level) consistent with those in
Table 4 with respect to the Risk Factors, MD&A, and Use of Proceeds
sections. Results for the entire document and for the Business
Description were not statistically significant, which means they do not
bolster, but do not necessarily refute, the results of the analysis above.
E. Discussion of the Results
The analyses lead to a number of conclusions but also raises
more questions. First, the analyses show that, in the aggregate,
boilerplate is associated .with more indicia of information asymmetry,
suggesting either that boilerplate tends to hinder investors from
becoming informed about issuers or that its mere presence signals lower
quality information about an issuer. Moreover, boilerplate is associated
with higher costs to issuers: underpricing forces issuers to leave money
on the table when deals are priced lower than what the market would
185. See Nelson & Pritchard, supra note 67, at 2, 7-10 (explaining the use of a variable
indicating firms with a high risk of litigation and firms with a low risk of litigation). For purposes
of this analysis, specific industry groups identified as being high risk for securities litigation are
those with SIC codes 2833-2836, 2911, 3571-3577, 3612-3679, 4925, 4931, 4911, 4812-4813,
6162-6163, 6211-6289, 7370-7379, 8721, and 8731-8734.
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have born, and higher litigation risk means higher legal fees and
potential settlement costs. It is plausible that the boilerplate language
itself creates these adverse consequences; however, even if that is not
the case, at the very least the presence of a large amount of boilerplate
provides a signal about the information asymmetry the market
perceives regarding a company.
The results do not mean that all boilerplate in IPO disclosures
is linked to higher costs or less efficient outcomes. Indeed, every
prospectus in the dataset contains language that appears nearly the
same form in other prospectuses. The important point is the general
trend: the greater the level of copied language, the less information
conveyed on average and the higher the costs for the issuer.
These conclusions have implications for boilerplate theory as it
applies to securities disclosure. Although the results do not establish
that any single theory explains the boilerplate phenomenon completely,
they indicate strengths and weaknesses of various theories' explanatory
power. Intuitively, one would imagine that boilerplate is efficient,
perhaps the product of a learning externality that helps new lawyers
draft quality documents and more seasoned lawyers negotiate them. If
boilerplate is used to make deals more efficient, however, it does not
seem to be a good value proposition from the perspective of the issuing
companies. For instance, although boilerplate may be an efficient (and
perhaps strategically vague) means by which to make disclosure, that
efficiency (or strategy) comes at a price. If an issuer from the dataset
pays, on average, $65,000 less in legal fees for each additional 10% of
boilerplate disclosure in a whole prospectus (taking the average of the
range in fee reduction from Appendix Table A), that savings will be
overwhelmed by the loss an average issuer is likely to experience due
to underpricing. For instance if the additional 10% boilerplate were
found in the MD&A section, the transaction would be expected to lose,
on average, between $5 to $6.2 million to underpricing. 186 In addition,
the company would face extra litigation risk, increasing the expected
settlement amount of a class action claim by approximately $600,000 to
$850,000 on average, and possibly much more if the litigation went to
trial or failed to settle within the typical range.18 7 That amount includes
186. The average size of deals in the dataset is $106,000,000. This number would be multiplied
by the increased level of underpricing that corresponds to risk factor boilerplate.
187. The average payment for settlement of securities class actions during the period of the
study is approximately $25 million, while the median settlement amount is approximately $6
million. See Securities Class Action Settlements 2015 Review and Analysis, CORNERSTONE RES. 810 (2016), http://securities.stanford.edu/research-reports/1996-2015/Settlements-Through-122015-Review.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4NA-DMKS] (presenting data on all securities class action
settlements from 1996 through 2015). A simple formulation of the average expected loss for a class
action settlement would be the increase in probability (approximately 1.6% to 3.1%) multiplied by
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only the actual settlement; one would still have to account for attorneys'
fees, time costs, reputation costs, and the loss of value of the company's
stock to assess the full impact of such litigation. It is possible that
boilerplate merely signals low quality or high variance regarding an
issuer that cannot be changed or mitigated, in which case perhaps such
issuers would rather save money on legal fees if no amount of tailored
disclosure would help. However, the analyses, all taken together,
supports the conclusion that boilerplate has a role in affecting
information asymmetry and, resultantly, costs to issuers, either
through its information effects or through its signaling effects.
Tailoring disclosure could therefore result in less information
asymmetry and lower costs. Even assuming that some of the costs are
justified and there are time savings from using boilerplate that are not
captured through reduced advisory fees, it seems that boilerplate is not
always worth its costs.
A question remains as to why high levels of boilerplate continue
to appear in some deals, despite the SEC's efforts to reduce it and the
costs that it carries with it. It is possible that at least some individual
boilerplate provisions do facilitate communication or signal conformity
with market norms. An analysis of the topics taken from the principal
component analysis ("PCA") shows that some individual boilerplate
topics are associated with indicia of less information asymmetry (i.e.,
more information flow). These results are not presented here, but they
raise questions for future work. Although the topic model used here
must be interpreted carefully given that PCA has no causal
interpretation, it nonetheless raises the possibility that individual
modules of boilerplate can convey information. But the clearest pattern
in the data analyzed in this Article suggests that, in the aggregate,
boilerplate is associated with negative information effects. If it has no
use at all, one might conclude that market forces would reduce it, at
least to the point that its benefits equal or outweigh its costs. But that
does not seem to be the case.
One explanation for why large quantities of boilerplate are used
despite potential drawbacks is that there are benefits from using it that
are difficult to observe and measure. It is possible that boilerplate is
used strategically by issuers, perhaps on the advice of underwriters or
counsel; or issuers might use generic language to vary their chosen level
of disclosure-in essence choosing to reveal less information while still
complying with the letter of the law. The benefits of doing so might be
to delay giving detail about negative information until the company is
the expected average loss ($25 million). Disclosure dollar loss-the amount of stock market value
lost after a company discloses a securities class action settlement-would be even larger. Id. at 11.
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in a better position, or to prevent competitors from obtaining sensitive
information about the company's workings. If issuers are rational, then
they might be willing to pay the price for these benefits. That
explanation would be consistent with theories of strategic vagueness.
Institutional investors may be indifferent if they are appropriately
compensated for doing their own research through underpricing, which
allows them to realize large short-term returns. For such investors, the
disclosure is just the starting point of the process through which they
will gather information from the issuer and elsewhere. It is difficult to
see what benefit retail investors derive, however, since they pay full
price in the market. Thus, if the law is concerned with protecting small
retail investors, the equilibrium that allows so much boilerplate to
persist is more problematic.
Another possibility is that very large amounts of boilerplate in a
securities disclosure represent the capture of a deal's value by parties
other than the issuer. Strategic vagueness could be driven by a firm's
advisors-in particular, the underwriters-who lose little but stand to
gain a lot if an IPO is underpriced. In particular, high levels of
underpricing create substantial benefits for underwriters that easily
outweigh any losses they suffer from forgone commissions.1 88 The
underwriters lose out on seven percent (the typical underwriting
commission) of the underpriced amount. However, underwriters gain
substantial benefits by allocating the underpriced stock to favored
investors, who return that favor through future business and trading
commissions. 18 9 Indeed, the underwriter might have an incentive to
underprice the issue to a much higher degree than what the issuer
should want because the underwriter captures the benefits from
underpricing. Consequently, the underwriter can save time and effort

188. See Griffith, supra note 105, at 590-99 (evaluating methods by which underwriters can
minimize risk and maximize reward, including underpricing).
189. See Ritter & Welch, supra note 13, at 1810 ("There is some evidence that underpriced
share allocations have been used by underwriters to enrich buy-side clients in return for quid pro
quos . . . ."); see also Griffith, supra note 105, at 593-94:
[U]nderwriters may be able to increase profits above their base compensation by
engaging in underpricing. This may seem contradictory since, as noted above,
underwriter compensation is a percentage of aggregate offering proceeds, which are
maximized by raising, not lowering, the offering price. However, underpricing creates
an additional profit opportunity for underwriters by enabling the practice of spinning.;
Loughran & Ritter, supra note 13, at 8-9 (analyzing the factors that incentivize underwriters to
underprice IPOs). The profitability of allocating underpriced stock to favored investors was a
significant issue in the litigation surrounding the eToys IPO. See Joe Nocera, eToys v. Goldamn
Sachs: The Documents, N.Y. TIMES 1-8 (Mar. 9, 2013), https://archive.nytimes.com/
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/03/10/opinion/sunday/nocera-goldman-sachs-etoys.html?ref=
Sunday [https://perma.ccl3G4V-XMEP]
(Goldman Sachs internal documents reflecting
compensation "owed" to the bank from investors receiving underpriced IPO allocations).
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on due diligence by impelling the use of boilerplate while losing little
(and perhaps gaining). Litigation is also less of a concern for
underwriters because they have more defenses available to them than
issuers do in suits based on misleading registration statements. The
issuer's management, which relies on the underwriter and counsel for
advice, may not realize the tradeoff being made. If that is true, then the
intuitive and theoretical premise that boilerplate is efficient is indeed
true-just not for the issuer. Rather, boilerplate's efficiency gains
accrue to the underwriters, who can substitute due diligence for generic
disclosure and pay few if any of the costs.
Finally, boilerplate may be the product of a network externality,
which could be helpful or harmful. Lawyers or bankers might borrow
from others within their network, free-riding on the drafting that others
have done and avoiding having to reinvent the wheel. There is some
evidence in the data that different boilerplate topics revealed by the
topic model have diffused differently in different geographic regions,
lending credence to the network externality explanation. The
externalities from network effects may be positive or negative. For
certain discrete types of disclosure, a standard form might provide
value in deals and provide a positive externality. However, some
boilerplate disclosures may be passed on without much critical revision.
Since no one party internalizes the full benefit of refining general
disclosures, there is no incentive to try to make them better or to think
about them much at all. This, coupled with human tendency to
gravitate toward the status quo and precedent, might explain the
perpetuation of boilerplate even when too much of it can have harmful
consequences. 190 If that is the case, then boilerplate represents another
type of value transfer from issuers to their advisors. These
consequences may be unrecognized and unintended, stemming from
habitual practices of dealmakers who fear straying from the template
provided by other successful deals. 191 Moreover, these precedents
provide a way to lessen the cognitive cost of learning and complying
with the SEC's complex requirements. Since the law firms drafting the
190. This would be the textual version of the cognitive bias known as the anchoring effectthe formation of a belief about the value of something, based on a specified initial value, regardless
of whether that initial value is salient or entirely irrelevant. See JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 14 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) ("In many situations, people make
estimates by starting from an initial value that is adjusted to yield a final answer... . [D]ifferent
starting points yield different estimates, which are biased toward the initial values. We call the
phenomenon anchoring.").
191. Cf. Mark Weidemair, Robert Scott & Mitu Gulati, Origin Myths, Contracts, and the Hunt
for Pari Passu, 38 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 72, 96 (describing lawyers using boilerplate language acting
as "custodians of some ancient and sacred document-one whose inscrutable text they would not
dare to alter").
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disclosure do not internalize the cost of using it, they may not always
have incentives to refine it. The SEC's complex regulations may,
ironically, be partly responsible for all the boilerplate; at the same time,
it is an area where energetic SEC action would help. Addressing
boilerplate may be both simpler and harder than it would be if it were
primarily used strategically. It would be simpler because there is no
party with a particular vested interest in using it; it would be more
difficult because human habits can be hard to change, even when the
humans know they should change them. Moreover, given the SEC's
other priorities, boilerplate may end up low on its list of enforcement or
rulemaking activities.
In sum, the data points to a deleterious role for boilerplate in
IPO disclosure, at least in the aggregate. However, the analysis in this
study does not definitively determine why boilerplate persists or how it
fits with theory, but it does shed light on some of the main possibilities,
leaving questions for further inquiry. A better understanding of the role
that boilerplate plays in the interaction between issuers, investors,
bankers, and lawyers might help to guide dealmakers and policymakers
in future transactions.
IV. FURTHER ANALYSIS
For any lawyer who has spent late nights crafting a well-tailored
narrative from seemingly lifeless boilerplate, wondering if the exercise
was worthwhile, the evidence from the past few decades of IPOs
indicates that it often is. The results also indicate that the SEC is
justified in trying to limit boilerplate, and courts are right to be
skeptical of boilerplate disclaimers, because high levels of such generic
language are associated with deals in which information is not conveyed
to investors very well. But despite the best efforts of the profession and
the SEC to regulate boilerplate, it continues to be an ever-growing
staple of securities disclosure. This Part describes the implications that
this study supports and makes suggestions for the SEC's reform efforts.
A. Disclosure Tradeoffs
One possibility that these findings raise is that, to some degree,
good disclosure is traded off against IPO price to the initial investors.
That tradeoff represents a process with some characteristics of a tacit
bargain between investors (at least some of the institutional ones) and
securities issuers (or their advisors). Boilerplate is important in such a
process because it serves as a substitute for specific disclosure and
costly information gathering. Whether it is true that issuers make a
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strategic choice to withhold information or willingly pay a price, or
whether investment bankers and lawyers make that choice for them,
the tradeoff between boilerplate and value lends support to the theory
developed in the contract boilerplate literature that cut-and-paste
language is the product of an implicit bargain and might therefore be
efficient in ways that are not salient in the data.
That possibility, if true, has implications for securities
regulation. The idea that this type of implicit bargain affects securities
disclosure is related to a broader debate in securities law about whether
disclosure should be mandated by the government or whether investors
and issuers should have more autonomy to decide what is disclosed. 192
To briefly outline this debate, those in favor of mandatory disclosure
posit that issuers are unlikely to disclose sufficient information without
being forced to do so. 19 3 This is true because the substantial internal
costs of producing disclosure will almost always be greater than the
94
amount of benefit the issuer will capture from such efforts.1 The costs
to the issuer arise not only as internal operational costs, such as the
fees to advisers and management's time costs, but also by divulging
sensitive information-for example by disclosing information that
allows a supplier to negotiate for higher prices or by revealing to
192. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International Money:
Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1855, 1878 (1997) (claiming that
differing national securities regimes across many countries give investors the best information
about issuers); Fox, supranote 101, at 1340-62 (arguing that government-mandated disclosure is
necessary); Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group
Formation:A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 928 (1994) ("As markets
have become more efficient, society's need to devote resources to support a statutory regime of
mandatory disclosure designed and enforced by the SEC has disappeared. Any information that
was supplied by the force of law now is supplied by the marketplace."); Roberta Romano,
Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2374
(1998) (arguing that the relationship between disclosure and share price creates powerful
incentives for issuers seeking new funds to disclose). Although many of the central works in this
debate come from the era before Dodd-Frank, the debate continues in a variety of contexts. See,
e.g., Kevin S. Haeberle & M. Todd Henderson, Making a Market for CorporateDisclosure, 35 YALE
J. ON REG. 383 (2018) (arguing that market forces, rather than government regulation, should be
allowed to determine what information issuers produce).
193. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failureand the Economic Casefor a Mandatory Disclosure
System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 745 (1984) (illustrating that in the municipal bond market, which is
exempt from SEC disclosure, critical information is not being disclosed to investors); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L.
REV. 669, 672-73 (1984) (arguing that mandatory disclosure might be the best of any alternative);
Fox, supranote 101, at 1361 (arguing that in a world where issuers choose their disclosure tactics,
investors "will not be as well informed as [they] would be if all issuers were compelled to disclose
at the higher level that some issuers choose voluntarily"); Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for
a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 6-8 (1983) (claiming that critics of
mandatory disclosure fail to take into account evidence that persuaded Congress in 1933 and 1934
concerning securities fraud and excessive underwriter compensation).
194. See Fox, supra note 101, at 1344-45 (illustrating via a graph that the cost to managers of
disclosing is higher than the benefits the company receives).
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competitors that barriers to entry in an industry are low. 19 5 These costs
will be greater to an issuing firm than any benefit the issuer captures.
However, such disclosures are socially optimal because society as a
whole does capture some benefits, making the overall cost-benefit
analysis favor disclosure that would not happen without regulation. 19 6
Proponents of allowing issuers freedom to disclose as they please
argue that markets are capable of forcing issuers to make adequate
disclosure more efficiently than government regulators. 197 The
rationale is that efficient markets readily reward issuers who disclose
information the market finds valuable and punish firms that do not. 198
Another variation on their argument is that a firm's decision to be fully
transparent is itself a signal of quality that will be rewarded in the
markets, while firms that do not disclose signal low quality and drive
investors away. 199 Thus, under most circumstances, firms will have
strong incentives to be transparent. This view of capital markets
regulation gives investors an important role: market-driven regulation
would only work if investors are savvy enough to reward firms that
disclose and punish firms that do not.
The analysis of boilerplate language supports both accounts but
also shows how they are incomplete. On the one hand, even mandatory
disclosure rules cannot ensure that issuers disclose information
completely. The use of boilerplate is evidence of the way in which
issuers can make disclosures that technically comply with regulations,
but fail to provide specific or probing information. On the other hand,
this means that issuers already have some choice about how much
disclosure to make under the mandatory regime (even if that choice is
limited).
Viewed through the lens of the securities disclosure debate,
boilerplate demonstrates that even mandating disclosure is not always
a complete solution-there are ways to comply without being
informative. But it also demonstrates that investors are capable of

195. Id. at 1345.
196. See id. at 1346 (arguing that as a result of interfirm costs, a manager will never choose
the socially optimal level of disclosure).
197. See Romano, supra note 192, at 2374-75 (arguing that information production in lessregulated European markets is no less efficient than the U.S. mandatory-disclosure regime).
198. See id. at 2374 ("Because firms need capital and investors need information, firms have
powerful incentives to disclose information if they are to compete successfully for funds against
alternative investment opportunities.").
199. See Stephen A. Ross, Disclosure Regulation in FinancialMarkets: Implications ofModern
Finance Theory and Signaling Theory, in ISSUES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 177, 183-93 (Franklin
R. Edwards ed., 1979) (describing signaling theory as the proposition that issuers who openly
choose to disclose news to the market will signal the company's quality, while investors will infer
from those that do not disclose that the company has lower worth).
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providing incentives for companies to disclose and garnering
compensation when disclosures are incomplete. It is less clear, however,
how well market mechanisms price vague disclosures. It is not possible
from the analysis above to disaggregate overall boilerplate levels from
specific boilerplate disclosures to know if there is a differential impact.
Doing so is an area ripe for further research.
B. Regulating Boilerplate
As the SEC tries to streamline disclosure, it walks a fine line
between regulating in a way that simplifies disclosure while also
preserving the value of disclosure's content. Members of the
Commission have expressed a willingness to decrease disclosure
requirements, emphasizing that more disclosure is not necessarily
better, 200 but investor groups are divided over which disclosures are
useful and which can be eliminated. 20 1 And despite the call for
streamlined disclosure rules, the SEC has repeatedly espoused the view
202
that "better disclosure is not at all synonymous with less disclosure."
This leaves the SEC in a difficult position as it attempts to regulate
disclosure. 203 Volume of disclosure is a problem, but investors want
more disclosure anyway.
The solution that the SEC proposes involves two basic
approaches: tailoring disclosures to the needs of different investor
groupS 204 and giving issuers more flexibility in choosing what to
disclose. 205 The SEC has also suggested that issuers should be allowed
200. See Keith F. Higgins, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Disclosure
Effectiveness: Remarks Before the American Bar Association Business Law Section 7 Spring
933 2
#.
Meeting (Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/SpeechlDetail/SpeecI13705414
to
Depict?
Complex
Too
Hu,
T.C.
Henry
also
see
VPUKkeFOecE [https://perma.cclUC3R-7G22];
Innovation, "Pure Information," and the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1652
(2012) (claiming that the volume of disclosures mandated by the SEC make them "very hard to
evaluate" given the large number of pages per filing).
201. See, e.g., Higgins, supra note 200 ('Tnvestors in different securities also might have
different needs.").
202. Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks Before the Nineteenth
Annual Conference of the Financial Analysts Federation (May 24, 1966) (emphasis omitted),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speechll966/052466cohen.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QME-9Y9D].
203. The paradox has been explored at length by Professor Roberta Karmel. See Karmel, supra
note 93, at 828 ("What may be considered 'disclosure overload' for one investor group could
simultaneously be regarded by another as insufficiently informative.").
204. See Kara M. Stein, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks to the Council of Institutional
Investors (May 8, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/speechl2014-spch05O8l4kms [https://perma.cc/
DV57-BYP6] ("But, with rapid shifts in technology, the rise of increasingly large and complex
businesses, and a growing understanding of our connection to each other and the planet, investors'
needs and expectations have changed.").
205. See Higgins, supra note 200 (positing whether "companies [should] have flexibility to
determine how they can convey information more effectively").
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to experiment with different manners of disclosure. 206 With respect to
both approaches, companies would be required to assess the materiality
of the information, since that is the standard by which liability for
securities fraud is assessed.20 7 The challenge with either approach is
that materiality is typically assessed from the point of view of the
"reasonable" investors, 208 which makes the standard amorphous and
sometimes difficult to apply ex ante. The amorphousness of the
standard is at least partly responsible for the problem of too much
disclosure-specially boilerplate disclosure-in the first place.
The market's reaction to past disclosures potentially provides
the SEC with an additional tool for navigating this thicket. The topics
uncovered by the topic model described in Part II provide a potential
guidepost for giving investors flexibility and allowing for tailored
disclosure, at least with regard to much of the boilerplate or pro forma
disclosure. This is because it reveals patterns in the boilerplate
disclosure that allow one to assess how useful or superfluous it really is
to market participants, assuming that discrete selections of boilerplate
can be useful even when an avalanche of such language is not.
Less useful types of disclosure that are frequently made using
rote boilerplate could be standardized and incorporated by reference to
a central website of generally applicable disclosures. It might also be
possible for the SEC to exempt such topics from the disclosure
requirements, although the Commission may be reluctant to exclude
them altogether given the cautious approach it usually takes with
respect to major changes. In any event, removing such language from
the main document would allow prospectus drafters to focus disclosure
on information that is more pertinent to the offering without losing any
information that they feel the generic text might provide, while also
allowing those who consume the text to focus on what is unique about
a company. The length of prospectuses could be reduced, and investors
who want to read the general disclosures would still have the ability to
do so.
To illustrate, I note that the most common substantive topics in
Appendix Table D fall into three broad categories. The first category
consists of topics that would seem to a human reader to be obvious,
generic, and convey little or no useful information. Even still, topics
from the first category persist despite regulation. For example, Risk
206. See id.
207. See 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2012) (stating that an untrue statement of a material fact is
considered securities fraud).
208. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (stating that a statement
or omission is material "if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would
consider it important").
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Factor Topic 1 (warnings that the issuer's new status as a public
company will entail new compliance and other costs) would apply to the
vast majority of IPO companies and does not offer useful information
relative to other similar investments. Nonetheless, most issuers include
this language, presumably out of caution. This conclusion is supported
by the fact that the prevalence of this topic increases linearly
throughout the time period covered in the data, despite the SEC's
regulations, whereas the appearances of many others ebb and flow in
sync with regulation. However, if such statements make the disclosure
documents less useful for conveying more pertinent information, then
it would be better for investors as well as issuers if the language could
be safely left out.
The same is true for other types of disclosures, including the risk
that a company may issue preferred stock in the future (Risk Factor
Topic 3), the possibility that an active trading market for the company
stock may not develop (Risk Factor Topic 8), and the fact that markets
are volatile and that volatility increases litigation risk (Risk Factor
Topic 12). These warnings are true for almost every company that goes
public, and would be obvious to most investors. Yet, their persistence in
the face of regulation suggests that issuers derive some value from
these obvious statements or are too risk averse to shed them.
Such language could easily be standardized and provided on a
central website. Issuers could incorporate these statements by
reference, or perhaps more simply, these statements could become
default disclosures unless issuers elected to vary them. In either case,
the issuers would be deemed to adopt the generic statements unless
they explicitly varied or disclaimed them.
The second category of topics laid out in Appendix Table D are
broad statements that may only apply to some companies. Examples
include statements about the risk that trade secrets might be obtained
by competitors (Risk Factor Topic 5 and Business Description Topic 1),
the risk that the company may have difficulty hiring and retaining
highly skilled employees (Risk Factor Topic 6), or risks related to
ownership concentration (Risk Factor Topic 7). This second category of
disclosures could also be standardized, and issuers could incorporate
them by reference. In addition, issuers would be encouraged to provide
any specific information beyond the standard disclosure if there is
anything material to add.
The third category of boilerplate contains general language
relating to certain types of business models (such as companies that
have large internet operations) or certain types of heavily regulated
industries (such as biotechnology or pharmaceuticals). Examples from
this category include issues related to government regulation by the
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FDA (Business Description Topic 2), foreign regulators (Risk Factor
Topic 4), or the level of competitiveness in the industry (Risk Factor
Topic 2 and Business Description Topic 11). This third category deals
with topics for which generic information is unlikely to apply broadly to
most companies, but is very important for certain sets of companies. It
may help for the SEC to know that such disclosures are routinely copied
when more thorough information might be warranted. It is these types
of disclosures that the SEC can focus on in reviewing prospectuses, for
example, or in formulating mandates for more thorough company
disclosure.
Perhaps as important, changes in boilerplate use provides
information about what the market perceives as important to the
reasonable investors, and how that changes over time. This would guide
regulators when trying to prune disclosure regulations that may no
longer be warranted but that have grown overly burdensome through
years of accretion. In addition, to the extent the SEC wants to eliminate
needless disclosures, analyzing the market impact (or lack thereof) of
certain boilerplate disclosures can guide the SEC on what to eliminate,
or at least where to begin asking market participants for input. 209
C. The Future of Boilerplate
Language processing techniques like those used in the analysis
above are becoming increasingly available in user-friendly formats.
Given that fact, concerns about boilerplate language may soon become
less important, because its presence will do less to hinder extraction of
information from disclosure. Whatever its limitations, the analysis
shows that boilerplate is likely persist in securities disclosure, and this
may have drawbacks for issuers and investors. However, the emergence
of computerized language processing as well as algorithmic trading and
advisory services provide an opportunity to leverage the positive
aspects of uniformity in disclosure. 2 10 The standardized nature of
boilerplate makes it especially well suited to detecting latent patterns
and signals that the presence or absence of tailoring provide. As text
analysis and machine-learning modalities become more commonplace,
user-friendly, and commercialized, boilerplate may in fact become
extremely useful for sophisticated and ordinary investors alike.
Investors who would ordinarily recoil at even the most detailed and

209. This analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, but is the subject of future work.
210. See Tom C.W. Lin, Reasonable Investor(s), 95 B.U. L. REV. 461, 508-09 (2015) (arguing
that the reasonable-investor standard is antiquated in the age of algorithmic trading).
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thorough disclosure would have access to a digest of the information in
even the driest boilerplate-filled prospectus.
To illustrate, it may be possible to learn specific information
about companies from the boilerplate they use by comparing the
company's boilerplate to that of other companies using the same
language. For example, it may be the case that a risk factor about the
inability of a company to deal with cyber-security issues conveys
information that makes pricing more difficult because such boilerplate
language provides no information regarding the specific problems a
company faces. However, it may be the case that the presence of the
risk factor by itself provides a signal about the company's challenges
which, when compared with other companies using the same language,
could provide meaningful information.
The precise way in which this might work is an area for further
research, but in any event, boilerplate may be a less significant problem
if an algorithm is distilling the text to its most important elements.
These tools have the potential to help even relatively unsophisticated
investors. Even in the absence of boilerplate, most securities disclosure
is too complex for an investor with no finance or accounting training to
digest meaningfully. Even the SEC has recognized that creating
disclosure that is universally digestible by all investors is not realistic
and should not be a goal of disclosure reform. 211 However, mechanical
text processing tools can help to distill these complex documents and
easily compare them to other similar disclosures in the market.
Boilerplate would facilitate this process, and thus may ironically help
average investors more than it harms them. Although few investors
have access to complex machine-learning tools, that is likely to
change. 212
CONCLUSION

Boilerplate is ubiquitous in securities disclosure, and the
evidence from this Article shows that its value is different from what
might be assumed. Although it may not be efficient in the aggregate, it
211. See Higgins, supra note 200 ("while an individual investor may feel overloaded-and a
bit overwhelmed-with information in a periodic report, other investors have said there is not a
'part of the disclosure pie that goes uneaten.' ").
212. For instance, products are widely marketed to help lawyers assess the ambiguity and
readability of complex documents. See, e.g., INTELLIGIZE, www.intelligize.com/products/
transactions (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) [https://perma.ccLUV8E-DBJK] (describing a product that
compares SEC filings to look for significant deviations from the norm); LEXCHECK,
http://www.lexcheck.com/#precisedocuments (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
V5WX-EMKM] (describing a product for the legal market that uses natural language processing
and machine learning to look for ambiguous language and poor drafting in contracts).
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might perform a useful function by allowing issuing companies (and
their advisers) to choose the specificity of the disclosures they make,
while remaining in compliance with the SEC's regulations. Issuers may
pay a price for using too much boilerplate disclosure, but this tradeoff
can be seen as the result of a larger bargain with investors, in which
issuers may find the price for vague disclosure worth paying. It remains
an open question whether issuers are making this tradeoff wittingly or
not. Nonetheless, boilerplate's role helps to explain its persistence. But
the fact that boilerplate is here to stay may not be such a bad thing in
the context of securities disclosure. Given that automated analysis of
documents is becoming more commonplace and accessible, boilerplate
might prove especially useful. Its standardized nature might ironically
make it easier to digest than other kinds of disclosure, facilitating
comparisons among deals and providing signals about what
information is vague, what information is specific, and what
information is important to investors. Thus, boilerplate can fit well into
the SEC's disclosure reforms if it is able to leverage investors'
preferences to better tailor disclosure mandates.
The results in this Article provide support for the conclusion that
boilerplate-defined as language that is copied from one deal to the
next-is related to information asymmetry and may obscure
information in the aggregate. This reality appears to have become part
of the fabric of the securities marketplace. The fact that the presence or
absence of standardized language can be predictive of informativeness
is useful nonetheless. If such signals can be readily interpreted by
mechanical processes, boilerplate can communicate something by its
presence, if not by its content. Thus, despite its potential to obscure, it
is a source of information that should not be overlooked when regulators
reconsider disclosure laws.
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SUMMARY STATISTICS

Deal Proceeds ($)
Company
Assets (S)
Company Age
(years)

Mean
(1)
107,000,000

Median
(2)
60,000,000

539,758,000

134,398,00
0

12

7

25th
percentile
(3)
34,100,000

75th
percentile
(4)
102,000,000

2,751

56,936,000

358,865,000

2,751

<1

N

157

2,751

Legal Fees ($)

850,604

596,098

350,000

1,200,000

2,743

Prospectus Length
(words)

101,725

71,266

45,766

100,473

2,751

5

10

2,751

84%

76%

91%

2,751

47%

42%

35%

57%

2,617

Risk Factors
Similarity (%)

32%

32%

23%

41%

2,617

Use of Proceeds
Similarity (%)

23%

23%

17%

29%

2,617

MD&A Similarity

34%

35%

27%

42%

2,617

Business
Description
Similarity (%)

15%

13%

9%

17%

2,617

Overall Gunning
Fog Score

17.9

16.8

13.6

19.9

2,751

Risk Factors
Gunning Fog Score

18.1

17.3

16.3

18.6

2,751

Use of Proceeds
Gunning Fog Score

15

14.7

13.2

18.6

2,751

MD&A Gunning
Fog Score

15.9

15.0

13.6

16.7

2,751

Business
Description
Gunning Fog Score

17.1

16.5

14.7

19.4

2,751

S-1 Amendments
(number)

7.6

Amount of

84%

Overall Prospectus
Similarity (%)

7

Prospectus
Amended (%)

(%)
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APPENDIX TABLE A: LEGAL FEES, ACCOUNTING FEES,
UNDERWRITER DISCOUNT, TRANSACTION TIMING,
AND BOILERPLATE

(2)
(1)
Panel A:Total Legal Fees for All Counsel (natural log)
Overall Similarity
-0.33**
-0.35**
(0.15)
(0.16)

Gross Proceeds (log)

0.22***
(0.03)

0.67
2,617

Gross Proceeds (log)

0.17***
(0.04)
0.60
2,600

Adj. R2
Number of
Observations
Panel C: Total Underwriting Spread (percent)
Overall Similarity
0.08
(0.18)
Gross Proceeds (log)

0.19***
(0.04)

Adj. R2
0.35
Number of
2,601
Observations
Panel D: Time to Completion (number of days)
Overall Similarity
-1.39
(22.80)
Gross Proceeds (log)
Adj. R2
Number of
Observations
Industry * Year FE
Bank FE
Auditor FE
Law Firm Market
Share

$42,000 to
$84,000 lower
fees

0.23***
(0.03)

Adj. R2
0.66
Number of
2,617
Observations
Panel B: Total Accounting Fees (natural log)
Overall Similarity
-0.19
(0.19)
0.16***
(0.03)
0.58
2,612

Change per
10% Change in
Similarity
(Antilog * 0.1*
Average Fees)
(3)

-0.10
(0.21)

0.20
(0.15)
0.26***
(0.03)
0.36
2,601

-0.65
(25.35)

-10.72***
(2.79)
0.11
2,616

-8.62**
(4.04)
0.22
2,616

X
X

X
X
X
X

Controls include deal proceeds (log) and fixed effects for each lead
underwriting bank, the IPO year and industry, and the interaction of these
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two sets. The second specification for each analysis includes a fixed effect for
the issuer's auditor, as well a control for the dollar market share of the
issuer's law firm in the IPO market. Additional controls for the issuer age
(log), issuer total assets (log), venture capital involvement, and prospectus
wordcount (log) are included for all specifications but not tabulated. Robust
standard errors reported in parentheses. Estimates marked with *, **, and
are statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.

APPENDIX TABLE

B: LAWYER DEALS AND BOILERPLATE

Dependent Variable: Change in Boilerplate for Each
Additional Deal by Law Firm in Relevant Time Period
(2)
(1)

Number of Deals in
the Past Year

(3)

0.002**
(0.001)

Number of Deals in

0.001

the Past Two Years

(0.001)

Number of Deals in

0.000

the Past Three
Years
Industry FE

(0.001)
X

X

X

IPO Year FE
Industry * Year FE

X
X

X
X

X
X

Adj. R2
Number of
Observations

0.35
2,605

0.35
2,605

0.34
2,605

Controls include fixed effects for the IPO year and industry and the
interaction of these two sets. Additional controls for the deal proceeds (log),
the issuer age (log), venture capital involvement, syndicate size, and
prospectus wordcount (log) are included for all specifications but not
tabulated. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Estimates
marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level respectively.

280

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX TABLE

[Vol. 72:1:191

C: AMENDMENTS, AMENDED TEXT, AND SEC
COMMENTS

Panel A. Number of Amendments (log)
(1)
Overall Similarity
-0.47
(0.67)
Gross Proceeds (log)
0.39***
(0.11)
Adj. R2
0.20
Number of
2,549
Observations
Panel B: Amount of Text Amended (percent)
Overall Similarity
-0.004
(0.02)
Gross Proceeds (log)
0.004*
(0.00)
Adj. R2
0.12
Number of
2,551
Observations
Panel C: Quantity of SEC Comments (log)
Overall Similarity
-0.745
(0.91)
Gross Proceeds (log)
0.02
(0.95)
Adj. R2
0.15
Number of
804
Observations
Industry FE
X
IPO Year FE
X
Industry * Year FE
X
Bank FE
X
Law Firm FE

(2)
-0.45
(0.68)
0.35**
(0.13)
0.25
2,549

-0.02
(0.02)
0.01
(0.00)
0.11
2,551

0.03
(0.09)
-0.70
(1.25)
0.30
804
X
X
X
X

Controls include deal gross proceeds (log), fixed effects for each lead
underwriting bank, the IPO year and industry, and the interaction of these
two sets. Fixed effects for each issuer law firm are included in the second
specification. Additional controls for issuer age (log), issuer total assets (log),
and prospectus wordcount (log) are included for all specifications but not
tabulated. Untabulated analysis for individual Risk Factors, MD&A, Use of
Proceeds, and Business sections were not statistically significant. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses Estimates marked with *, **,
and *** are statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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APPENDIX TABLE D: BOILERPLATE TOPICS FOR EACH
PROSPECTUS SECTION
Topic
Number

Business
Description

Use of
Proceeds
Statements that the
company's
financials must rely
on estimates/
assumptions/
historical
experience
Statements that the
company's systems
are being updated
for cybersecurity/
new technology
needs

The company relies
on proprietary
rights, which
unauthorized
parties may obtain

The company may
issue preferred
stock in the future
that will impact the
rights of common
stock

Recitations
regarding financial
instruments and
guarantees

None of the
company's
employees are
covered by
collective
bargaining
agreements

Government
regulation may
impair the
company's
revenues/ability to
raise new money!
ability to obtain
licenses/limit

Statements that
financial data in the
section is derived
from audited]
unaudited financial
statements

The company is
involved in legal
proceedings from
time to time in the
ordinary course of
business

Possible loss of
proprietary
rights/trade secrets

Recitations
regarding
derivative
instruments and
bedging activities
Recitations
regarding
variable interest
entities/exit
disposal activities:
Fin 46; SFA 146
Statements
regarding software
capitalization costs

No current legal
proceedings but
one may arise in
the ordinary course
of business
The company has
never experienced
work stoppages/
employee relations
are good

1

Purpose of the
offering is to
increase available
working capital

Being a public
company will incur
significantly greater
legallaccounting/
compliance
expenses

2

Purpose of the
offering is to
create a public
market in the
company's
stock/increase its

It may be difficult
to compete with
more established
competitors
competitors have
longer histories and

visibility

more resources

Amounts and
timing of actual
uses depend on
numerous factors
such as the
company's
marketing/

3

The company's
products require
FDA or foreign
regulatory
approval and/or
clinical trials

research/revenues
4

Framing
language: the
company
estimates an
amount of net
proceeds based on
assumed IPO
price
________expansion

5

6

7

8

Management/the
Board of
Directors retains
broad discretion
to spend proceeds
Pending other
uses, the proceeds
will be invested
in short term
interest-bearing
securities
Proceeds may be
invested in
complementary
business or
technologies
Purpose of the
offering is to

Difficulty finding
and retaining
skilled employees

Concentration of
ownership/owner
lockup agreements
will expire and
sales will cause
price to decline
An active market
for the shares may

Framing lan
regarding

Statement that
historical results
are not necessarily
indicative of future
periods
on may be
ry to
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attract employees
and facilitate
future access to
the capital
markets

not develop, making
the shares less
valuable and hard
to trade

9

The Board has
discretion
applying proceeds

Management may
issue more shares
in the future,
causing dilution

10

Proceeds will be
invested in
income-producing
investments

The company has
never, and may
never, declare
dividends

11

Proceeds will be
used to redeem
preferred
stock/repay
promissory notes
issued by the

Antitakeover
provisions/
ownership structure
may deter changes
in control

income/revenue and
expenses from
administration,
depreciation,
amortization, and
operations
Recitations
regarding income
tax accounting
uncertainty
Language regarding
year-on-year
comparisons,
interest income,
and expense
Recitations
regarding
accounting
impairment for
disposal of long
lived assets

[Vol. 72:1:191
enforce the
company's
intellectual
property rights/
trade secrets
Litigation could
result in costs/take
management
resources/adversely
affect operations
Litigation could be
expensive and
might not succeed

General statement
that there is
significant
competition in the
industry

founders

12

Pending other
uses, proceeds
will be invested
in U.S.
government
securities

Market price could
decline/the
company could be
subject to class
action if prices are
volatile

Statement that
accounting
impairment wil
have no material
impact on the
company
Sttmagreemens

The company relies
on trademarks,
copyright laws,
trade secrets, and
uses contractual
restrictions and
nondisclosure
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APPENDIX TABLE

E: BID-ASK SPREADS AND BOILERPLATE

Overall Similarity

Adj.

R2

Number of
Observations
Rf Similarity
Adj. R 2
Number of
Observations
UP Similarity
Adj. R2
Number of
Observations
MD&A Similarity
Adj. R2
Number of
Observations
Business
Similarity
Adj. R2
Number of
Observations
Industry FE
Year FE
Industry * Year FE
Bank FE

Bid-Ask
Spread on
the First
Day of
Trading
(1)
0.04
(0.02)

Change in
Bid-Ask
Spread
After
Thirty
Trading
Days
(2)
-0.07
(0.05)

Change in
Bid-Ask
Spread
After Sixty
Trading
Days
(3)
-0.02
(0.04)

0.15

0.12

0.33

2,380

2,263

1,971

0.15***
(0.03)
0.16
2,464

-0.11**
(0.04)
0.12
2,342

-0.10**
(0.04)
0.15
2,305

0.15***
(0.03)
0.15
2,464

- 0.81*
(0.04)
0.12
2,342

- 0.06
(0.05)
0.15
2,305

0.10***
(0.03)
0.50
2,455

- 0.25
(0.04)
0.11
2,322

-0.003
(0.04)
0.15
2,296

0.10***
(0.03)
0.15
2,459

- 0.79*
(0.04)
0.12
2,337

-0.07*
(0.04)
0.15
2,300

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

The Table shows results of an OLS regression in which the average bid-ask
spread on the first day of trading (column 1), after thirty days of trading
(column 2) and after 60 days of trading (column 3) is the dependent variable
and boilerplate is the independent variable. Controls include fixed effects for
each lead underwriting bank, the IPO year and industry, and the interaction
of these two sets. Additional controls for the issuer age (log), issuer size total
assets (log), venture capital involvement, volatility and turnover (as turnover
on the first day of trading for the specification in column one, and average
daily turnover for the 30 and 60 days post offering date for the specifications
in columns two and three) are included for all specifications but not
tabulated. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Estimates
marked with *, ** and *** are statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1%

level respectively.
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EXPLANATORY NOTE FOR APPENDIX TABLES F1 AND F2

The following analysis uses propensity score matching to
address the possibility that firms that self-selected to provide more
boilerplate and less specific disclosure differed systematically from a
control sample of firms that used less boilerplate and more specific
disclosure in a way that drove the results in the regression analysis.
Propensity score matching attempts to simulate an experiment by using
characteristics to match issuers in a "treatment" sample to the most
similarly situated issuers in a "control" sample in the data. The match
is performed using issuers' observable characteristics that should in
theory be similar with respect to unobservable qualities.
To create a propensity score matching sample, the first step is to
determine which variables predict treatment. Treatment here is
defined as greater use of boilerplate. Although boilerplate in this Article
is a continuous variable, I construct an indicator treatment variable
using the 25th percentile measure for the level of the boilerplate for
each section of the disclosure to separate "high" boilerplate from "low"
boilerplate issuers. For example, 23% boilerplate in a disclosure is the
25th percentile for boilerplate in the Risk Factors section, meaning that
this level and above is used as the treatment group in Appendix Table
E. The first step determines which variables predict that a firm will use
more boilerplate. The second step compares the treatment firms with
the matched sample. The analysis matches each treatment observation
to one or more control observations that are similar along a number of
covariates that are likely proxies for unobserved qualities of an issuer
that would give rise to more or less boilerplate, all else equal. I generate
a propensity score, and thus match observations, by estimating a
logistic regression on the following covariates: (1) an indicator for
industry category, based on two digit SIC industry categories; (2) the
log of deal gross proceeds; (3) log of total assets; (4) book-to-market
ratio; (5) log of the company age; (6) an indicator for the involvement of
venture capital investors pre-IPO; (7) the dollar market share of each
lead underwriter; (8) the return on assets ("ROA") for the year
preceding the IPO; (9) the log of research and development
expenditures for the year preceding the IPO; (10) earnings before
interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization ("EBITDA") for the year
preceding the IPO (normalized); 213 (11) total revenues for the year
preceding the IPO (normalized); (12) an indicator for whether the

213. For financial data that cannot be normalized using a log transformation (i.e., because it
takes both positive and negative values), the variable is normalized by taking its cube root.
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company is a technology company; (13) an indicator for whether the
company is in an industry that historically draws greater than average
litigation; and (14) the offering date of the deal.

APPENDIX TABLE Fl: COVARIATE MEANS AND VARIANCES FOR
RAW AND MATCHED SAMPLES

1Panel B: Treatment = MD&A

Panel A: Treatment = Risk Factors Boilerplate> 0.23
(1)

(2)

Standardized differences

(3)

(4)

Variance Ratio

Boilerplate > 0.27
(5)

(6)

Standardized differences

(7)

(8)

Variance Ratio

Raw
-0.4280

Matched
-0.1033

Raw
0.5776

Matched
0.6895

Raw
-0.3844

Matched
-0.0166

Raw
0.4099

Matched
0.5746

Venture Capital
Involvement

0.0102

-0.0212

0.9847

1.0359

0.2452

-0.0253

0.6828

1.0385

Total Assets
(log)

-0.3739

-0.0822

0.6294

0.6927

-0.4514

-0.0434

0.4669

0.6039

Gross Proceeds
(log)

Book to Market

0.1957

-0.0658

0.2676

0.8072

-0.0256

0.0414

0.7399

1.2389

Offering Date

-0.3700

-0.0683

1.7190

1.6739

-0.2787

0.1044

1.1988

1.4201

Industry
Category

-0.0798

0.0358

0.7822

0.8555

-0.0058

-0.0596

0.6649

0.7180

Company Age
(log)

0.0412

-0.0079

0.8113

0.8920

0.0260

0.0373

0.6569

0.7957

Underwriter
Market Share

0.0235

-0.1589

1.3440

0.60724

-0.0299

0.0597

0.7695

0.8852

Return on
Assets

0.0072

0.0071

0.6810

1.1034

0.0254

0.0223

0.7002

0.8157

EBITDA
(standardized)

-0.2696

-0.0255

0.6267

0.7680

-0.4150

0.0015

0.6682

0.8042

Tech Company
Indicator

0.3837

0.0511

1.0741

1.0108

0.6358

0.0591

1.0385

1.0093

R&D Expenses
(log)

-0.1790

-0.0456

1.8058

1.0500

-0.1466

-0.0493

1.3189

0.9747

Total Revenues
(standardized)

-0.3503

-0.0680

0.4012

0.5541

-0.4017

0.0275

0.4718

0.7763

Panel C: Treatment =Use of Proceeds Boilerplate > 0.17

Gross Proceeds
(log)

(2)
(1)
Standardized differences
Matched
Raw
-0.0376
-0.7583

(4)
(3)
Variance Ratio
Matched
Raw
0.4564
0.4109

Panel D: Treatment = Business
Description Boilerplate > 0.09
(5)

(6)

Standardized differences
Matched
Raw
0.0339
-0.0482

(7)

(8)

Variance Ratio
Matched
Raw
0.9251
0.9075

Venture Capital
Involvement

0.3414

0.0691

0.6209

0.9189

-0.1960

0.0488

1.2979

0.9373

Total Assets
(log)

-0.9162

-0.0402

0.5703

0.5379

-0.0220

0.0179

0.8439

0.8882

Book to Market

-0.1528

0.0341

0.5267

0.7004

-0.1057

-0.0548

1.1470

1.1146

Offering Date

-0.4989

-0.0316

1.8866

1.4025

-0.4210

-0.0139

1.1125

1.0992
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Industry
Category

-0.2260

0.081 6

0.8483

1.2716

0.2361

-0.0010

0.9345

1.0014

Company Age
(log)

-0.2868

-0.102 2

0.5160

0.7814

-0.0447

-0.0845

1.2581

1.3091

Underwriter
Market Share

-0.0166

-0.057 3

0.6799

0.3463

-0.1060

0.0507

0.5058

0.8779

Return on
Assets

-0.1016

0.012 3

9.0650

3.8129

0.1104

0.0467

0.1782

0.2969

EBITDA
(standardized)

-0.9846

-0.077 4

0.7934

0.8093

-0.0924

0.0674

0.9646

1.0020

Tech Company
Indicator

0.7753

0.016 3

1.3085

1.0031

0.1323

-0.0295

1.0174

0.9954

R&D Expenses
(log)

-0.1373

-0.099 9

2.1645

1.9391

0.0149

0.0709

0.8555

0.6701

Total Revenues
(standardized)

-0.9036

-0.077 7

0.3508

0.6149

-0.1293

0.0096

0.6824

0.8614

Panel E: Treatment = Entire Document Boilerplate > 0.33
(1)

(2)

Standardized differences

(3)

(4)

Variance Ratio

Raw
0.3118

Matched
0.1979

Raw
1.3071

Matched

Venture Capital
Involvement

0.1348

0.2866

0.8245

0.7476

Total Assets
(0g)

0.3848

0.2305

0.9619

0.5903

Book to Market

0.0103

0.1249

2.1275

2.0749

Offering Date

1.5408

-0.1981

0.7968

0.7291

Industry
Category

-0.0674

0.0561

1.1065

1.2199

Company Age
(log)

0.3357

0.0647

1.0276

1.6458

Underwriter
Market Share

0.0696

0.0217

1.3591

1.7715

Return on
Assets

0.1079

0.1759

0.0930

0.2271

EBITDA
(standardized)

0.5795

0.3710

1.0344

0.6458

Tech Company
Indicator

-0.0300

0.1017

0.9948

0.9991

R&D Expenses
(log)

0.2905

-0.0619

0.3361

1.1395

Total Revenues
(standardized)

0.4115

0.0889

1.2373

0.6209

Gross Proceeds
(log)

0.8976

In an alternative, unreported specification, I use two-digit North
American Industry Classification System codes to match industries and
obtain consistent results. For all specifications, I force an exact match
for industry category and use a running day-count variable to match on
offering date. In a further alternative but unreported specification, I

2019]

BOILERPLATE'S IMPACT

289

force exact matches for industry and IPO year, instead of matching on
the continuous offering date variable. This specification results in
consistent estimates as well, although it is less theoretically justifiable
since there is no reason to assume that an IPO at the end of one year is
meaningfully different than one at the beginning of the following year.
The soundness of a propensity score matching method to
estimate treatment effects depends upon the extent to which the control
and treatment groups are balanced with respect to covariates. Balance
indicates that the control and treatment groups would likely experience
the same outcomes in the absence of treatment. To ensure validity of
matching estimator, I analyze the covariate balance in two ways: by
examining the matched sample means and by plotting the sample
propensity score densities.
Appendix Table F1 compares covariate means between the raw
and matched samples for the five different text selections from which
treatment and control groups are constructed. Columns one, two, five,
and six of the Table show that the specification leads to good balance on
the covariates, given that the differences in standardized means of the
matched sample is small to negligible; the differences in means of the
raw samples are larger for most covariates. It also shows, in columns
four and eight, that the variance ratios of the matched treatment and
control sample are relatively close to one.
In addition, I visually compare the distribution of the propensity
score for the given covariates for each of the five different types of
treatment (i.e., greater than median boilerplate in the five text
selections studied) before and after matching on the covariates.
Appendix Figure 3 shows this distribution before and after matching.
The similarity in the density of the two propensity scores after matching
suggests that the two groups are balanced with respect to the
propensity score.
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APPENDIX FIGURE 3: BALANCE PLOTS OF DISTRIBUTION OF
COVARIATES BEFORE AND AFTER MATCHING
Balance Plot - Business Description
= Business Description Boilrphe > 9%

Balance Plot - Use of Proceeds
Treatenent Use of Proceeds Boerplate > 17%

Treatment

untced

Raw

2

A

Propensity Se_
- control

-

re

Balance Plot - MD&A Boilerplate
Treatment

A

A

A

Balance Plot - Risk Factor Boilerplate

MD&A Boilerptle > 27%

Re

12

Propenity Score
n

Treatment = Risk Factor Bolerpinte > 23%

Matched

Ran

Msetusse

a-_

0

315I0
-

Propensity Score
control

.5

Propensty Sore

treated

-- - onrtrol -treate

Balance Plot - Entire Document
Treatment Entire Document Boferplate > 35%

Propernity Son
--mrkol

-

eatd

Propensity Score Balance Tests. In both left and right panels, the density of
propensity scores is plotted for treatment groups (solid lines) and control
groups (dashed lines), comparing the raw controls with the propensity-score
matched observations.

As shown below, the consistency of the coefficient estimates in
significance and magnitude strongly suggests that the results in the
text are not driven by spurious variation in covariate balance.
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Appendix Table E2 shows that the treatment effects on the
outcomes of interest remain consistent with the regression analysis
described in detail in the text. The analysis here employs propensityscore matching, and estimates the average treatment effect for the
issuers with high boilerplate disclosure (defined as above median
boilerplate for each section) by propensity score matching them with
issuers with relatively lower levels of boilerplate that are comparable
with regard to important characteristics. Z-scores based on robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses.
APPENDIX TABLE
Average
Treatment Effect
for:
Overall
Similarity
Number of
Observations
Rf Similarity
Number of
Observations
UP Similarity
Number of
Observations
MD&A
Similarity
Number of
Observations
Business
Similarity
Number of
Observations

F2: AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECTS

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Underpricing

Price Revision

U
Litigation

Analyst
Dispersion

Bid-Ask
Spread

0.013
(0.57)
1,847

0.041*
(1.86)
2,317

0.046
(0.75)
1,923

-0.019
(-0.94)
1,907

-0.005
(-0.79)
2,271

0. 106**
(2.81)

0.060**
(2.40)

0.076**
(2.34)

0.173***
(4.22)

0.017*
(1.79)

2,305

2,314

1,904

2,252

0.110***
(3.54)

0.027*
(1.92)

0.042
(1.22)

0.002
(0.31)

2,291

1,890

2,229

2,277
0.092*
(2.34)
2,300

2,282

0.161***
(8.47)
2,277

0.075**
(2.86)
2,305

0.12***
(3.58)
2,126

0.080**
(2.06)
1,890

0.007
(0.19)
2,109

-0.052**
(-1.99)
2,118

-0.004
(-0.16)
2,124

0.011
(0.37)
1,826

0.015**
(2.33)
2,229
-0.002
(-0.12)
2,065

Z-scores based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Estimates marked with *, ** and *** are statistically significant at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level respectively.

The results with respect to Risk Factors and MD&A sections are
consistent with the OLS analysis and significant at the 10% level or
better, with the exception of the relationship between MD&A
boilerplate and class action litigation, which does not give a statistically
significant result. Boilerplate in the Use of Proceeds section also yields
a positive and statistically significant result (at the 10% level or better)
for the underpricing, price revision and litigation dependent variables.
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With respect to the Business Description section, boilerplate continues
to bear a statistically significant relationship only to upward price
revision, and the relationship is negative. With respect to the entire
document, boilerplate bears a significant and positive relationship to
upward price revision. For Risk Factors, MD&A, and, to a large degree,
Use of Proceeds, the results here support those obtained in the
regression analysis in the main text, while the results for the entire
document and the Business Description section are inconclusive.
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APPENDIX TABLE

G: GUNNING

FOG INDEX AND BOILERPLATE

Gunning Fog
Score

(1)

(2)

Overall Gunning
Boilerplate

6.90*
(3.00)

6.57*
(3.02)

Gross Proceeds (log)
Adj. R2

0.12***
(0.04)
0.21

0.08
(0.05)
0.30

Risk Factor
Boilerplate

1.32**
(0.43)

1.00*
(0.50)

Gross Proceeds (log)

0.23***
(0.04)

-0.02
(0.04)

Adj. R2
Use of Proceeds

0.471
-1.08

0.57
-1.55t

Boilerplate

(0.72)

(0.82)

Gross Proceeds (log)

-0.08***
(0.04)
0.10

-0.23***
(0.05)
0.20

Adj. R 2

MD&A Boilerplate

6.52*

7.95**

(2.93)

(3.22)

-0.28***
(0.03)
0.22

-0.13***
(0.03)
0.41

Business Boilerplate

0.84*
(0.37)

0.99*
(0.41)

Gross Proceeds (log)

-0.01
(0.18)
0.09
X
X
X
X

-0.02
(0.03)
0.20
X
X
X
X
X
2,451

Gross Proceeds (log)
2
Adj. R

Adj. R2
Industry FE
Year FE
Industry * Year FE
Law Firm FE
Bank FE
Number of

2,451

Observations
Controls include deal proceeds (log) and fixed effects for each lead
underwriting bank, the issuer's law firm, the IPO year and industry, and the
interaction of these two sets. Additional controls for issuer age (log), issuer
total assets (log), and prospectus wordcount (log) are included for all
specifications but not tabulated. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Estimates marked with t, *, ** and *** are statistically significant at the
10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level respectively.
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APPENDIX TABLE H: REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF
BOILERPLATE PHRASES
[] If Form filed register additional securities offering pursuant Rule b Securities Act please
check following box list Securities Act registration statement number earlier effective
registration statement offering
If Form posteffective amendment filed pursuant Rule c Securities Act check following box list
Securities Act registration statement number earlier effective registration statement offering
That purpose determining liability Securities Act posteffective amendment shall deemed new
registration statement relating securities offered therein offering securities time shall deemed
initial bona fide offering thereof
The registrant hereby amends Registration Statement date dates may necessary delay
effective date registrant shall file amendment specifically states Registration Statement shall
thereafter become effective accordance Section a Securities Act Registration Statement shall
become effective date Commission acting pursuant said Section a may determine
The underwriters initially propose offer shares common stock part directly public initial
public offering price set forth cover page prospectus part certain dealers including
underwriters price less concession excess per share
This table read conjunction financial statements notes thereto included elsewhere Prospectus
Managements Discussion Analysis Financial Condition Results Operations"
SELECTED CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL DATA The following selected consolidated
financial data read conjunction Company\s Consolidated Financial Statements Notes thereto
"Management\s Discussion Analysis Financial Condition Results Operations" included
elsewhere herein
This Prospectus forms part Registration Statement contain information set forth Registration
Statement exhibits schedules thereto
THIS PROSPECTUS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFER TO SELL OR SOLICITATION
OF AN OFFER TO BUY ANY SECURITY OTHER THAN THE SHARES OF COMMON
STOCK OFFERED HEREBY NOR DOES IT CONSTITUTE AN OFFER TO SELL OR
SOLICITATION OF ANY OFFER TO BUY ANY OF THE SECURITIES OFFERED HEREBY
TO ANY PERSON IN ANY JURISDICTION IN WHICH IT IS UNLAWFUL TO MAKE
SUCH AN OFFER OR SOLICITATION
This Prospectus contains forwardlooking statements involve risks uncertainties
The Company intends furnish stockholders annual reports containing audited financial
statements reported independent auditors quarterly reports first three quarters fiscal year
containing unaudited interim financial statements
The following summary information qualified entirety detailed information including "Risk
Factors" Company\s Consolidated Financial Statements Notes thereto appearing elsewhere
Prospectus

L] CALCULATION OF REGISTRATION FEE PROPOSED PROPOSED TITLE OF EACH
CLASS OF MAXIMUM MAXIMUM SECURITIES AMOUNT TO OFFERING PRICE
AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF TO BE REGISTERED BE REGISTERED PER SECURITY
OFFERING PRICE REGISTRATION FEE Common Stock $ par value
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For six months ended June net cash used operating activities $ million
It currently estimated initial public offering price Common Stock $ $ per share
$

As of June the Company had cash and cash equivalents of $ million and working capital of
million

In opinion financial statement schedule considered relation basic financial statements taken
whole presents fairly material respects information set forth therein
This represents immediate increase net tangible book value $ per share Common Stock
current holders Common Stock immediate dilution approximately $ per share new investors
purchasing shares Offering
The results operations interim periods necessarily indicative results expected future periods
Net Loss Per Common Share Net loss per common share computed using weighted average
number common shares outstanding year

